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The problem of speaking about God arises from the claim that God is utterly 
transcendent and is ‘wholly other’ from human or this-worldly existence. Another 
challenge is the profound sense of mystery that surrounds God’s being. In traditional 
theology, the response opted by some is to keep silent. This would seem to have been 
the position of the early Wittgenstein who famously declares, ‘What we cannot speak 
about we must pass over in silence.’ 
In this study, I take a different position by contending that it is still possible to 
speak about God—that he is not beyond language. My argument, however, is that 
although we may speak about God, our language cannot be pressed to yield precise 
definitions or complete explanations of the divine. So, while language about God can 
and does open up previously shrouded pathways leading us to know (more) about 
God, the sheer incommensurability between divine transcendence and its possible 
expression should leave us with ambiguities and gaps in our understanding. 
My argument is wedged between two extreme understandings of religious 
language. On the one hand, there is the tendency to regard religious statements as 
having no factual content, or at best, as expressing moral or ethical intentions to 
follow a certain way of life. The consequence of this is that speech about God is 
rendered empty or even inauthentic, giving rise to scepticism. In contrast to this 
approach, however, is the tendency to assume that words are perfectly fitted to give 
believers precise explanations and render God (or, indeed, reality as a whole) 
completely intelligible. The consequence of the latter tendency is absolutism or 
idolatry. 
In support of my case, I will explore the philosophy of Wittgenstein and 
appropriate his insights to shed light on the nature of language and its use. Many of 
his notions, such as ‘meaning-as-use’, ‘language-games’, ‘form(s)-of-life’, and the 
‘private-language-argument’ will be discussed. What will be stressed is 
Wittgenstein’s overall view that language is not merely a system of signs for stating 
facts or making truth-claims—even about God—but that the speaking of language is 
grounded in the setting of everyday life. Meaning, in a large class of cases, is bound 
up with ‘use’: what a word or statement actually means depends on how it is used in 
relation to the conventions, practices and needs of a given community. I will also seek 
to learn from George Lindbeck, a theologian whose postliberal theology was inspired 
by Wittgenstein and who has sought to maintain a balance between two not 
dissimilar poles of conceiving the use of religious language, namely, the ‘cognitive-
propositional’ and the ‘experiential-expressive’ theories of religion. 
The conception of language I am concerned to advance here, however, does not 
deny the possibility of truth, and it does not imply that ‘anything goes’. The question 
of truth will be included in the discussion.  
Other than attempting to navigate a via media between scepticism and 
absolutism, my approach can also veer us toward a better appreciation of the proper 
role of language in speaking about God, and to an understanding of religion that is 
much more than that of being fixated with inquiring into or explaining about ‘how 






Even with widespread unbelief and indifference towards religious concerns in 
contemporary society, God continues to be habitually spoken of. God is addressed in 
prayers, reflected upon in religious discourses, and featured in scriptures, creeds, 
sermons, and liturgies. In all this diversity, the presupposition is that it is possible to 
say some things about the divine reality by means of language. 
A polarisation of views regarding the religious use of language has divided modern 
theology. On one pole, there is a tendency to treat religious statements as having no 
factual content, or at best, as expressing moral or ethical intentions to follow a certain 
way of life. The consequence of this is that speech about God is rendered empty or 
even inauthentic, giving rise to scepticism. On the other pole, there is the tendency 
to assume that words are perfectly fitted to give believers precise explanations and 
render God (or, indeed, reality as a whole) completely intelligible. The consequence 
of the latter tendency is absolutism or idolatry. 
The argument of my thesis is the simple but important one that though religious 
words and statements can give us factual content about God, they can only do so 
with a certain level of ambiguity or incompleteness. This follows from God’s radical 
otherness—that is, his being radically different from us and our language—and the 
presumed notion of divine mystery. The account of language I am concerned to 
advance here, however, does not deny the possibility of truth, and it does not imply 
that ‘anything goes’.  
The strategy I have adopted to argue my case is to appropriate insights principally 
from the philosopher of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein and in a secondary way, from 
the ecumenist theologian George Lindbeck, to shed light on language and its proper 
use. What will be stressed is Wittgenstein’s overall view that language is not merely 
a system of signs for stating facts or making truth-claims—even about God—but that 
the speaking of language is grounded in the setting of everyday life. Meaning, in a 
large class of cases, is bound up with ‘use’; that is to say, the meaning of a word or 
statement is dependent on how that word or statement is actually applied in relation 
to the conventions, practices and needs of a given community. As for Lindbeck, we 
will consider his use of language as an analogue for his understanding of religion and 
doctrine. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Lindbeck’s project offers an account of 
theological meaning that is best reached by navigating between two alternative 
approaches which he designates the ‘cognitive-propositional’ and the ‘experiential-
expressive’. Lindbeck’s preferred theory is called the ‘cultural-linguistic’. 
Other than attempting to navigate a via media between scepticism and 
absolutism, my own thesis will also take us toward a better appreciation of the proper 
role of language in speaking about God, leading to an understanding of religion 
according to which religion does not revolve around the pursuit of so-called objective 
facts and exhaustive conceptions about God. When religious believing is so 
perceived, doctrinal differences across religions and within a religion will become less 
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The Problem Introduced 
 
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your 
way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know 
your way about.1 
                                                                                                         Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Language and Divine Transcendence  
In most of the world’s religions and certainly in all the monotheistic ones, God is 
habitually spoken of, referred to, and reflected upon. Even God’s ways, supposedly 
past finding out, are diligently searched for and deliberated. The ‘place’ where such 
forms of discourse or ‘God-talk’ are most evident is in the pages of sacred scriptures 
such as the Tanakh, the Bible or the Qur’an, but they also occur in a wide variety of 
routine situations that are vital to the practice of religion, such as in confession, 
prayer and praise, thanksgiving, worship, preaching, theological reflection, and so on.  
In all the diverse forms of God-talk just mentioned, the presupposition is that it is 
possible to say something about the divine by means of language, that is to say, 
language is a proper or even primary medium for portraying God or conveying 
truth(s) about God. There is plenty of support for attributing such a role to language, 
and the growing consensus that all experience of transcendence must come to 
language is, no doubt, a factor.2 In the same vein, Jeff Astley (b. 1947) has averred 
that ‘there is no alternative to the medium of language.’3 To my mind, words are gifts 
to us; they are all we have for framing and fashioning what, for human, self-conscious 
existence, can only be called ‘our world’. And if words can be used to do all sorts of 
work, it stands to reason that they can also be used to speak about the divine. We 
might, thus, say that God is not beyond words.  
                                                     
1 PI, §203. 
2 E.g. Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1995), 35. 





To be sure, most people of faith who talk about God are not unaware of the 
transcendence of the divine—that God is ‘wholly other’ and radically different from 
human beings and what they ordinarily experience. Nevertheless, they seem to 
assume a good deal of knowledge about who God is and what his will and purpose 
for the world are. With Christians, for instance, it is believed that the gap between 
the divine and human has been bridged on account of the mediation and revelatory 
work of Jesus Christ, and, henceforth, God may be known and spoken of. One of 
Christianity’s most influential theologians, Karl Barth (1886–1968), has declared, ‘We 
humans cannot speak of God, but because God has become human, we may speak 
of God.’4 Then there are the many other ordinary religious adherents who, 
unacquainted with the concept of divine alterity, go about believing that God, whom 
they trust is always close at hand, is in some dynamic mode of communication with 
them. The people I have here characterised could well be the ones Karen Armstrong 
(b. 1944) has in mind and identifies with when she observes, ‘We are talking far too 
much about God these days, and what we say is often facile.’5 Whether that 
sentiment is fair or not, what we may note is how easily, in our attempt to speak 
about the transcendent God, we can overlook the absolute distance between our 
words and the divine reality. 
Some Issues with God-talk  
Even if we have been respectful of the divine-human divide, we still should note that 
it is in the very realm of speaking that problems with different aspects of God-talk 
have arisen. For one thing, talking about God is very different from talking about 
people and things: the use of language in one case is different from the use of 
language in the other. In fact, the language that underlies talk about God is itself 
complicated, with its employment of words for a reality that is said to be ‘beyond 
language’ (and resisting all description!). In making this observation about the 
underlay of language, I am referring not only to distinctively religious words like 
                                                     
4 Karl Barth, The Word of God and Theology, trans. Amy Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 191. 
5 Karen Armstrong, The Case for God (New York: Anchor Books, 2010), ix. 
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‘incarnation’, ‘justification’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘repentance’, ‘predestination’ and the rest, 
but any words that are appropriated to play a linguistic role within some religious 
context. For the most part, religious language uses ordinary words whose meaning is 
an adaptation of what has been fixed by their use outside religion. There are at least 
two pitfalls to watch out for when using religious language. The first is to want to take 
words at their face value. That would be too simple-minded, as words have ‘rough 
edges’ and can have many meanings. The second pitfall concerns the incongruity of 
using human, and therefore materially derived and fallible, language for a subject 
who is presumed to be infinite, immaterial and beyond all human imaginings. One is 
reminded of the attempt of Eberhard Jüngel (b. 1934) at explaining this difficulty: 
‘Our language is worldly language, and has only worldly words which refer to and are 
predicated of worldly beings.’6 Predictably, the result has been that God is sometimes 
spoken of as though he were a human person. Regular users of religious language are 
generally not very attentive to such an anomaly; indeed, they tend to regard God-talk 
as relatively unproblematic, and to just get on with it. However, I anticipate that once 
questions are raised about the meaning of particular words, statements or utterances 
in their religious context, or whether religious expressions are literally true or only 
symbolically so, the complaint that religious language is of the ‘oddest kind’ will 
quickly emerge and become more keenly felt.7  
Preliminary Considerations 
Inquiring into the meaning of words and statements in religion seems almost 
required of us, for as language users we naturally presuppose that some kind of 
meaning must pertain to language about God. Certainly, most believers do assume 
that they know and understand—at least partially—what their religion teaches 
through its creeds and doctrinal statements. Still, we are never guaranteed easy or 
straightforward answers. Indeed, an inevitable circularity awaits us: for to ask about 
                                                     
6 Eberhard Jüngel, Theological Essays, trans. J B Webster (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 59. 
7 See Ian T Ramsey, Religious Language (London: SCM Press, 1957), 48 who has suggested that the 




the meaning of words is to find ourselves entrapped within an almost endless round 
of other words, other signs. And if we ask for the meaning of these words which are 
meant to render the meaning of those earlier ones the response would still be in 
terms of words.8 Be that as it may, we can do no better than recognise that words 
form ‘a complete system’9 and try to make the best of it. Under the circumstances, 
all one can do is remain as reflective as one can be within language, resolutely 
resisting the temptation to embrace a nihilist view that ‘there is nothing except 
language in the world.’10 Here I should like to call attention to a confusion that is 
sometimes made in discussions about the use of religious language—that of 
collapsing knowing what a statement means with knowing the ways or conditions in 
which the statement is to be verified.  While knowing the meaning of some statement 
must include knowing the conditions for its verification, the two forms of knowing 
are not the same. This has been made clear by Friedrich Waismann (1896–1959) , a 
member of the famed Vienna Circle, who writes, ‘In the normal use of language the 
questions “What does this sentence mean?” and “How do I find out whether this 
sentence is true?” are two entirely different questions, and anyone will refuse to 
regard them as alike.’11 Thus, a statement like ‘A cat is a nocturnal animal’ is false, 
and yet anyone who speaks English can easily understand it. If we are to attribute 
one single thing which the ‘linguistic turn’ of the early twentieth century has 
reasonably established for us, it is that the question of meaning is prior to the 
question of truth: one must know what a statement means, or have an idea of its 
meaning, before one can even begin to discuss whether the statement is true or false. 
In the last example about cats being nocturnal, it is in virtue of the fact that we 
understand what is being claimed that we can say that the statement is not true. 
                                                     
8 This is the basic idea of textualism; see Gerard Loughlin, Telling God’s Story (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 12–13; also, Don Cupitt, The Time Being (London: SCM Press, 1992), 64. 
9 Don Cupitt, The Long-Legged Fly: A Theology of Language and Desire (London: SCM Press, 1987), 
14. 
10 Loughlin, Telling God’s Story, 13, paraphrasing Derrida’s famous line, ‘there is no outside-text…’  
11 Friedrich Waismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. R Harre (London: Macmillan, 
1965), 330; also cited in Dallas M High, Language, Persons, and Belief (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 43. 
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Further back in history, theology was concerned with a different set of questions, 
such as who God is, what the nature of God is, what the Trinity is, what the proofs of 
God’s existence are, how did God become man, how God relates to the world and to 
us? The issues raised are largely metaphysical: they are about what ‘there is’, and 
about the ‘how-to’ of arriving at knowing what exists.12 
The question of meaning with which we are concerned, is usually understood as 
a question about how words and statements refer or signify. This is the ‘word-object 
theory’ of meaning, a theory that correlates words to their objects, where the latter 
could be thoughts, concepts, facts or even things. The root idea is that every word 
has a meaning and this meaning is ‘the object for which the word stands.’13 Most 
people, I imagine, would find this whole approach regarding the quest for meaning 
so intuitive as to be ‘commonsensical’. It is because meaning here bears a 
correspondence to the word with which it is correlated, and is obtained by this 
correlation—it is the ‘hook’ between word and object, as it were—this theory is also 
known by various designations, namely the ‘correspondentist’, the ‘referential’ and 
the ‘representationalist’ theory of language. Designations aside, what matters is 
whether the theory is adequate as a system of communication facilitating the pursuit 
of meaning. If it is adequate, our research project can simply conclude by suggesting 
that we apply the theory and see how far it takes us, and how best it serves our 
purpose. Or, we can recommend consulting a standard dictionary or encyclopaedia. 
But, as I shall argue, this theory is not so much outrightly false as it is deficient, for it 
seems to be oblivious to the complexity of issues surrounding the question of 
meaning. To give a foretaste of what I intend to claim, the theory seems woefully self-
contained in a world of only word and object.14 Is meaning simply a matter of 
establishing how the former relates or corresponds to the latter? Surely, the meaning 
                                                     
12 See Nancey C Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern 
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1996), 38. 
13 PI, §1.  
14 We could say this is a concentration of a two-term relationship instead of a more holistic, three-




of any religious utterance or expression cannot be detached from the matrix or ‘form 
of life’ in which language functions and is embedded. Full details about the notion of 
‘form of life’ and the associated concept of ‘language-games’, which are both 
borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) will be provided later. For the 
moment, all that needs to be said here is that the application of these concepts to 
our research questions have thrown up important insights for our understanding of 
meaning. I have just mentioned that meaning cannot be fully arrived at, as if it is only 
the upshot of a two-term relationship between word and object; what has been 
overlooked—and which may matter for a fuller understanding of any word or 
statement—is the context in which such utterance is made. We shall have occasion 
to discuss ‘meaning’ more fully, including the suggestion by Wittgenstein that 
language ought to be regarded as something we use in a variety of ways, for different 
ends and purposes.  
Research Question & Thesis 
Our enquiry into meaning, and what have been said about language, have prepared 
the ground for us to consider a longstanding puzzle, namely, the relation between 
‘what is said’ and ‘the way things are’. In other words, we are concerned with how 
religious language functions. We might put the question: How do religious 
statements connect to or portray reality, or, rather, how do they refer to God? 
Religious believers have typically understood that there is a cognitive or factual 
dimension to religious language, and that theological statements reflect content 
which they take to be factual, if not also true. For example, the creedal statement, 
‘He (Jesus Christ) will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead’ is read as 
entailing the factual claim that Jesus will return from heaven, and that he will sit in 
judgement over those who are still alive when he comes, as well as those who are 
not. It must be said that I have no issue with the contention that religious language is 
fact-stating or cognitive. Given that religion or theology deals with issues of supreme 
importance affecting human life (on both personal and communal levels), we can 
expect that what is said (or written) will include some measure of factual reference. 
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To be sure, a good deal of religious language will be chiefly taken up with ‘second-
order’ discourse—discourse that goes beyond factual into the realm of the spirit and 
the immaterial. A case in point would be the Bible, the pages of which comprise a rich 
mix of statements of fact, metaphors, exhortations, prayers, imageries, parables, 
myths, and so forth. Still, ‘facts’ are all-important for religious discourse, for what has 
no factual content cannot command serious interest or attention. Even so, what I 
think is problematic is the claim by some believers that words give them full or 
definitive access to the divine, as well as to reality as a whole. It would be too strong 
a charge to accuse those who think in this way of idolatry for identifying words with 
God.15 A fairer assessment would be to assign blame to a failure to take divine 
transcendence with sufficient seriousness. Or, it may all be a matter of mistakenly 
assuming that religious statements are the same sort of statements which we find or 
make in ordinary life and in the sciences. The thesis I am concerned to defend in this 
project is that although language about God can provide some factual (or cognitive) 
content, it cannot be pressed to yield precise definitions or complete comprehension 
of the divine. Again, while language about God can and does help us to know (more) 
about God, the sheer incommensurability between divine transcendence and its 
possible expression should leave us with ambiguities, gaps and even obscurities in 
our understanding. To quote Rowan Williams (b. 1950), ‘claims to be speaking 
truthfully about God can still be made even if we take it for granted that we cannot 
produce definitions of God or detailed descriptions of “what it is like to be divine”.’16 
My claim is thus wedged between two extreme understandings of religious language. 
The first is one that regards religious statements as having no factual content, or at 
best, as expressing moral intentions or exhortations and attitudes toward the world. 
The second is one that tends toward treating language about God—especially the 
                                                     
15 See Richard Cross, ‘Idolatry and Religious Language’, Faith and Philosophy, Vol.25:2 (2008), 190–
196, who thinks that the charge of idolatry (especially against those who uphold univocity) is 
often mistakenly made in theological literature. 





texts of sacred scripture—as the very Word of God from which one may obtain 
precise definitions and explanations about the divine or the world as a whole.17 
To those familiar with modern linguistic theories, my contention would seem to 
go no further than to restate the arbitrariness of language.18 Recall that Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857–1913), who is widely regarded as the father of modern linguistics, 
had insisted that within any given linguistic structure, the sign is essentially arbitrary 
in relation to the signified. By ‘arbitrary’, Saussure simply implies that sign actually 
‘has no natural connection’19 with that of which it signifies. He further notes, 
‘Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results 
solely from the simultaneous presence of the others.’20 A standard illustration of this 
linguistic principle, recalls Anthony Thiselton (b. 1937), is that of colour words. 
‘Where is the cut-off point between “red” and “yellow”?’ Thiselton asks. The 
meanings of these colour words depend on whether ‘orange’ is part of the field of 
colour words, and how other available terms contribute to that field.21 Even so, we 
must underscore that such arbitrariness of language as is being raised should not be 
thought of as implying that the meaning of a word can be arbitrarily changed at an 
individual’s whim or fancy.  
My contention—not least in disclaiming the possibility of religious language to 
                                                     
17 For a case of religious statements being regarded as moral assertions, see R B Braithwaite, ‘An 
Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief’ in Basil Mitchell (ed.), Philosophy of Religion 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 72–91. Braithwaite has famously suggested that to 
assert ‘God is love’ is to express an intention to follow an agapeistic way of life. (81). The passion 
of Joanna Lumley, who was brought up in the Christian tradition, to search for the remains of 
Noah’s Ark offers a good illustration of the other approach towards religious text. She says, ‘It’s 
so familiar to us all, from the animals going in two by two and the dove of peace, and the olive 
branch and the rainbow. But who was Noah, and what was the Ark and what was it made of? 
When and why did the flood happen? It has fascinated me all my life, and I’m going in search of 
the truth’; cited in David Tacey, Religion as Metaphor: Beyond Literal Belief (Somerset, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2015), xxii. 
18 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistic, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. 
Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 67. 
19 Ibid., 69. 
20 Ibid., 114. 
21 Anthony C Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein (Exeter: 
Paternoster Press, 1980), 119. 
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attain a precise definition of the divine—would also seem to echo the postmodern 
position that language cannot reflect reality, let alone deliver a complete explanation 
about the nature of God or the world. Whatever the famous postmodernist axiom 
‘there is nothing outside the text’22 may mean, some people who are sufficiently 
immersed in words and images have appealed to it as a sanction for imagining 
‘themselves in a virtual reality, the sealed world of their own beliefs and sayings.’23 
To be sure, it needs to be said that the view of reality being beyond language has 
occupied philosophers and thinkers long before the advent of postmodernism.24 The 
view that language does not exactly fit reality has been demonstrated by the fact that 
the precise translation of one language to another is exceeding difficult, if not 
impossible. To quote David Brown (b. 1948), no one language ‘divides up the external 
world in precisely the same way as any other.’25 Nevertheless, I do not wish to 
disavow any pretention to being inspired by either the modern or the postmodern 
theories of language—or both. What I would strongly repudiate, however, is any 
suggestion that not much appears to be at stake here. For, as I hope to show, I am 
convinced that a discussion of the question of meaning and how religious statements 
are to be understood in the context of talk about God will take our theological 
reflection a good step forward.  
What the Enquiry might Yield  
In undertaking this enquiry, I am concerned on the one hand to raise a caution against 
the extremes of a scepticism that denies language as having any epistemic 
relationship to reality, and of an absolutism that sees a one-to-one correspondence 
between words and reality, on the other. To assume the former position would be to 
                                                     
22 Or, ‘there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte’; see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 
trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 158.  
23 Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 170. 
24 E.g. Wilbur M Urban, Language and Reality: The Philosophy of Language and the Principles of 
Symbolism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939), 49, who writes, ‘Reality is, in a sense, doubtless 
beyond language… and cannot be wholly grasped in its forms, but when in order to grasp reality 
we abandon linguistic forms, then reality, like quicksilver, runs through our fingers.’ 
25 David Brown, God and Mystery in Words: Experience through Metaphor and Drama (Oxford: 




succumb to the strict Cartesian separation between knowing-subject and knowing-
object; while the latter position is hardly tenable given that the transcendent or the 
wholly other can never be exactly mirrored by or in language. According to the 
position that I propose to argue, religious terms and propositions can still have 
‘factual significance’ for the believer, even if their use involves our regarding them as 
having a certain level of ambiguity or incompleteness. In saying that language ought 
to be characterised in this way, I am not implying that religious truth claims should 
therefore be abandoned. Also, what is being proposed as an account of language 
most certainly does not mean ‘anything goes’—that we can make up whatever we 
want about the world. As we have sought and will have opportunity to stress, the 
language of religion does more than describe or represent ‘how things are’; it also 
orientates the user to what is central to life and thought. The ‘paradigm case’ of 
religious expressions or utterances is not some fixed correspondence to a certain 
objective reality, rather, it is historically constructed out of the social framework 
within which it has arisen. This represents a key shift in our understanding of 
language—from looking at a word and then to the object it is said to stand for, to 
looking at how the word is actually used in its home context for its meaning.26 
Besides seeking for a via media between scepticism and absolutism, I hope my 
argument will also steer us toward a better appreciation of the proper role of 
language. We might, for instance, begin to be more attentive to the depth of the 
problem faced in speaking about God, especially with respect to the way language 
must navigate between making claims about God that are literally true, and 
respecting the ontological difference between God and his creation. And seeing how 
the church and its theologians have sought to make creative use of metaphors, 
symbols, analogy, poetry and so on, to speak of the God whose ways are beyond 
complete discernment, we might also begin to be more sensitive to habits of 
language usage which have tended towards containment of the divine in words or, 
                                                     
26 Such a shift brings out the hermeneutic character of language; see Fergus Kerr, ‘Language as 
Hermeneutic in the Later Wittgenstein’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, Vol.27:3 (1965), 491. 
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indeed, complete explanation. Here, I must again stress that neither the descriptive 
or representational role of language in portraying God in religious communication, in 
religious learning nor in theological reflection, is being denied. What I hope will be 
gained is an appreciation of the role of religious language in pointing allusively 
beyond itself—not unlike how a sacrament properly functions.27 The key take-away 
is to be vigilant against the error of idolatry, that is, identifying what is intelligibly 
referred to in language at both the expressive and experiential levels of preaching, 
instruction, worship, prayer and so on, with the divine reality itself. 
Another implication to draw from this study is that it might encourage greater 
caution in the explication of the meaning of particular statements in isolation from 
their larger Sitz im Leben, as well as healthy criticism in the evaluation of competing 
religious claims. Williams, who is well aware of the complicity involved in ‘making 
sense’, has urged that we ‘question our clarity or truthfulness in the light of 
communications from others’ and that we even ‘suspend judgement at certain points 
because we are aware of not having the conceptual or linguistic equipment to enable 
decisions.’28 Already, caution in deciding or assigning meaning to words and 
sentences should be a default response in light of the general rule in analytic 
philosophy that it is a ‘stretch of language’ or a ‘speech-act’ that is the bearer of 
meaning, rather than the atomic word, that is the word in isolation. I would take a 
step further to suggest that we should not be too quick to jump to the establishment 
of the meaning of propositions, statements or even larger portions of text without 
relating them to other linguistic signs in our overall system of religious thought. As 
previously noted, meaning may not be adequately arrived at semantically, that is, it 
is not a matter of relation between word and object, but within a ‘syntactic’ process 
                                                     
27 Brown, God and Mystery in Words, 44–74, is right to urge a ‘sacramental approach’ in any attempt 
at using language to map reality. Metaphor and sacrament are alike in being accused of much 
imprecision, yet both succeed in pointing allusively beyond themselves to the divine reality. 
They, as it were, enable us to make ‘the jump to the divine’. See also idem, Divine Generosity 
and Human Creativity: Theology through Symbol, Painting and Architecture, ed. Christopher R. 
Brewer and Robert MacSwain (Oxford: Routledge, 2017), 24–25.   




in which it coheres with other signs. Connected with the issue of meaning is a crucial 
matter which has vexed most religions since their founding. It is the dissatisfaction 
with how disagreements and disputes over scripture, doctrine, teachings and even 
ethical conduct are managed.29 A carefully nuanced de-emphasis on the 
cognitive/objective status of religious terms and statements may, hopefully, lead to 
less acrimony among the disputants, perhaps even to an enriched understanding of 
what truly divides them.  
Finally, I hope my proposal can contribute towards reaching a proper 
understanding of religion. What I think is erroneous with much current thinking about 
religion—especially in its popular or ‘folk’ version—is that it is fixated with trying to 
inquire into ‘how things are in the world’ and to explain them as though religion is 
some sort of a science with the necessary answers.30 With their emphasis on the 
cognitive-propositional aspects of religion, religious practitioners31 are often told by 
senior figures in their community to be ready to do intellectual battle with sceptics 
and atheists, staking out the claim that their particular religion can fill any 
explanatory gap that arises in the understanding of reality. The actual words of 
Norman Geisler (b. 1932), a conservative Christian, may illustrate what I have in mind 
here: ‘The challenge, then, is for the Christian to “out-think” the non-Christian both 
in building a system of truth and in tearing down systems of error.’32 Never mind the 
Heideggerian criticism that the very question of Being is thus left out of consideration, 
sacred texts are here being read as giving precise definitions and detailed 
explanations of God and his dealings with the world. The underlying conviction is that 
language, in having God as its original author, is fully ‘adequate for all religions and 
                                                     
29 This dissatisfaction is what prompted Lindbeck to write his landmark book, The Nature of Doctrine. 
(ND, 7). 
30 Some scientists are careful to claim that ‘the necessary answers’ from science are at best 
provisional. For example, Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1965), 77, writes, ‘If you thought before that science was certain—well that is just an 
error on your part.’ Feynman (1918−1988) was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics in 1965. 
31 E.g. William Craig Lane and J P Moreland. 
32 Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1980), 73. 
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theological expression.’33 My unease with this stems from the fact that religion is put 
at risk of being reduced to an abstraction wholly concerned with explaining and 
mapping out external reality. The alternative kind of understanding of religion I wish 
to commend is significantly different. I would not be too anxious about spotting 
explanatory gaps, nor be over-preoccupied with the cognitive or factual content of 
religious expressions. I am emphatically not suggesting that religion is to be 
understood as being without objective content, or that we may just ascribe anything 
to the objective reality that religious language seeks to represent to us. Rather, I am 
simply acknowledging that we do not have the ‘extra descriptive resources’ available 
to us in language to map reality out in absolute terms.34 What is more vital and 
appropriate is for religious believers to attend to the truly spiritual and moral 
dimensions of faith, letting their ‘self’ be moulded and shaped by the ‘symbol system’ 
of religion. The position I have in mind here is, I think, consonant with that which has 
recently emerged in the work of John Cottingham (b. 1943) on seeking a ‘new’ model 
of religious understanding. Although Cottingham’s claim to newness may be 
disputed, his proposal—that ‘we need to take seriously the possibility that 
understanding the world religiously is not an attempt to dissect and analyse and 
explain it… but rather a mode of engagement, or connection, with reality as a 
whole’35—is definitely not.  
Why Wittgenstein and Lindbeck are selected for Special Study 
This study has been undertaken using resources mainly but not exclusively drawn 
from the philosopher, Wittgenstein and the ecumenist theologian George A Lindbeck 
(1923–2018). I shall briefly explain in turn why I have chosen these two thinkers. The 
choice of Wittgenstein seems a natural one—by general consensus, Wittgenstein 
                                                     
33 Gordon H Clark, ‘Special Divine Revelation as Rational’ in Carl F H Henry (ed.), Revelation and the 
Bible (London: The Tyndale Press, 1959), 41; see also, idem, Religion, Reason, and Revelation 
(Hobbs: Trinity Foundation, 1961), 146. 
34 See Williams, The Edge of Words, 8. 
35John Cottingham, ‘Transcending Science: Humane Models of Religious Understanding’ in Fiona Ellis 




may well be regarded as the most creative and influential philosopher of language in 
modern times. His notions of ‘language-game’, ‘form of life’, ‘meaning as use’ (to 
name only a few), developed in his later philosophical phase, are not only of 
relevance to our conceptual concerns, they lend themselves as tools for applying to 
our own enquiries. Even his ‘Tractarian’ insight on the mystical has, I hope to show, 
useful bearings on any consideration of language in its relationship to the 
transcendent. As we proceed, I hope Wittgenstein’s relevance will become clear. In 
the case of Lindbeck, he is selected primarily because he explicitly drew on 
Wittgenstein’s work in developing his own ground-breaking postliberal approach to 
religion and doctrine. That the Wittgensteinian method is applied in that direction 
invites our keen interest, for it is rare that such a parallel is drawn. We might say that 
Lindbeck’s foray represents a much welcome test case. Another reason for selecting 
Lindbeck as being of special importance for the present study is his ingenious use of 
the analogy of language for conceiving religion in terms of a cultural-linguistic 
framework that makes possible the following claimed outcomes: ‘the description of 
realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings 
and sentiments.’36  
Organisation of Material 
The argument which I advance in this thesis is relatively uncomplicated. It is that 
although language about God can and does provide some cognitive content, it cannot 
be pressed to yield a precise definition or complete description of the divine. The 
structure I have developed for establishing such a thesis is also a simple and 
straightforward one, comprising seven chapters, not including this introduction. 
The opening chapter (Chapter 1) entitled ‘”Discovery” of Language’, is concerned 
with the general characteristics of language. It explores them by tracing the trajectory 
of how language has been understood in a variety of ways as the centuries advanced. 
My main purpose is to draw attention to the importance of language in the service of 
                                                     
36 ND, 33. 
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religion and the role of language in conveying meaning and cognition. I briefly touch 
on the so-called ‘linguistic turn’, a development of great significance as far as the 
philosophy of language is concerned. The turn superseded the previous turn to 
epistemology and marked the beginning of a new epoch. Whereas attention had 
been focussed first on epistemological and then metaphysical problems of 
philosophy, it was now to be focussed on the linguistic categories of philosophical 
discourse itself. Philosophical problems came to be perceived as problems which may 
be solved either by understanding more about or reforming the language with which 
they are framed. 
Against that backdrop, I proceed in Chapters 2 and 3 to undertake an exploration 
of Wittgenstein’s early and later phases of philosophising with respect to language, 
picking out conceptual tools which may have a bearing on our argument. Both 
chapters serve as one long study on the philosopher, focussing on his two principal 
texts, namely, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (henceforth referred to and cited 
as the Tractatus or TLP) and the Philosophical Investigations (henceforth referred to 
and cited as PI).  Attention is also given to Wittgenstein’s shift from his earlier 
conception of language as merely a system of signs (Zeichensprache) for the 
explication or communication of ideas or things, to a later conception which regards 
language as reality-disclosing or world-disclosing (Hermeneutik).37 Because, as was 
said before, Wittgenstein’s new conception of language also represents the 
disavowal of the thought–language dualism which has been so prevalent throughout 
most of human history, some space will be devoted to a critique of René Descartes 
(1596–1650) and his dualist theory of mind and body as different kinds of thing. Other 
key concepts within the Wittgenstein corpus such as meaning-as-use, language-
games, form-of-life, private-language, will also be discussed. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss Wittgenstein’s thoughts on ‘the mystical’, an element that 
is sometimes treated as an afterthought to his philosophic schema and thus one that 
                                                     





might be conveniently ignored.38 My view, on the contrary, is that ‘das Mystische’ 
forms an integral part of TLP—it might even be considered a culmination of all that 
was said earlier in that work. But it is not difficult to understand why the concept of 
mystery is problematic: do most religious people not wish for clarity and intelligibility 
in matters of faith? Indeed, it is this drive for ‘clear and distinct ideas’—even 
certainty—that has fuelled the ‘positivist’ view about religious language that I am 
concerned to challenge. What I hope will emerge from my proposed discussion is the 
suggestion that the mystical cannot be exhaustively grasped by or contained within 
the categories of language.  
In Chapter 5 we turn our attention to the immensely complex issue of what ‘truth’ 
itself might be. Besides engaging with the ancient question ‘what is truth?’ and 
considering the Christian claim that Jesus Christ is himself the truth, we also attend 
to the assault on truth in the form of scepticism. The latter I find to be an ally of faith, 
not a foe. As the concept of truth is one of Wittgenstein’s on-going concerns, both 
his early and mature positions will be examined for the light they can shed on it. I aim 
to show that truth is not primarily an epistemic concept but a relational one, in the 
sense of being expressed in language. That is, we might say that we can have no 
account of it except by reference to language.  
Our focus in Chapter 6 will be on Lindbeck whose landmark book uses the 
language analogy to propose a new understanding of religion and doctrine. Lindbeck 
is unabashed about having drawn from Wittgenstein’s work to support his ‘cultural-
linguistic’ model of religion and doctrine. For example, he makes good use of some 
of the philosopher’s concepts like ‘language-games’, ‘form of life’, as well as his 
‘private language’ argument. Lindbeck’s work thus provides a useful test case for our 
study.  
Lastly, I provide a concluding chapter in which the key concepts from my two 
guiding lights (namely, Wittgenstein and Lindbeck) which I have explored in my study, 
                                                     
38 Bertrand Russell confesses to being left with ‘a sense of intellectual discomfort’ by Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of the mystical. (TLP, xxii). 
The Problem Introduced 
17 
 
are extracted and summarised. As suggestions for further research, I also indicate 
some of the important issues or questions which I have either neglected or failed to 
discuss adequately or competently. This chapter ends with the affirmation that words 
are good enough to facilitate meaningful God-talk but that they cannot be pressed to 





 Chapter One 
‘Discovery’ of Language 
 
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every 
sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning 
is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are 
produced.1    
                                                                                                         Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction  
The ‘discovery’ of language—by which I mean the preoccupation with or the 
consciousness of what language is and how it bears and conveys meaning—may be 
likened to a scenario portrayed by the author and philosopher Iris Murdoch (1919–
1999). In her book about the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), who had 
repeatedly called attention to ‘the crisis of language’, Murdoch writes, ‘We can no 
longer take language for granted as a medium of communication. Its transparency 
has gone. We are like some people who for a long time looked out of a window 
without noticing the glass—and then one day began to notice this too.’2 Murdoch’s 
analogy illustrates how we have become more conscious that language is our window 
into reality, and that instead of looking through words or statements for the most 
part, we have begun to look at them. Naturally, such close attention to language itself 
has brought about an important awareness, the awareness that ‘the glass’ through 
which we see may actually reduce or obscure our vision, if it becomes cloudy. This 
raises the question as to whether language is capable of accurately expressing reality 
or whether words can bear their semantic freight or cope with the use they are put 
to. For some of us, there is the further question posed by Wittgenstein, whose 
resources we have chosen to draw on: why has it never occurred to us to take off the 
‘pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at’?3  
                                                     
1 TLP, 4.002. 
2 Iris Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 27. 




The discovery of the epistemic primacy of language is about much more than not 
taking language for granted. To be sure, the discovery of language in this sense is not 
a recent phenomenon. Philosophers and other thinkers have been preoccupied with 
the question of language, often being beset by the perplexities that the use of words 
entails, since very early times. Nor is the enduring concern with language an isolated 
movement. In this chapter, I will outline the key currents of thought on this subject-
matter in the history of philosophy. As my objective is to set the stage for the larger 
argument of my project, I shall not be concerned to present a systematic or an 
exhaustive account of how language has evolved since the earliest years of human 
civilisation; for such an undertaking would take us beyond the scope of our present 
study. What I wish to cover, namely the main outlines of the ‘story’ at least up to the 
period of Wittgenstein, will for many be familiar territory; still I hope my 
recapitulation will help to generate a certain sensibility about how language has been 
perceived or understood as the centuries advanced, and serve to indicate how the 
fascination with language has impacted our present day understanding of this very 
human feature.   
What has just been said about language applies naturally to the narrower 
phenomenon of ‘religious language’, though the latter, in the sense in which I shall 
be using the term, does not refer to a natural language like English, French, or some 
other. The jibe, ‘Do you speak English, French, or religious?’4 drives home this point 
for us. According to William Alston (1921–2009), whose jibe I have just used, ‘the 
term “religious language” is a special case of the bad habit of philosophers to speak 
of a special language for each terminology or broad subject matter (the “language of 
physics,” the “language of ethics,” etc.)’ in which the distinction between language 
and speech (or better, discourse) is neglected.5 Alston further notes, ‘The former is 
an abstract system that is employed primarily for communication, and the latter is 
that employment. What is erroneously called religious language is the use of 
                                                     
4 William P Alston, ‘Religious Language’ in William J Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 220. 
5 Ibid. 
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language (any language) in connection with the practice of religion—in prayer, 
worship, praise, thanksgiving, confession, ritual, preaching, instruction, exhortation, 
theological reflection, and so on.’6 So when we are engaged in speaking of God we 
are using the same concepts that we use in our social intercourse. Notwithstanding 
what was just said, however, we shall, like Alston himself, continue to use ‘religious 
language’ because the term is now fully entrenched in popular parlance, as well as in 
academic literature.  
Historical Antecedents 
Pythagoras (c.570–490 BCE) may well have been the first of the Greek philosophers 
to have put forward a rudimentary theory of language—the idea that ‘the soul gives 
names to things.’7 Underlying Pythagoras’ conviction is the belief that a name of a 
thing expresses or somehow identifies the true nature of a thing. So the names are 
not arbitrarily given by the soul, but are given ‘on the basis of the natural link between 
the name and the thing—a link somewhat like the correspondence between a mental 
image and the object represented by such an image.’8 In the Cratylus, Socrates 
(c.470–399 BCE) who was Plato’s teacher, is asked a question about language by two 
interlocutors which is whether words are just arbitrary signs or whether they describe 
or resonate with the things they signify. Socrates’ response is one of support for the 
latter position—that words can disclose something about the world and so are more 
than conventional or arbitrary signs.9 Accordingly, in asking after the meaning of 
justice in The Republic or the meaning of love in The Symposium what he aims for is 
to critically examine the way that these words are frequently used. Plato (c.428–348 
BCE) himself, in another work, tells us what his own view about language is—that 
when nouns or adjectives are applied to particular objects, ‘we assume them to have 
                                                     
6 Ibid.  
7 Vincent Brṻmmer, Brṻmmer on Meaning and the Christian Faith (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2006), 123. 
8 Ibid. 




also a corresponding idea or form.’10 In short, words are instruments which reflect 
the structures within an unchanging and eternal world of forms. At the same time, 
though, Plato seems to be uneasy about the nature of language, not least with 
respect to the written word. What is rendered in written form, he suspects, could 
become ‘a vehicle of falsehood’ if exploited by those who seek to fashion it (as 
something inert) into a permanent record of some understanding which is not 
corroborated by person-to-person discourse.11 For Aristotle (c.384–322 BCE), words, 
thought and things are related in a so-called ‘semantic triangle’. In his On 
Interpretation, he writes,    
Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the 
soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is 
speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections 
themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for 
the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections 
are representations or likenesses, images, copies.12 
Aristotle’s observation about the ‘mental affections’ of words is undoubtedly astute. 
It seems that words as symbols or signs of objects do vary in their spoken and written 
forms across cultures, but not the ‘mental affections’ to which the words refer. 
Indeed, as Aristotle had underscored, the mental affections themselves stay ‘the 
same for all races of men.’  Such a theory holds promise for boosting inter-faith 
relations, if religious people can similarly agree that though they use or have used 
different words to express the object of their ultimate concern—for example, ‘God,’ 
‘Gott,’ ‘Dieu,’ ‘Dios,’ ‘Allah,’ ‘Tien,’ and so on—the mental reference of these words 
is about the same entity. With respect to how Aristotle is able to arrive at his 
postulation about mental affections, no firm answer can be given except that thought 
has always been considered by him to have epistemic priority over speech.13   
Given that language is of interest to theology in many varied and important 
                                                     
10 Plato, Republic (Book X), 379 (available via: WEBSITE), accessed 21/8/18. 
11 See Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), 19. 
12 Aristotle, On Interpretation, trans. Harold P Cooke (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1983), 115. 
13 See Dan R Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol & Story (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), 11. 
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ways—not least the part it plays in making divine revelation meaningful and more 
intelligible for believers—the question of language has been raised by religious 
thinkers from very early on in Western history. St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), for 
instance, recognised the difficulty with language in speaking about God. After 
struggling to comprehend the mystery of the doctrine of the Trinity he wondered 
whether he should opt to be silent.14  
Augustine’s somewhat ambivalent view about language is shared by another 
figure who wielded an enormous influence in the Middle Ages, namely, Dionysius the 
Areopagite (flourished circa. 500), who is also known as Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite. In The Divine Names, Pseudo-Dionysius calls attention to the radical 
transcendence, incomprehensibility and ineffability of God. In a particular passage, 
he elaborates:   
For even as things which are intellectually discerned cannot be 
comprehended or perceived…  by the same law of truth the boundless 
Super-Essence surpasses Essences, the Super-Intellectual Unity surpasses 
Intelligences, the One which is beyond thought surpasses the 
apprehension of thought, and the Good which is beyond utterance 
surpasses the reach of words. Yea, it is an [sic] Unity which is the unifying 
Source of all unity and a Super-Essential Essence, a Mind beyond the 
reach of mind and a Word beyond utterance, eluding Discourse, Intuition, 
Name, and every kind of being.15  
Such portrayal of the Divine as beyond ‘the reach of words’ naturally raises a vital 
question for those who believe that God is personal and that he can be known. The 
question as framed by Pseudo-Dionysius himself is this: can we speak or even form 
any conception concerning this hidden Super-Essential Godhead? As part of his 
response to the conundrum, Pseudo-Dionysius proposes a ‘naysaying’ theological 
system that proceeds by the negation or denial of words and concepts to ‘reach’ God. 
Known technically as ‘apophatic’ theology, this method of approach prescribes that 
in any attempt to speak of God the focus should be on what God is not (apophasis), 
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rather than on what God is. The basic premise here is that language is woefully 
inadequate in undertaking the task of God-talk. While on the one hand the strength 
of apophatic theology is in safeguarding the mystery of God, it is, on the other, beset 
by a self-contradiction—that of making the claim in human language about the very 
inadequacy of human language.  
Another key figure who appealed to negation is the Jewish philosopher, Moses 
Maimonides (1135–1204). According to him, it is best that people should not apply 
any positive attributes to God, lest they misrepresent him. So extreme was 
Maimonides’ view about negation, he even contended that negation itself is 
objectionable because it introduces complexity to our understanding of who God is. 
Well aware of the deficiencies of religious language, Maimonides held the view that 
claims about God are at best understood as having merely come ‘one step nearer to 
the knowledge of God.’16 
A brief word may also be said about the contribution of John Duns Scotus (1266–
1308), who had argued that since revelation has been given, language about God 
must be univocal. It is not that Scotus denies that God is transcendent but that he 
grounds the possibility of univocal talk in a univocal conception of ‘being’. For Scotus, 
though divine being is different from created being, the same concept of ‘being’ 
applies univocally to both. We need not discuss how this view of Scotus has been 
employed by certain modern theologians to support the case for the use of literal 
language about God, except to note that the conception of being as univocal is still 
very much alive and well.  
Although St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) finds the apophatic approach useful as 
a first step to understanding religious language, his own preference is for the via 
analogia—‘a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation.’ In what 
immediately follows, the ‘theory of analogy’ will first be explained, then the two 
terms of extremes, namely ‘equivocation’ and ‘univocation’. According to St Thomas, 
                                                     
16 Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M Friedlander (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1904), 1.60. 
‘Discovery’ of Language 
25 
 
there exists a correspondence or an ‘analogy of being’ (analogia entis) between the 
created order and its creator, God. The applicability of this idea extends as well to 
language we use. So, words like ‘wise’, ‘good’, ‘living’ and so on when applied to God 
do bear a similar, though not identical, meaning to the meaning they normally carry 
when used within the human context. Following this line of reasoning, St Thomas 
contends that we are entitled to use words analogically of God, that is, as a signpost 
to God. As he had expressed it more fully:  
[O]ur knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from 
him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way 
than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in 
creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. 
Therefore as to the names applied to God—viz. the perfections which 
they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of 
signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong 
properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and 
are applied primarily to him. But as regards their mode of signification, 
they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of 
signification applies to creatures.17 
What about ‘equivocation’ and ‘univocation’? These are two other possible ways 
of applying human language to God, in contradistinction to the way of analogy 
favoured by St Thomas. Equivocation is perhaps better understood as doublespeak; 
thus, to speak equivocally of God is to use words which are the same but in 
completely different senses. The basis for speaking equivocally is the view that 
divinity and humanity are so distinct that they share no common ground. To apply a 
word univocally to God, we have noted, is to assume that God is exactly the same as 
us in some respect, and that the word means the same in its application to God and 
to the human user. Both ways of God-talk, however, have proven to be problematic: 
‘If univocal, then language falls into anthropomorphism and cannot be about God; if 
equivocal, then language bereft of its meaning leads to agnosticism and cannot for 
us be about God.’18 Thus, the use of analogy in speaking of God provides a way out 
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of these two opposite poles. 
In the modern period, the debate on religious language may be said to have been 
initiated by David Hume (1711–1776). An empiricist, Hume was opposed to belief in 
God as well as any talk of God. True to form, he offered a mock-historical account of 
religious belief—that ‘the primary religion of mankind [sic] arises chiefly from an 
anxious fear of future events.’19 His oft-quoted claim that any literary work, for 
instance, about divinity or metaphysics, which does not ‘contain any abstract 
reasoning concerning quantity or number’ nor ‘any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence’ should be consigned ‘to the flames: for it 
can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion’ reveals not only the depth but the 
aggressiveness of his empiricism.20 In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
Hume likens talk about God to verbal disputes in which ‘the disputants may here 
agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or vice versa; yet never be able to define 
their terms, so as to enter into each other's meaning: because the degrees of these 
qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, 
which may be the standard in the controversy.’21 In other words, arguments about 
God are indeterminate and even meaningless. Given his ideas about the ‘perpetual 
ambiguity’ of words and the radical otherness of God, Hume seems determined to 
press his readers to give up saying anything positive about God. Thus, we are left by 
him, in the words of Terrence W Tilley, ‘with our feet firmly planted in mid-air, unable 
to touch down so as to make progress toward the goal of understanding any meaning 
for talk of God.’22 
Hume’s rigid form of empiricism—that we can know the world around us or even 
the existence of the self only through observation by our senses—came to be 
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embraced by A J Ayer (1910–1989) and others.23 Ayer, in particular, appropriated 
Hume’s distinction between ‘relations of ideas’ (for example, propositions involving 
some contingent observation of the world, such as ‘the sun rises in the East’) and 
‘matters of fact’ (such as mathematical and logical propositions) in the development 
of his own thesis.24 Following Hume and members of the influential ‘Vienna Circle’, 
Ayer posited that only two types of statements could be considered meaningful, or 
of literal significance. These are: (i) statements which are verifiable as true or false, 
and (ii) tautologies (i.e. statements that define themselves such as ‘a beginner has 
just started’ or those that are simply true in virtue of linguistic rules). To the first type 
belong statements of science as well as propositions which convey factual 
information about the empirical world; while statements of mathematics and logic 
belong to the second. Religious or metaphysical statements which do not fall under 
either type are dismissed as ‘meaningless’ because they could not be verified (or 
falsified) empirically. Ethical statements too are adjudged meaningless, for the same 
reason that they could not be verified as true or false.25 The central tenet in Ayer’s 
thesis is what came to be known as the principle of verifiability and to which he offers 
the following formulation: 
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and 
only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to 
express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under 
certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as 
being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a 
character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with 
any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future 
experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere 
pseudo-proposition.26 
                                                     
23 We can count Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead and G E Moore among the ‘others’. 
24 This distinction is famously called Hume’s fork. The term has also been applied to a related 
distinction between ‘demonstrative’ argument and ‘probable’ reasoning; see J Broackes, “fork, 
Hume’s” in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 285.   
25 A J Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd Edn. (New York: Dover Publications, 1946), 107–109, 
however, grants that ethical statements have emotive meaning.   




It should thus occasion no surprise that objection against religion on the basis of the 
criterion of verifiability is much more unanswerable than that which ensues from a 
traditional assault on religion that its beliefs are not true. The believer’s proposition, 
for instance, that ‘God exists’ may be dismissed by his or her opponents as lacking 
evidential support, but at least it is admitted as meaningful. By Ayer’s criterion of 
verifiability, religious beliefs are not even within the realm of truth and falsity, nor do 
they possess any literal significance.27 ‘In other words,’ so notes Dan Stiver, ‘they 
have not achieved the merit of being meaningful, albeit false; they are simply 
cognitive nonsense.’28 Discussing the question of verifiability and its challenge to 
religious language further would take us much too far afield. It should suffice to note 
that the verification principle eventually ‘dissolved in its own acid.’29 The main reason 
for its dissolution is that on applying the very criterion to itself the principle was 
shown to have failed the test of verifiability—it too was as metaphysical as any 
religious statement or proposition. It remains for me to point out that though many 
aspects of Hume’s empiricism had echoes in logical positivism, he should not be 
simply assimilated into that 20th century school of thought. There are important 
divergences.30 For one thing, Hume was not primarily interested in language or logic, 
nor was he concerned about the meaningfulness and verifiability of propositions. And 
though he was ‘sceptical about the power of reason to determine what we believe’31 
he did not reject presuppositions of an external world, causation, and nature. 
Now it must be pointed out that Wittgenstein had also argued for the disavowal 
of metaphysical and religious propositions. That was during an early positivistic phase 
of his philosophising when he bought into the ‘logical atomism’ of his teacher, 
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Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Russell’s theory pre-supposes that the world is made 
up of irreducible particulars which he labelled ‘atoms’ and that there is a perfect one-
to-one correspondence between an ‘atom’ of language and reality. John Macquarrie 
(1919–2007) tells us that underlying Russell’s account of language is a naturalistic 
assumption that because language—and thus knowledge—is confined to the physical 
world, all statements which seek to deal with concerns beyond this world are logically 
invalid, meaningless, or nonsensical.32 Out of the exposure to these ideas and having 
imbibed their logic, Wittgenstein wrote his first book, TLP with the self-confessed aim 
of drawing a limit to ‘the expression of thoughts’ that is language.33 He purported to 
show that ‘what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense’,34 a 
reference to metaphysics, aesthetics and religion. On the basis of what he had written 
about, the philosophers comprising the Vienna Circle, as well as Ayer, were inspired 
to rule out anything except empirical and analytic statements as cognitively 
meaningful. In good time, however, Wittgenstein came to believe that such 
positivistic views were mistaken. In PI, Wittgenstein espouses an entirely new 
approach to considering language, not in terms of whether language refers, but in 
terms of the way it refers. His contention that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language’35 compels a rethink on the part of those who recognise only certain kind of 
language as meaningful while rejecting other kinds as nonsense. In introducing the 
analogy of language-games, one of Wittgenstein’s purposes must surely be to 
indicate that a multiplicity of languages is the order of the day. As his work had been 
of inestimable influence on the study and understanding of language it deserves a 
more detailed consideration which we shall undertake in Chapter 2. There is more to 
the history of the development of thought on language than what is covered above. 
As I mentioned at the outset, my chief concern has been to offer only a sketch of 
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developments leading up to Wittgenstein. Continental philosophers who developed 
structuralism, post-structuralism and deconstructionism have therefore been put to 
one side, at least for now. For our purposes, we shall turn next to a significant 
development in twentieth-century philosophy—the so-called ‘linguistic turn.’36 
The Linguistic Turn 
The expression ‘linguistic turn’ is said to have been introduced by Gustav Bergmann 
(1906–1987), though it is Richard Rorty (1931–2007) who gave it currency by using it 
in a collection of essays entitled The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical 
Method.37 Naturally what concerns us here is not the provenance of the term38 but 
what the ‘turn’ is about. To get to an understanding of the phenomenon we must 
first note that the word ‘turn’ can mean more than a change of direction or course. 
It can also be understood as implying a revolution or reformation of sorts. Indeed in 
explaining why he put together the said collection of essays, Rorty fittingly speaks of 
‘the most recent philosophical revolution, that of “linguistic philosophy”—the term 
‘linguistic philosophy’ being his parlance for the ‘linguistic turn’.39 That the two 
terminologies he uses are identical is not in doubt: consider the following statement 
that he pens immediately thereafter: ‘I shall mean by “linguistic philosophy” the view 
that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either 
by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently 
use.’40 Now the last remark is certainly striking for the claim it makes—that 
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philosophical problems could be solved by simply but closely attending to language. 
In the history of human thought no such role has ever been ascribed to language. 
Bergman had himself given a brief description of the ‘turn’ when he wrote, ‘All 
linguistic philosophers talk about the world by means of talking about a suitable 
language. This is the linguistic turn, the fundamental gambit as to method, on which 
ordinary and ideal language philosophies agree.’41 A recent writer has usefully 
expressed the essential feature of the linguistic turn as representing   
a decidedly modernist redirecting of philosophical attention from an 
outward focus on the perennial problems of philosophy (such as the 
problem of evil, the mind-body problem, the nature of the good, etc.) 
toward a reflexive, inward focusing on the normative vocabulary of 
philosophical discourse itself (asking, rather, what we can coherently 
mean by using the term ‘evil’ and ‘good,’ indeed, what it means to mean 
anything at all; or how to understand and analyse utterances about what 
is better than what, and, indeed, what it means to understand and 
analyse any utterance at all).42 
It may be useful to review how the linguistic turn has come to be adapted in 
analytic philosophical thought. We have already indicated that Wittgenstein’s ideas 
are contributory to the shift; what follows is a brief elaboration of his argument. Here 
I borrow from Carl A Raschke (b. 1944) who tells us that Wittgenstein first sought ‘to 
resolve the plethora of “conceptual muddles” and “pseudo-problems” rife in 
metaphysics and neo-idealism by exposing them as confusions of language.’43 The 
strategy provided is one which sees problems of philosophy as problems concerning 
language, after which they would be easier to overcome. Wittgenstein also argues 
that the grounds of certainty can be found in language, and not (necessarily) in 
metaphysics. His answer according to Raschke, is simply astute: ‘Ordinary language 
had its own built-in certitude because that was the way one spoke.’44 To illustrate 
this, we recall Wittgenstein’s famous remarks: 
When philosophers use a word—'knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, 
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‘proposition’, ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language-game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words 
back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.45 
Two further suggestions in accounting for the turn to language may be briefly 
noted. The first attributes the shift to language to the general awareness that ‘we 
cannot understand knowing or thought apart from the language in which it is 
expressed.’46 Few would disagree with such logic, especially as articulated by 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who insisted that one must first understand knowing 
before one can be sure of what one knows. The second suggestion by Stiver is 
somewhat speculative. Stiver thinks that the traditional epistemological turn was 
supplanted by the linguistic turn because to attend to language seemed to have the 
advantage of a ‘detour’ or perhaps even a short cut. This argument is best quoted in 
its entirety to be appreciated: 
Therefore, to put it perhaps too simply, we must understand speaking in 
order to understand knowing, and perhaps in the end we can return to 
the issue of understanding reality or being. It is true, however, that the 
long road back has appeared too treacherous to many thinkers, so that in 
the meantime the purpose of philosophy has often taken a permanent 
detour from metaphysics in the grand style to more chastened and 
limited enterprises of analysing language.47 
It should occasion little surprise to state that the linguistic turn has left quite an 
imprint on the philosophy of religion and theology. For one thing, a great deal of 
attention has been directed toward theories about language with the welcome result 
that we have become more aware of how our thought, our experience and indeed 
our lives are shaped by language, and not just by historical context. For another, 
philosophers and theologians can no longer be concerned only with questions about 
what reality is or how it can be known; they must now raise a further question, 
namely, what do we mean by what we say in the assumptions, claims and even 
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conclusions we make or draw? It would seem that the question of meaning is prior 
to the question of truth or validity48 and this is not illogical since one must have some 
idea of the meaning of a statement or utterance in question before one can properly 
enter into a discussion as to its truth or falsity.  
What is Language? 
From our brief sketch of developments that have arisen in language, we must now 
pause to attempt an investigation into the nature of language itself. If language has 
indeed been discovered—as we have claimed—the question, ‘What is language?’ 
ought to be a straightforward one. Yet, it is not the case, because the enquiry into 
language is one that presupposes a circularity—that of using the very language to 
inquire about language. As Paul Matthew van Buren (1924–1998) points out, using 
the same Murdoch’s analogy, ‘this means we are in a position like that of a man who 
wishes to examine the lenses of his eyes, yet must have those lenses in place in order 
to carry out his examination.’49 Needless to say, there seems to be no way out of this 
circle, except by a ‘phenomenological’ recourse as has been proposed by Macquarrie. 
Macquarrie’s proposed analysis of language comprises the following action steps: (i) 
that we take developed language as we find it; (ii) that we examine the various 
phenomena that go to constitute language, and (iii) that we endeavour to understand 
the inner workings of language.50 This scheme, Macquarrie further elaborates, may 
‘amount to no more than making explicit and clarifying as far as possible the 
understanding of language which we already have.’51 In what follows, we shall 
attempt something of a phenomenological investigation into the use of words, using 
words to do so. Some views from other sources about language will be introduced 
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for good measure.  
Origin of Language 
We begin with the ‘curious’ question of the genesis of language: is language of divine 
or human origin? Admittedly, this question belongs to the realm of speculation, and 
it is one that may never be resolved agreeably by all. Macquarrie, we read, had 
anticipated that ‘the study of this particular question would turn out to be a blind 
alley for any investigation into the nature of language.’52 Then there are those who 
are quite quick to return a definite answer to the question. In his Treatise on the 
Origin of Language published in 1772, the philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder 
(1744–1803) forthrightly dismissed the hypothesis of the divine origin of language as 
‘groundless’ and therefore not worth pursuing. Interestingly, his argument is said to 
be based on ‘the fact that in order to understand the language of the gods on 
Olympus the human being must already have reason and consequently must already 
have language.’53 It is, however, useful to note that John Milbank (b. 1952) has 
recently contended that Christian orthodoxy has always encouraged a similar point 
of view.54 He cites St Gregory of Nyssa (c.335–395) and Richard Simon (1638–1712) 
(the latter, a priest of the Oratory) as attributing the invention of language to Adam 
rather than God, and adds that ‘this was exactly what the eighteenth century tried to 
see as clear and self-evident—the origins of language, its natural foundation and 
rational succession, and thus the true character of humanity and culture, and the 
belonging of both within nature.’55 Even so, the issue that matters (here, anyway) is 
not whether language has come from God or from Adam; rather it is the question of 
whether one is able to see and accept language as a ‘gift’ from God. To make the 
affirmation that language is a divine gift is not to suggest that language is therefore 
to be accorded a special status that sets it apart from the regular activities which we 
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as humans do and are concerned about. Rather, the affirmation is intended to 
disabuse the ‘naturalistic’ view, made popular by Russell, that language is wholly 
restricted to describing our physical world, with human knowledge confined to 
material reality. In the following passage, Russell’s reductive naturalism about 
language is all too clear:   
A spoken sentence consists of a temporal series of events; a written 
sentence is a spatial series of bits of matter. Thus it is not surprising that 
language can represent the course of events in the physical world; it can, 
in fact, make a map of the physical world, preserving its structure in a 
more manageable form, and it can do this because it consists of physical 
events. But if there were such a world as the mystic postulates, it would 
have a structure different from that of language, and would therefore be 
incapable of being verbally described.56  
The weakness of this sort of view, it will be clear to us, is its refusal or inability to 
consider that words and sentences are more than physical entities which can also 
‘stretch’ beyond our world. Russell’s view rests on a certain assumption, namely, that 
the real is (and can only be) physical. I am, however, not suggesting that it can be 
challenged simply by claiming that language is a gift from God. 
The Ubiquity of Language 
That language is everywhere is well attested by ordinary, casual observation: anyone 
can easily see for themselves that words are used in every context of human life, and 
one can find them in all forms of media, from print media (books, magazines, etc.,) 
to video games. Words are indispensable means or tools by which people 
communicate with each other. For the eminent philosopher of meaning, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), ‘the whole landscape is overrun with words as in an 
invasion.’57 It is, however, important to mention that words can also be thought of as 
acts. In much of our conversation we do more than just speak words: we make 
promises, declare intentions, issue commands and warnings, pronounce judgements 
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or benedictory blessings, and so on. In his ground-breaking William James Lectures, 
John L Austin (1911–1960) takes issue with the then popular assumption that ‘the 
business of a statement can only be to describe some state of affairs, or to state some 
fact.’58 Austin points out that there are utterances (or ‘performatives’ as he labels 
them) which can actually do things—hence the title of his lectures, How to Do Things 
with Words. The following are some examples of ‘performative utterances’ from his 
writing: 
‘I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’—as uttered in 
the course of the marriage ceremony. 
‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’—as uttered when smashing the 
bottle against the stem. 
‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’—as occurring in a will.59 
 
One welcome benefit of the notion of ‘performative utterances’ (or the ‘speech-act 
theory’) has been that language users are enabled to recognise what the later 
Wittgenstein has sought to show, namely, that language is behaviour, indeed a 
distinctively human behaviour. People can sit easy with thinking that language is tied 
to everyday activities of human life, such as ‘commanding, questioning, recounting, 
chatting,’ and that it belongs ‘as much to our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking or playing.’60  
The Embeddedness of Language 
To theologians who have been labelled ‘narrativists’ the ubiquity of language implies 
more than the affirmation that words are everywhere present. They have insisted 
upon a further claim—that the way we think, feel and sense, indeed our whole 
awareness of reality have been formed and shaped by the language which inheres or 
circumscribes our everyday lives, including the stories, myths, narratives, 
propositions and sentences which we hear or which we ourselves tell or produce. As 
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linguistic beings, we are embedded in language as language is embedded in us. 
Gerard Loughlin has offered a helpful explanation of the narrativist understanding of 
language, as follows:  
There is a reciprocal relation between story and story-teller. As I recount 
my life-story, my story produces the ‘I’ which recounts it. I tell the story 
by which I am told. And since I am part of a larger community—one in 
which others tell stories about me, just as I tell stories about them—I am 
the product of many inter-related narratives, as is everyone else.61  
The validity of the narrativist analysis has been demonstrated by recent studies. 
According to Lera Boroditsky, writing in The Wall Street Journal, ‘if you change how 
people talk, that changes how they think.’62 It seems that learning a new language or 
switching to another can also cause a person’s way of looking at life to change. More 
alarming is the finding by Boroditsky that ‘if you take away people's ability to use 
language in what should be a simple non-linguistic task, their performance can 
change dramatically, sometimes making them look no smarter than rats or infants.’63 
To be sure, the narrativist position on language and the findings of recent times cited 
above are nothing new: early linguists like Johann Herder, Wilhem von Humboldt 
(1767–1835) and others had in the eighteenth century already espoused similar 
views.64 Wittgenstein, too, appears to hint of us being shaped by the language within 
which we are embedded. Consider these fascinating words of his:  
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.65 
Naturally, the view of language just presented will raise questions for those 
concerned about truth. Given that our perception is shaped by language how can 
truth be attained without any contribution from the words used in stating it? If 
language is so central to thought, and everything we know we know in and through 
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language, are we then cut off from any direct access to the divine reality? Is there an 
objective reality outside language or is it the case that stories ‘go all the way down’? 
Indeed, can we find meaning in the vastness of the maze of words? 
Meaning 
This leads us to the question of meaning and the reminder that it is a question that 
must precede the question of truth. For until some meaning is found in a statement 
or an utterance, there can be no discussion as to whether what is stated or uttered 
is true or false. As we have put it before, meaning is prior to verifiability. Perhaps it is 
just such a recognition that has prompted the quest for meaning to begin from the 
earliest times in Western history, with Socrates’ keen interest in the meaning of 
concepts like ‘justice,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘good.’  Most certainly, the search for 
meaning has also led to a corresponding and abiding interest in language, given that 
language is believed to be the bearer of meaning. Even the close attention that 
philosophers have paid to religious language has grown out of the controversies over 
how words and statements in religion are to be understood. For many words when 
they are used of God do not fully share the same meaning as when they are applied 
to human beings. Take the statement that God is good or wise or loving but that he 
is not good or wise or loving in the same sense that human beings are.66 Such 
statements are clearly problematic and will invite analysis by both philosophers and 
casual critics. 
In dealing with the question of meaning, a distinction is sometimes made between 
meaning as a ‘mental fact’67 (as in ‘I mean to read Heidegger’s Time and Being’) and 
meaning as logical meaningfulness. Naturally we shall not be concerned with the 
former, which is really an expression of intent. Confusion often occurs when we are 
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not careful to differentiate between the various uses of the word ‘mean’. Here we 
cite, borrowing from Alston, a few more examples in which ‘mean’ is used in a sense 
that is other than logical meaningfulness: 
That is no mean accomplishment. (insignificant) 
The passage of this bill will mean the end of second class citizenship for 
vast areas of our population. (result in) 
He just lost his job. That means that he will have to start writing letters of 
application all over again. (implies)68 
We have still to ask: what is meaning? Or, even better, what is the meaning of 
meaning? In Wittgenstein’s Blue Book, the question ‘What is the meaning of a word?’ 
appears as its opening line, and it is believed that his entire corpus of writing is 
engaged upon the same question.69 The usual response is to think of meaning as an 
object or an entity awaiting to be analysed, and so words get their meaning from the 
facts or state of affairs they represent. In this so-called ‘picture of language,’ 
Wittgenstein remarks,  
we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This 
meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word 
stands.70 
Admittedly, this ‘picture’ theory does seem to fit our own understanding of how 
language operates: words do seem to label things, and a collection of words seem to 
describe states of affairs. It is an understanding that has the backing of the 
philosopher, Russell, no less, whose thesis about atomic words being in perfect 
correspondence with reality we have briefly touched upon. Even Augustine may be 
cited as a proponent. The picture theory, however, encourages the form of logical 
positivism which we saw in Ayer and others, with its dismissal of whole realms of 
religious and metaphysical discourse as meaningless. The theory is also unable to 
incorporate some other important functions of language; indeed, it only appears 
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adequate when applied to a limited pool of examples, such as nouns and certain 
verbs. So here we find Wittgenstein distancing himself from it, and also debunking 
the claim that there is a correspondence between words and objects. He writes, 
It is important to note that the word ‘meaning’ is being used illicitly if it is 
used to signify the thing that ‘corresponds’ to the word. That is to 
confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. 
N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning 
dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to 
have meaning it would make no sense to say ‘Mr. N. N. is dead.’71 
Let us defer further discussion on Wittgenstein’s idea of meaning to a later stage 
in order to return to our attempt to get a working ‘definition’ of meaning. A helpful 
approach has been to call the kind of meaning that belongs to a word its 
‘signification,’ reserving the term ‘meaning’ for whole sentences.72 The usefulness of 
this approach is in the express caution that any single word can be understood only 
within the context of a given discourse. As Gerhard Ebeling (1912–2001) has argued, 
one may well understand each and every individual word comprising a sentence but 
still not understand its overall message.73 It is thus sound advice that one should 
attend to the context of words in order to understand the context of meaning. Yet, 
attention to the context of meaning may well overlook the fact that meaning is ‘an 
event constituted by the dialectic between sense and reference.’74 By ‘sense’ is 
meant ‘the propositional integrity’ of the sentence or linguistic expression75; 
sometimes simply equated with meaning.76 By ‘reference’ is meant ‘naming’; it is ‘the 
proposition’s claim to reach reality.’77 Perhaps a quick example may help to clarify 
the distinction: The statement, ‘Santa Claus will be distributing gifts to those 
attending the party’ makes sense and anyone who speaks English can understand it. 
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So even though the Santa referred to is fictitious, the sense of the statement is not 
compromised. In general then, the sense of what is said does not depend on its truth 
or falsity, whether or not it refers. In his discussion of a certain philosopher’s view of 
language, as well as that of Plato’s, Alston has observed ‘a confused assimilation of 
meaning [read ‘sense’] and reference’ on the part of these thinkers, an assimilation 
he hopes he would later straighten out.78 It is still a temptation for us to pursue 
meaning as primarily informational, overlooking the need to attend to the dialectic 
between the sense of the text and its reference.   
A final point before we bring these initial and tentative thoughts on meaning to a 
close is that it would be ‘wrongheaded’ to think of meaning as some ‘acts that take 
place in the realm of the mind’,79 stored away privately inside our heads. The reason? 
If such were the case, we shall be looking for meaning as if it were a thing or object 
that awaits to be categorised. This tendency to think of meaning as a mental activity 
entrenches us in a picture of the self as very much ‘the autonomous bearer of mental 
and spiritual properties.’80 The assumption that thoughts have an existence and 
function independent of language is also questionable. Thinking is not prior to 
language; indeed, as van Buren explains, ‘although we can think without 
speaking…we cannot think without language.’81 The sum of what we are driving at is 
the location of meaning within a proper social dimension. As Fergus Kerr (b. 1931) so 
aptly puts it, ‘the locus of meanings is not the epistemological solitude of the 
individual consciousness but the practical exchanges that constitute the public world 
which we inhabit together.’82 
Conclusion 
The preceding account is not intended to give a detailed or complete story of the 
phenomenon of language. I am aware of gaps and omissions in what I have written. 
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Still, I hope my survey has called attention to the fact that religion has always been 
concerned about language, for the simple reason that language gives religion a form 
and a means of expression in order that it can survive, spread and flourish. I also hope 
that my brief treatment of the past movements affecting language and the later 
currents of thought about language has shown us that there has been a definite shift 
in how language is understood. Despite voices to the contrary, the epochal ‘turn’ to 
language is far from over; indeed, in my view, it is a development that must still be 
given due attention. Given that language is of interest to theology, or rather, that 
language is needed by theology, the very first task of theology must be to seek for the 
necessary understanding of the nature and character of language. In the following 
chapters, we shall be looking to both Wittgenstein and Lindbeck for insights and 






Wittgenstein’s Relevance for Theology 
 
If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there 
whom we were speaking of.1 
                                                                                                         Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction  
Ludwig Wittgenstein is undoubtedly among the most important and influential 
philosophers of the last century. Whether by consent or dissent, whether through 
understanding or even misunderstanding, his works on philosophy are thought to 
have revolutionised the subject.2 In point of fact, they have inspired the development 
of two major but differing movements of thought, namely logical positivism and so-
called ‘ordinary language philosophy’. These movements, usually associated with the 
two phases of his philosophical life—the early and later Wittgenstein—have had a 
profound influence on many succeeding generations of philosophers. Beyond the 
field of philosophy, Wittgenstein’s insights have also made an impact on areas of 
human endeavour as diverse as culture, politics, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, 
psychology, law and theology.3 In each and every of the disciplines where his 
influence has been felt, his ideas are acknowledged to be original, unconventional, 
and full of subtlety. Wittgenstein’s iconic status has been given a further boost by his 
being named among the 100 ‘most important people of the century’ by Time.4  
In this chapter, we shall be concerned to pursue a narrow compass of inquiry on 
Wittgenstein, namely the significance of his philosophy for religious discourse. We 
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shall not be concerned with all of his philosophy which means that not all aspects of 
his work will be touched on. What I propose to do, however, is to consider his early 
and later works and pick out the issues that, as I see them, have a bearing on 
theology. I will then attempt to interpret and elucidate the thoughts or ideas that he 
expresses as accurately and clearly as I can. Finally, I will also attempt, where 
applicable, to indicate the connection between Wittgenstein’s insights with the 
question of the nature of religious language.  
Our intended task here may seem quite straight-forward, but it is by no means a 
simple one. The reason has to do with the rather terse style and unsystematic form 
in which Wittgenstein has written his philosophy. The text of PI is saturated with 
aphorism, wit and paradox which are hard to comprehend; moreover, the content 
often reflects a multiplicity of voices and perspectives which can be rather confusing 
to the reader. Wittgenstein was well aware that he had written a difficult book that 
few would understand. In a conversation with his friend Norman Malcolm (1911–
1990) after they had both read the book’s typescript, he remarked, ‘The reason I am 
doing this is so there will be at least one person who will understand my book when 
it is published.’5 Another difficulty that assails our task is that although PI is concerned 
with ‘the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition… and other 
things’6, we are never given a complete theory of language. Wittgenstein has 
famously said that he seeks neither to advance any sort of theory, nor to give 
explanations or new information.7 He avers that ‘description alone must take its 
place’ which is an approach that aims to solve philosophical problems ‘by arranging 
what we have always known.’8 Following Wittgenstein, I shall not attempt to seek a 
theory of language. Instead, I shall focus on insights and perspectives that may be 
drawn from his works with a view to applying them to the use of religious language. 
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A Biographical Sketch 
One’s personal life and one’s thinking are profoundly bound together. This is certainly 
true of Wittgenstein. Before his ideas are explored, it is useful to know and 
understand something about the man himself.9 Since our concern is with how his 
philosophy impinges on religious belief, of particular interest to us will be his personal 
attitude to religion. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein was born on 26 April 1889 into a wealthy family in Austria 
and baptised into the Roman Catholic Church. He was the youngest of eight children, 
but three of his brothers would later commit suicide, with Wittgenstein himself 
contemplating it, too. As a very young man, he came to Manchester, England, initially 
to study mechanical engineering. By 1912, his interest having switched to philosophy, 
he went to Cambridge upon the advice of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) to work under 
Bertrand Russell. He did well in his studies and received high praise from Russell and 
G E Moore (1873–1958). Moore, a leading philosopher in his own right, testified: ‘I 
soon came to feel that he [Wittgenstein] was much cleverer at philosophy than I 
was… with a much better insight into the sort of inquiry which was really important 
and best worth pursuing, and into the best method of pursuing such inquiries.’10 
When war broke out, Wittgenstein volunteered for the Austrian army and fought on 
the Russian and Italian fronts. It was while on active duty, and presumably while a 
prisoner-of-war for some months, that he wrote the notes and drafts of his first book, 
TLP, which saw publication after the war.  
From 1920 to 1926, Wittgenstein worked as a teacher before spending two years 
supervising the building of a mansion for his sister in Vienna. These were years spent 
divorced from philosophy because he thought he had solved every philosophical 
problem there was to solve. In the preface to TLP, he had written: ‘[T]he truth of the 
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thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I 
therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of 
the problems.’11 By 1929, however, he was drawn back to philosophy after disputes 
with members of the Vienna Circle over the theory of logical positivism, which his 
Tractatus had, ironically, inspired to a considerable extent.12 In remarks made around 
that time, he seemed already more conciliatory towards religion, though the view of 
religion he proffered could still be regarded as somewhat positivistic: 
Is speech essential for religion? I can quite well imagine a religion in which 
there are no doctrines and hence nothing is said… Therefore nothing 
turns on whether the words are true, false or nonsensical.13 
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in January 1929 as a research student and, 
on completing his PhD the following year, was made a research fellow in philosophy. 
Moore thought that he chose Cambridge ‘for the sake of having the opportunity of 
frequent discussion with F P Ramsey [1903–1930].’14 Be that as it may, for the next 
few years until the outbreak of Second World War, Wittgenstein threw himself wholly 
to working through his new notions of language in classroom lectures, but without 
publishing them. In 1939 just before war broke out, he succeeded Moore as professor 
of philosophy. During the war years (1939–45) he worked as a porter in London and 
later as a laboratory assistant in a hospital in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. He returned to 
his academic post in Cambridge when the war ended but resigned in 1947. Two years 
later, he was diagnosed with cancer and died in 1951. It was during the last years of 
his life that he completed his mature work, PI. 
In his lifetime, Wittgenstein published only two short works. The first is Logisch-
Philosophische Abhandlung which appeared in 1921. It was translated a year later 
into English under the better-known title of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. His 
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second publication was entitled Some Remarks on Logical Form which he had 
prepared in 1929 for the joint session of the Mind Association and Aristotelian 
Society. His later work, i.e. PI, was published posthumously in 1953; it has remained 
one of the most important works of philosophy of the twentieth century. Several 
other publications comprising either unfinished books or lecture notes dictated to his 
students had since appeared under the following titles: Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics (1956, revised 1978), The Blue and Brown Books (1958), Zettel (1967) 
and On Certainty (1969).  
Religion 
The question as to whether Wittgenstein was a believer in the Christian faith has 
often been raised by those concerned with the significance of his philosophical 
reflections for religion. The matter, however, cannot be easily settled, as he did not 
make any profession of faith, nor was he formally linked to any church.15 It seems 
that in his youth he was contemptuous of the Christian faith, though this attitude 
soon changed. We are given an impression of the change in his religious outlook by 
one of his closest friends who relates, 
Throughout his adult life Wittgenstein’s attitude to religion was anything 
but that of a hostile positivist critic. He always gave his own religion 
during his wartime service as ‘Roman Catholic’. Amongst his closest 
friends and most appreciated pupils he happily numbered many 
christians [sic]. It is said that when he encountered the rituals of 
organised religion he observed them with demur. He never spoke 
derisorily about Christianity, or its priests and pastors. When other 
philosophers expressed contempt for religious beliefs, Wittgenstein on 
occasion rebuked them.16 
W Donald Hudson (1920–2003) who provided this account also concluded that 
Wittgenstein was not a religious believer.17 The views of other friends of 
Wittgenstein’s, namely, Norman Malcolm, Georg von Wright (1916–2003) and G E M 
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Anscombe (1919–2001)—all of whom were eminent philosophers in their own 
right—are not dissimilar; Malcolm for instance, was ‘confident enough about the 
matter to deny that he was a religious man.’18  
Yet, religion does receive a great deal of mention in Wittgenstein’s writings. Even 
if we agree with Alan Keightley that one has to tread very warily with respect to those 
direct references to religion in Wittgenstein’s corpus, one must still grant that their 
preponderance does cast doubt on the view that he was not religious or that he had 
no interest in religion.19 As for Norman Malcolm, faced with the vast amount of 
remarks about religion found in the Nachlass (the collection of notes made by 
Wittgenstein) and in Culture and Value, he has since modified his judgement about 
Wittgenstein’s religiosity.20 He now thinks Wittgenstein ‘was more deeply religious 
than are many people who correctly regard themselves as religious believers.’21 
We must also consider the following enigmatic disclosure which Wittgenstein is 
said to have made to his friend Maurice O’Connor Drury (1907–1976): ‘I am not a 
religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.’22 
What does being in such a state tell us about the person himself? We may draw 
several conclusions here. Although not outwardly religious, religion did matter to 
him. He was concerned to reflect often and deeply about its relevance and 
outworking in his everyday life. Discerning the depth and persistence of 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts about religion in his notes from 1937 onwards, Kerr avers 
that they ‘disclose a sympathetic and penetrating understanding of the subject that 
few Christians, never mind professed non-believers, could match.’23 
Whether Wittgenstein’s religiosity has anything to do with his attack on logical 
positivism we shall never know, though we think it is his discrediting of this ‘old Adam’ 
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of analytic philosophy that makes many people think he was an ally of religion.24 
There is an interesting record of his conversation with Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), 
the leader of the Vienna Circle, which seems to indicate that even in the early days 
of the logical positivist movement, his attitude towards religious belief was different 
from that of Schlick and the other logical positivists. Wittgenstein did agree that 
doctrines of religion had no theoretical content, but he was not with them in 
consigning religion to a childhood phase of humanity or oblivion. At one stage in the 
conversation he even defended the admissibility of a metaphysical statement made 
by some philosopher.25  
Wittgenstein’s Early & Later Phases 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical life, we have noted, comprises an ‘early’ phase, 
exemplified by TLP, and a ‘later’ phase, articulated in PI. Separating the two periods 
is an interval of several years, during which Wittgenstein even gave up philosophising 
all together. Whatever view one takes on such a periodisation of the philosopher’s 
career, it is clear that there are marked differences between the ‘two’ Wittgensteins. 
For a start, the two books that Wittgenstein wrote could not have been more 
different in terms of style and presentation, and we are told in his preface to PI that 
there are ‘grave mistakes’ in his first book.26 To be sure, we are not suggesting that 
the books simply negate one another, as some have claimed.27 If that had been the 
case, Wittgenstein would not have expressed the wish to publish them together, nor 
would he have said that the new ideas in his later work ‘could be seen in the right 
light only by contrast with and against the background of [his] old way of thinking.’28  
Still, several commentators have questioned whether a strict division in 
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Wittgenstein’s thought can be made and cautioned against an exaggeration of the 
differences between the earlier and later works. Their main contention is that the 
fundamental issue which engages Wittgenstein remained unchanged throughout. 
Duncan J Richter writing for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for instance, 
contends that Wittgenstein’s writings spanning the two periods ‘attack much the 
same problems, [although] they just do so in different ways.’29 While acknowledging 
marked differences of style and content between the works in question, Anthony 
Kenny (b. 1931) detects many connections and common assumptions between 
them.30 Given that ‘there are both continuities and discontinuities in Wittgenstein’s 
thought,’ adds yet another commentator, ‘we would be better off acknowledging 
that his writings are “related to one another in different ways” (PI, §65) and turning 
to the more productive task of investigating those relations in greater detail.’31 These 
remarks are certainly valid, prompting us to pick out not only the discontinuities 
between Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy, but the continuities as well.  
In both periods of Wittgenstein’s philosophical career, his preoccupation has 
been the task of attending to the question of meaning and its implication for 
connecting thought, language and the world. As Hudson confidently maintains, ‘one 
of his main concerns throughout was to clarify the nature of reality from a 
consideration of language.’32 In TLP, Wittgenstein exudes confidence in explaining 
the nature of language, drawing what he terms ‘a limit to thinking’ or more carefully 
put, a limit ‘to the expression of thoughts.’33 He divides language between what 
makes sense and what does not, and between what can and what cannot be said. In 
the preface to this work, he expresses the view that the problems of philosophy are 
due to the misunderstanding of the logic of language.34 In PI, the same aim of 
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understanding the structure and limit of thought is pursued, as is the attempt to 
provide a critique of language. Evidently, some of the ideas and insights developed 
and arrived at in TLP continued to serve as a leading thread in his later work.  
Of the discontinuities between the two periods in question the most basic is that 
which relates to the methodology of inquiry employed by Wittgenstein. In the 
preface to PI, Wittgenstein has asked us to contrast his later work with his ‘old way 
of thinking’—that is, his former method of doing philosophy. The implication is 
difficult to miss—it is that his old way and his new way of thinking are in opposition. 
Indeed, the two ways or methods are, as K T Fann (b. 1937) puts it, ‘poles apart.’35 
Fann further elaborates, ‘The Tractatus follows the methods of traditional theoretic 
construction (even though to construct only a ‘ladder’ to be abandoned at the end) 
while the Investigations employs what can best be described as the method of 
dialectic.’36  
Wittgensteinian Fideism 
It has sometimes been suggested that Wittgenstein should be more widely read and 
appropriated by theologians than has been the case. Kerr, whose work we have 
earlier referenced, thinks that the charge of ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ against the 
philosopher may have deterred theologians from taking him seriously. This 
repugnant label with which Wittgenstein’s name is linked owes its genesis to the 
atheist philosopher, Kai Nielsen (b. 1926) the author of a widely-circulated article of 
that title.37 Fideism takes the view that religion is ‘self-contained’, as being in a class 
of its own, and therefore is immune from any criticisms that are based on criteria of 
meaning or truth drawn from any other domain or enterprise. According to this view, 
the concepts and tenets of faith are intelligible only to the insider, which is a nice way 
of saying unless you believe, you cannot understand the faith and have no right to 
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criticise it.  
Certain strands in the later work of Wittgenstein do seem to license a fideistic 
approach to religion. The most common is that of a ‘language-game’, with its specific 
rules, applicable and intelligible only to the players. Another strand is that of the 
notion of a ‘form of life’, which illustrates that language is bound up with the 
community within which it is used, and is subject to its own particular ‘grammar’. A 
third strand is that Wittgenstein seems to think that it is not the business of 
philosophy to play the master adjudicator in questions about God, recalling his 
insistence that philosophy should leave everything as it is. These strands do render a 
good description of an innocuous form of fideism: that religion is a form of life which 
has to be simply accepted; or, that religious discourse, like a language-game, has its 
own rules and goals; that people should let religion be, and not try to criticise it or 
interfere with it. More will have to be said about Wittgenstein’s notions of a ‘form of 
life’ and a ‘language-game’. In the meantime, let us simply note that there is little 
agreement on what Wittgenstein really means by these phrases. For instance, 
Norman Malcolm, whose work we have already referenced, is said to have 
understood religion as a ‘form of life’. If this is correct, his remark in which the two 
phrases in question appear, gives us a perfect illustration of fideism:  
Religion is a form of life; it is language embedded in action—what 
Wittgenstein calls a ‘language-game’. Science is another. Neither stands 
in need of justification, the one no more than the other.38 
To be sure, the attempt to infer that by ‘form of life’ Wittgenstein means religion 
has been found wanting by Kerr, citing textual grounds. Based on his reading of PI, 
Kerr points out that when Wittgenstein uses this particular phrase, he has only small-
scale activities in mind. The list of activities that can be considered ‘forms of life’ runs 
as follows: giving and obeying orders, describing, surmising, forming a hypothesis, 
telling a story, joking, counting, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying.39 Clearly, only 
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the ‘very elementary patterns of social interaction’ are meant, so it is wide of the 
mark to equate ‘forms of life’ with something as vast and both internally and 
externally diverse as religion.40 Nevertheless, Kerr concedes that Wittgenstein may 
have been a fideist.41 Kerr notes,     
There are no grounds in Wittgenstein’s text for the version of Fideism (so-
called) which makes great play with his notions of ‘form of life’ and 
‘language game’. This doesn’t mean… that much of what he is reported 
to have said specifically about religion might not be reasonably held to 
move in the direction of a certain Fideism.42 
The problems produced by fideism have been well-rehearsed and so may be 
passed over. It is, however, useful to note how fideism itself emerges as a problem. 
There must first be the domains of reason and faith to begin with, for if either one is 
not present there can be no fideism. Fideism emerges once reason and faith are 
divided into distinct domains without any traffic whatsoever between them, or when 
one domain is reduced to the other. For our purposes here, we are only concerned 
with the fideist who interprets religion as a self-contained enterprise and who urges 
reliance on faith rather than reason. This sort of fideist operates as though the 
domain of faith is all that mattered, such that reason is disparaged or denigrated. 
They make the further claim that because the language of faith they use is sui generis 
and private, they can have no public accountability whatsoever. What follows from 
such a fideistic stance is well anticipated by D Stephen Long (b. 1960), whose 
invective equally applies to the fideist who privileges and uses ‘pure’ reason to 
displace faith: 
A putative ‘public’ reason seeks to force people of faith into an arational 
space where they can have their faith in private. Some people accept that 
‘invitation’ and act accordingly, refusing to be policed by a putative 
universal reason… If the language of faith is nothing but the assertion of 
our will to power, it can have no public accessibility. Likewise if we have 
no public accessibility for our languages and practices, then the only way 
to adjudicate differences is through force, power, and coercion. This is 
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why fideism can be a serious political problem. We see ‘fideism’ among 
those persons and religious movements who cling to a faith devoid of all 
reason and allow it to guide their actions without any rational 
accountability to the consequences of their actions…43  
In spite of possible shortcomings, fideism has much worth commending. Two of 
its merits may be briefly noted. One is its recognition that religion is not a hypothesis 
about how or what the world is and, moreover, that belief in God is not a matter of 
intellectual demonstration. Religion is rather a way of life, to be embraced and lived 
out in daily practice. To apply the canons of the sciences to prove or disprove religious 
beliefs such as the existence of God is simply wrongheaded. The second merit is the 
relief it affords the believer who is weary of justifying his religious convictions to 
those who are unbelievers. While it is not defensible to claim immunity from external 
criticism, a fideistic believer confronted by unbelievers may well be warranted to 
question whether his or her critics know what they are talking about. 
A return to or an unquestioning embrace of fideism is not likely; nor should one 
press for it. We have no quarrels with the church’s past rejection of fideism—for 
pitting faith against reason. However, the self-confident, anti-fideist believer should 
guard against mischaracterising the nature of the Christian religion by turning 
religion, as we have earlier remarked, into a hypothesis to be debated or examined 
in abstraction. Wittgenstein has sounded a cautionary note:  
Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has 
happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of 
something that actually takes place in human life. For ‘consciousness of 
sin’ is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith. Those 
who speak of such things… are simply describing what has happened to 
them…44 
The best counter to fideism is, perhaps, to draw on Wittgenstein’s argument that 
no private language exists. As more will be said about this argument later in the 
chapter, here we shall briefly remark that if we grant that there is no private 
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language, it follows that language must always bear within itself a public accessibility 
and be publicly answerable to a considerable extent.  
Wittgenstein’s Anti-Cartesianism  
It may come as a surprise to read a remark by David Pole that though Wittgenstein 
initiated the study of language, his interest ‘was not in language itself taken as a field 
of inquiry in its own right [but] in the roots of philosophical perplexity which he 
located there.’45 The truth of this disclosure is not to be gainsaid given Wittgenstein’s 
tendency to be concerned with what underlies the way language is viewed and 
understood. Recall, for instance, his characterisation of philosophy as ‘a battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.’46 Or, when he 
famously says the aim of philosophy is ‘To shew [sic] the fly the way out of the fly-
bottle.’47 
One of the philosophical assumptions that greatly bothers Wittgenstein is the 
Cartesian paradigm of the self. According to which, the self—famously known in the 
literature as the Cartesian ‘I’—is the ‘thing that thinks’ or res cogitans. The body, on 
the other hand, is not a thing that thinks. Descartes further insists that the ‘I’ that is 
him is the mind, not the human body with its physical parts. Descartes’ own words 
cannot be clearer about such a dualist conception: 
At last I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I 
am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. 
For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally 
cease to exist… I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that 
is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason—words whose 
meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing 
which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have 
just said – a thinking thing [...] I am not that structure of limbs which is 
called a human body.48 
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In the same ‘foundationalist’ vein, Descartes can even argue from the ‘clear and 
distinct ideas’ in his mind to the existence of God, but that is another story.49 What 
concerns us here is his view of the mind in relation to the body. Having posited that 
the mind is the thinking substance he is led to relegate the body—considered also a 
‘thing’—to the status of a mere automaton. Thus, the mind and the body are both 
separate and different to each other, the former having no extension in space and is 
immaterial, whereas the latter like other physical objects, occupies space and is 
material. Puzzled by the strict division he has thus fashioned, and being unable to 
explain the causal nexus between the two, Descartes further postulates that the 
mind, being a bodiless thing, is housed in a material body. With such a dualistic 
conception of the human person, Wittgenstein is clearly not altogether comfortable 
as his comments below reveal: 
We feel then that in the cases in which ‘I’ is used as subject, we don’t use 
it because we recognise a particular person by his bodily characteristics; 
and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something 
bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to 
be the real ego, the one of which it was said, ‘Cognito, ergo sum’.—‘Is 
there then no mind, but only a body?’ Answer: The word ‘mind’ has 
meaning, i.e., it has a use in our language; but saying this doesn't yet say 
what kind of use we make of it.50 
One result of Descartes’ notion of the res cogitans is the emergence of a picture 
of the fully self-conscious, autonomous and disembodied individual. It is a picture of 
the self that, according to Kerr, many philosophers including Wittgenstein have 
striven to revise, if not obliterate altogether.51 This is because the ‘worldless ego’ thus 
created is individualistic to the point of being isolated from and totally impenetrable 
to other selves. Furthermore, the perspective of this Cartesian ‘I’ is so completely 
egocentric that the individual cannot be sure if other bodies surrounding him or her 
are real or not. The following scenario in Descartes’ Second Meditation illustrates just 
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how egocentric the ‘I’ can be: 
But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as 
I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves 
just as I say I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which 
could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something 
which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the 
faculty of judgement which is in my mind.52 
Descartes makes the point that he judges the hats and cloaks he has seen beyond his 
window as covering human beings and not machines; presumably he could have 
judged otherwise. Clearly, he is claiming that the ‘I’ is in a position to decide what to 
make of the surrounding world, perhaps giving it a God-like status. The resultant 
picture of an individual who is self-conscious, autonomous and all-responsible is still 
very much with us today. It is a picture that Wittgenstein finds difficulty with. In a 
lecture delivered in the 1930s, Wittgenstein had already expressed his opposition to 
such an emphasis on the Cartesian ‘I’.53 That word ‘I’—the first-person pronoun— is 
one among others he proposes should be brought back from its metaphysical misuse 
to its home in everyday conversation: 
When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, 
‘proposition’, ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back 
from their metaphysical to their everyday use.54 
Yet, the idea of the Cartesian ego dies hard; and modern theology seems very 
much saturated with it. Kerr, who is concerned to alert Christians to the rise of human 
subjectivity, counts many major contemporary theologians55 among those who are 
decidedly Cartesian dualist in mode of thought, especially in terms of their 
epistemological assumptions about the individual. One of those named has even 
affirmed that ‘there must be no going back on “the transcendental-anthropological 
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turn in philosophy since Descartes.”’56 What they had inadvertently brought on—so 
Kerr charges—is an ‘inverted theology,’ the type of theology in which the individual 
(ego) is at the centre of theological reflection as well as the starting point.57  
What is relevant to our study is that the Cartesian paradigm of the solipsistic self 
has also fostered an inclination ‘to think of meaning as some essentially occult state 
or act inside one’s consciousness, radically inaccessible to anyone else’.58 This follows 
from the belief that the self, concealed inside the person exists and thinks, while 
matter merely extends in space, whose existence could even be doubted. Now mind 
and matter are distinguished by the theory of knowledge into a distinction of subject 
and object, for the subject is what knows, and matter is the object of thought and 
knowledge. What enters the mind as content are ideas such as mental images, 
sensations, thoughts and even pain. Following an ancient principle, Descartes had 
held that ‘there must be at least as much [reality] in the efficient and total cause as 
in the effect of that cause.’59 In virtue of this conception of ideas—and by extension, 
meaning—as being in the mind and therefore radically private has become 
assimilated into our epistemologies, most people today do still think of thinking as a 
private mental activity. It follows that knowledge of material objects is gained by 
one’s inspection of the ideas inside one’s mind that correspond to or represent the 
reality outside one’s mind—an ‘inside/outside picture of knowledge’,60 as Charles 
Taylor (b. 1931) calls it. Yet, it is a picture which does not sit well with Wittgenstein—
or should not with us, either—because the assumption is still that of the self who is 
concealed as well as imprisoned inside the person. 
This simile of ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the mind is pernicious. It is derived from 
‘in the head’ when we think of ourselves as looking out from our heads 
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and of thinking as something going on ‘in our head’. But we then forget 
the picture and go on using language derived from it.61 
Two uncanny trends are the upshot of the inside/outside epistemological 
framework, namely the aspiration to seek a representation of reality by means of 
language, and a disregard for the mediation of the community in one’s quest for an 
absolute conception of reality. Wittgenstein would counter that language is not 
always representational, and that the role of the community cannot ever be 
downplayed since one cannot step outside a community to gain any objective 
perspective of things. I would further add the concern that the inside/outside 
paradigm encourages one to be rather sceptical since one is in doubt as to whether 
language can ever grasp the external world and God. That paradigm assumes that 
what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’ are two regions of being. Knowledge, as James 
K A Smith (b. 1970) puts it, becomes ‘a matter of getting something “inside” our 
minds to hook onto things “outside” our minds.’62 If language is the means by which 
external things are represented or copied, one is still entitled to question whether 
our perception matches these objects, which is the ground for the radical 
epistemological scepticism exhibited by Descartes at the beginning of the 
Meditations. But if religious language is given a full Wittgenstein treatment of 
rehabilitation from such dualist assumptions, and is rid of its representational role, 
one would be able to worry less about not getting ‘what are out there’ right. 
Resources for Theology 
We must now turn to consider how some of Wittgenstein’s thoughts and ideas have 
been or could be relevant for theology.  
1. Meaning 
Wittgenstein has always been concerned about the question of meaning; indeed, 
as we have noted, all his works revolve around this particular topic. Much of his first 
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book, TLP, is devoted to what scholars have called the ‘picture theory’ of meaning. 
Briefly stated, this theory maintains that propositions reflect the nature of what they 
represent. In the Blue Book (so named because its content comprises Wittgenstein’s 
lecture notes for students bound in blue cloth) the question ‘What is the meaning of 
a word?’ is not only raised, it even appears at the very beginning of the book.63 In PI, 
the concept of meaning is a key concern.64 
The question of meaning in religious discourse is now widely held to be prior to 
the question of truth or falsity. This is an entirely logical and sound position: in order 
to verify whether an assertion is true or false, one must first be clear about its 
meaning. As Hudson puts it, ‘Any proposition, say, “John loves Mary”, must (logically) 
be known to be meaningful before it can be known to be true or false.’65 In her 
insightful study, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, Nancey C Murphy has 
provided a helpful illustration of how the judgement that philosophical problems 
could best be addressed by first attending to language has supplanted the concern 
over epistemological issues: 
…we might say that whereas ancient and medieval philosophers asked 
metaphysical questions about what there is, early modern philosophers 
recognised a prior question: how can we know what exists? Late modern 
philosophers ask: what do we mean when we say that we know 
something? (or, what are the linguistic categories needed to give a 
complete account of what there is?). It should not be surprising, then, 
that a great deal of attention has been given… to the development of 
explicit theories about language, answering especially the question: how 
does language get its meaning? Or, better: what is the meaning of 
meaning?66 
Wittgenstein’s Early Theory 
Since Wittgenstein’s later views can only be understood against the background 
of his old way of thinking, let us now return to the ‘picture theory’ of meaning that 
we find in TLP. According to this theory, language consists of propositions, with each 
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proposition standing for—or ‘picturing’—a definite state of affairs in the world. ‘In a 
proposition,’ Wittgenstein posits, ‘a thought can be expressed in such a way that 
elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.’67 In 
other words, there is an unambiguous correspondence between language and reality, 
such that individual words in language are labels for objects or things other than 
themselves, and sentences are combinations of such labels or names.68 The 
supposition, derived from logical atomism, is that the world is a ‘totality of facts’ 
comprising states of affairs,69 which, in turn, can be reduced to a collection of objects 
or simples.70 Language can likewise be reduced, with each level of the structure of 
language matching a level of structure in the world. What language reduces to is a 
collection of ‘elementary’ propositions—so-called as they cannot be further 
analysed—which match facts in the world. Thus, the early Wittgenstein comes to 
view language as a perfect mirror of the world: there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between a proposition and the situation it describes. Anticipating possible objection 
to such a schema, Wittgenstein proffers the following comparison: 
At first sight a proposition—one set out on the printed page, for 
example—does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is 
concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture 
of a piece of music, nor our phonetic notion (the alphabet) to be a picture 
of speech. And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the 
ordinary sense, of what they represent.71 
Apparently, he does seem to have made a strong case for insisting upon the 
correlation between ‘name’ and ‘object’. His reasoning is robust, though as will be 
shown, such correlation is valid only within a narrow range of words:  
The word ‘Excalibur’, say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The 
sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are 
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combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the 
sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade’ makes sense whether Excalibur is 
still whole or is broken up. But if ‘Excalibur’ is the name of an object, this 
object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no 
object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. 
But then the sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade’ would contain a word 
that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it 
does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to 
the words of which it consists…72  
So convinced was Wittgenstein that the picture theory (also known as the referential 
theory) he has formulated is valid and that he had consequently solved the central 
problem of philosophy, he quit the practice of philosophy.73  
Wittgenstein’s Later Theory 
When Wittgenstein returned to philosophy many years later, he questioned the 
assumptions upon which the theory of meaning espoused in TLP was based. Some of 
the issues he has problems with may be briefly reviewed.  
Firstly, he rejects the notion that elementary propositions are logically 
independent of each other. He counters that they can be logically related to one 
another within systems, and that if we are to understand any single proposition we 
must take into account the whole system to which it belongs. Wittgenstein also 
challenges the idea that the simples in a proposition must have a one-to-one 
correspondence with the basic blocks making up reality. His critique of this 
assumption comprises two parts, namely, that it makes no sense to think of reality as 
comprising simples because the attempt to distinguish between simple and 
composite is bound to fail; and that the one-to-one correspondence between 
language and reality fails to maintain a separation between meaning and the signified 
object.  
Wittgenstein, we have noted, admitted ‘grave mistakes’ in TLP. Accordingly, in PI, 
he devoted much attention to refuting and correcting many of the assumptions and 
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doctrines of the picture theory. However, he never presented his later work as an 
absolute repudiation of the earlier work. We recall again his express desire for both 
works to be published within a single cover. Unsurprisingly, we find in PI the same 
quest for answers to essentially the same question about how language is related to 
the world. The key difference is that whereas in TLP Wittgenstein had turned to logic 
for answers to questions about language and meaning, he now placed the problems 
of logic within the wider, and much more complicated, nexus of human existence. As 
Anthony Thiselton has rightly perceived, in the later Wittgenstein ‘language was now 
grounded not in a single comprehensive abstract calculus of formal logic, but in the 
varied and particular activities of human life.’74 
PI opens with a passage from Augustine’s Confessions (I:8) in which the saint 
recounts his experience as a child learning a language. The narrative clearly reveals 
the epistemological predicament of the infant Augustine.75 Wittgenstein uses it to 
summarise a ‘particular picture of the essence of human language’ that he 
(Wittgenstein) would distance himself from. He imputes the following idea of 
language to Augustine:  
The individual words in language name objects—sentences are 
combinations of such names.—In this picture of language we find the 
roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is 
correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.76    
This summary will sound familiar for it is much like the confused theory of language 
espoused in TLP. The view of language correlating a word and an object may seem 
‘natural’ or ‘commonsensical’ to us, but Wittgenstein has identified problems with 
this view, namely, (i) locating meaning in atomised words rather than in their use, 
and (ii) learning words by ostensive definition rather than from a wider context. The 
issues are closely related, as one leads to another: if the meaning of a word is located 
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in the object that the word stands for, then meaning is obtained by us pointing to the 
object. The assumption behind this so-called ‘ostensive teaching of words’ should not 
escape us: ‘Meaning is reference: a word refers to a thing and the “hook” between 
the two is “meaning”.’77  
While Wittgenstein does not say that Augustine’s theory is entirely wrong, he 
considers the saint’s conception of how language works ‘primitive.’78 He thinks that 
as a system of communication it is only appropriate within a narrow range of words. 
He explains,  
Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only 
not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say 
this in many cases where the question arises ‘Is this an appropriate 
description or not?’ The answer is: ‘Yes it is appropriate, but only for this 
narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were 
claiming to describe.’79  
We need to remember that Wittgenstein is here correcting himself as well, for he 
has once held the same ‘representational’ theory that a language functions only to 
name objects. It seems that he had been so focused on finding solutions to the 
philosophical problems about the nature of propositions that the perspective of how 
everyday language actually functions escapes him.80 If Wittgenstein had been able to 
see the contrast between what his theory leads him to claim and the workings of 
ordinary language, he would have seen far earlier that naming objects is far from the 
only function of words.  
The inclusion of Augustine’s story also enables Wittgenstein to make the point 
that meaning is not just a ‘mental activity’.81 The inclination to think of meaning as 
being in the head is, as we have noted, a legacy of the Cartesian dualist bent to cast 
a divide between the mental and the physical, tempting us to picture the self as fully 
autonomous and solitary, locked within a private world inaccessible to other persons. 
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Having thus argued that the meaning of words is located neither in the object with 
which they are associated nor in one’s head, Wittgenstein arrives at the brilliant 
notion of defining meaning in terms of use. The meaning of words, he decides, is to 
be understood by the way in which words are used within their context.  
In the course of his investigation, Wittgenstein would propose a new image to 
convey the nature of language along the following lines:  
Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from 
various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs 
with straight regular streets and uniform houses.82 
In this picture of language, one sees language in an entirely new and dynamic way. 
Language is shaped and built up over time; its growth is historical, not a construction 
built according to some plan and completed all at once. Also, as no uniform plan 
forms the basis of an ancient city; similarly, no uniform logic or grammar forms the 
basis of our language. The additions to the city refer to new terminologies and 
vocabularies which are added to deal with change. Most importantly, just as we think 
of a city as having a population of people, language too is at the centre of all social 
interactions. This manner of conceiving language, I should add, is important for the 
direction of my present project. Closely linked to this analogy are the concepts of 
language-games and form of life. To these we shall now turn.  
2. ‘Language-Games’ (Sprachspiel) 
Wittgenstein introduces the highly influential notion of ‘language-games’ at the 
beginning of PI with the intention of encompassing the whole of language, and all the 
actions and performances woven into it.83 Whatever the subsequent understandings 
given to ‘language-games’, the term has evolved into common parlance. In what 
follows, I shall be concerned with two questions. The first is: what does Wittgenstein 
mean by the concept of language-games? The second question is: why does he 
introduce it? These questions should prepare us in inquiring into how ‘language-
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games’ apply to religious language. 
With respect to the first question, the term is first applied by Wittgenstein to 
simple activities such as his imaginary builders, children’s games with words such as 
‘ring-a-ring-a-roses’, and the way children learn their native language.84 Later, he 
includes many more examples, including giving orders and obeying them, reporting 
an event, making up a story and reading it, making a joke, asking, cursing, greeting, 
praying, and so on.85 Wittgenstein does not tell us what a language-game actually is, 
or how one is to be identified.86 Instead, he stresses that there are countless different 
kinds of words and sentences which make up language-games, and that there are 
countless different uses of such utterances.87 ‘This multiplicity,’ he underscores, ‘is 
not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-
games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get 
forgotten.’88 If the last remark is true it will bear on how we understand religious 
language. We will consider this issue in the next chapter. 
It may be useful if I mention here that the notion of language-games is intended 
by Wittgenstein to be no more than an analogy. In his own words, ‘language-games 
are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts 
of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.’89 If so, it 
can hardly be justifiably claimed by anyone that Wittgenstein had intended to 
construe language in general as a ‘mere game’.90 Nor should the concept be 
misconceived as a sanction for fideism, a charge with which, we have noted, 
Wittgenstein’s name has been linked. In defence of Wittgenstein, we need only point 
out that of the language-games he exemplified, most are not exclusively associated 
with particular practices. For by ‘language-games’, Wittgenstein does not have in 
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mind complete domains of discourse (scientific, religious, political, and so forth). 
Moreover, he asks us always to look out for ‘similarities’ or ‘family resemblances’ 
between language-games.91 That Wittgenstein does not wish ‘to draw strict 
boundaries between language-games’92 and even admits to similarities between 
them must be read as a negation of any fideistic inference that there is no 
commonality at all. We can see again an obvious application here—that those who 
use the religious language-game are not to suppose that they are hermitically sealed 
against overtures and inputs from other types of discourse. 
The question of why the expression ‘language-game’ was introduced is a natural 
one to raise. I propose that it is to refute the view in TLP that language is ‘an object 
or independent entity, all above-board and open for detached inquiry and analysis.’93 
At bottom, what Wittgenstein wants to show is one’s behaviour and the language 
one uses are very closely woven together. Thiselton is thus correct to understand the 
language-game analogy as seeking to highlight ‘the fact that language-uses are 
grounded in the particular surroundings of situations in human life.’94 Like games, 
language or the speaking of language is a social and rule-guided activity, and it is 
embedded in life. He further notes that the analogy also illustrates that language is 
not to be used in a singular and uniform way.95 As we have been informed by 
Wittgenstein himself, there are ‘many kinds of sentence’ and ‘countless different 
kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences".’96  
We may perhaps advance another reason why the concept of language-games 
was created. What it is will have an obvious application to religious language which 
will be taken up in the next chapter. Let us draw a parallel between the two. Games 
are usually played according to rules, but the rules that have force in one game may 
not apply in another. In a similar vein, certain terms and concepts which are 
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meaningful for a game for the part they play within it, may have no relevance in 
another. There is, for instance, no such thing as ‘targeting a bull’s eye’ in a game of 
chess. In the case of religious language, some of its terms and concerns will simply 
not make sense if they are uttered outside their original context. The question ‘Is 
Jesus the Messiah?’ will not interest or fully make sense to those who are not part of 
a religious tradition in which messiahship has significance. By means of language-
games, what Wittgenstein has done is recognise that language can be conceived as 
having different ‘concrete entities’.97 Within its own ‘entity’ the religious language-
game is properly played, under the circumstances and terms in which it is set.  
3. ‘Form of Life’ (Lebensform) 
What does Wittgenstein mean when he uses the phrase ‘form of life’? As in the 
case of ‘language-game’, we are not offered any precise definition of the term. 
Opinions are thus not only divided about its meaning but also as to whether it is a 
useful concept at all. A close reading of the passages where the phrase appears in PI 
will confirm how difficult it is to know precisely what is meant: 
‘[T]o imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.’98 
‘[T]he term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact 
that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life.’99  
‘It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of 
life.’100 
‘[T]he phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life.’101 
‘What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of 
life.’102 
Yet, from these expressions it is possible to deduce a number of ways in which the 
notion ‘form of life’ may be understood: ‘transcendentally (e.g. as a necessary 
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condition for the possibility of communication); biologically (e.g. an evolutionary 
account of how practice is possible); and culturally (e.g. a sociological or 
anthropological account of what members of a particular social group have in 
common)’.103  
In a recent study, Steven Knowles reveals an understanding of ‘form of life’ that I 
think is reached by the very approach just enunciated. For instance, he takes the use 
of the phrase to illustrate ‘that language is intrinsically bound up with communities 
who evolve and change through the process of ongoing dialogue and activity.’104 He 
further suggests that the idea of ‘form of life’ is a reference to the cultural 
phenomena of language, all of which is valid because the term in question is certainly 
linked to language and its use. The phrase seems also intended by Wittgenstein to 
remind us that language is embedded in daily human life, and that it is within the 
social context that the meaningfulness of language is located. Perhaps Ignace D’hert 
is correct in saying that the notion of ‘form of life’ is ‘simply a deepening of the 
concept of language-game’ and that it does not add anything new to our 
knowledge.105  
However, if the concept of ‘form of life’ is anything like what we have said, the 
implications for understanding the nature of language are immense. For one thing, 
the process of understanding a language will require more than an understanding of 
its rules of grammar and its vocabulary. It would entail an interaction with the culture, 
the environment and, not least, the people who are the users of that particular 
language. As has been widely acknowledged, we cannot understand language except 
by being ‘part of an activity which is not simply oral.’106 This point is subtly driven 
home in a remark by Wittgenstein that ‘[i]f a lion could talk, we could not understand 
him.’107 We can see why this should be the case: it is because a lion does not share 
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our forms of life so that even if he could utter words we would still not be able to tell 
what he communicated. 
As the notions of ‘form of life’ and ‘language-games’ seem for most purposes to 
come to much the same thing, I shall henceforth subsume the former into the latter 
in my subsequent discussion.  
4. Argument against Private Language 
Wittgenstein’s argument against private language is introduced and contained in 
PI, §§244–271. Though highly significant in philosophical discussion, it is often 
misunderstood.108 Let us briefly clarify that he is not denying that people cannot have 
such a language in which they can describe their inner thoughts and feelings; nor is 
he denying that people cannot formulate their own expressions to represent how 
they feel or think. Indeed, he even grants that people can coin individual words that 
refer to private sensations which only they themselves can understand. To affirm that 
language has a public nature is not to deny that words and utterances can be used 
‘privately’ by or within specific groups of people, such as a church or a fellowship.  
What Wittgenstein is chiefly concerned to point out is this: if a word—‘red’, say—
is made to refer to a private sensation, it ceases to function as a word within the 
repertoire of our everyday speech. For it is possible that under such a condition of 
use, the word may refer to something different in every case. In contradiction, our 
whole system of language has developed on the basis that there is a distinction 
between ‘correct’ and ‘mistaken’ applications of words, a distinction arrived at by the 
community of language users. An essential feature for meaning is the level of 
constancy. Thus, the word ‘red’ in the earlier example must mean something that is 
generally understood. Otherwise, what obtains is ‘that one section of mankind had 
one sensation of red and another section another.’109 Concisely put, Wittgenstein’s 
argument against private language is not that it is not possible to devise one, but that 
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it is useless for establishing communicable content. He writes, ‘When I talk about 
language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day.’110 
The significance of this issue for theological language is immense. Firstly, 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of private language helps to undermine the view that one 
can have a strictly fideistic language. As noted above, fideism is countered once it is 
denied a private language by which it can shield itself from public accountability. 
Secondly, Wittgenstein refutes the view that religious terms are merely non-
objective symbolisations of experience, and thereby ‘helps us to discern false 
accounts of “inwardness” in religion.’111 Lastly, at the heart of Wittgenstein’s 
argument is his insistence that religious language cannot be abstracted from the 
community that uses it—by which the determinants of its content are located.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has served to introduce Wittgenstein and sketch out a little of his 
background, career and achievements. We have also explored what he thinks about 
religion, and seen how his philosophy has developed or changed. Although it is 
difficult to determine the precise degree of his sympathy with Christianity, I do not 
think that what he was in terms of his religious affiliation matters as far as his logic of 
language is concerned. It would be wrongheaded of us to embrace or reject his 
philosophical insights on the grounds that he was religious or even a Christian. But 
there can be little doubt that religious beliefs played a big role in how his thought 
took shape.  
Our consideration of his philosophical development has led us to question the 
common view that Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophies are totally disparate. I 
am inclined to think that his philosophical interest has remained consistent 
throughout his career, while the changes and corrections of the later phase have 
been the result of a continuous and maturing process on his part. Still, it would be a 
serious lapse of judgement to fail to recognise that the atomism of TLP is poles apart 
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from the mature view in PI that language is grounded in the varied and particular 
situations of everyday life. There are several ways of accounting for the contrast 
between the two views respecting language. Thiselton’s has already been noted, 
namely, that the ground of language has moved from logic as an abstract calculus to 
the varied and particular activities of human life. The contrast can also be seen as a 
shift from an understanding of logic as being separated from the use of language and 
thus hidden in language in the early Wittgenstein, to an understanding of logic as 
being shown in our use of language in the later Wittgenstein. Quite clearly, the 
atomism of TLP is based on a dualist assumption of an external/internal distinction, 
a distinction that the later Wittgenstein seeks to eliminate.  Once the dualism is 
overcome, we would see that language is available for a diversity of use, and that 
more importantly, it is grounded in the setting of human life. Wittgenstein’s later 
manner of conceiving language, together with other aspects and terms of his 
philosophy, are relevant to our argument about how language about God is to be 
regarded. 
In the next chapter we will look at how insights from Wittgenstein’s philosophy 







What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up 
the ground of language on which they stand.1 
                                                                                                         Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have considered the work of Wittgenstein and identified 
several of his ideas which are of theological relevance. In particular, we looked at his 
notions of meaning-as-use, language-games, form of life, and his private language 
argument. We also considered the Cartesian paradigm of the ‘worldless self’ which 
Wittgenstein has sought to revise, and the form of fideism with which his name is 
now linked. In the present chapter, I shall attempt to go beyond what has been raised 
and say more about how these themes could be constructively appropriated in our 
conception and use of language in religion. In order to be in a position to realise this 
aim, we shall need to look again at the main features of both the early and later 
phases of his philosophy. 
On Appropriating Wittgenstein 
First, however, I would like to indicate where I stand regarding my own approach to 
Wittgenstein. Although I have explained my reasons for choosing to consider him, I 
should specify the two insights of his philosophy that have hugely appealed to me. 
The first is that the philosophical problems which confront us have arisen ‘through a 
misinterpretation of our forms of language’2 arising from the fact that ‘we do not 
command a clear view of the use of our words.’3 The second is that because meaning 
does not have an absolutely determinate sense, the quest for absolute exactness in 
language is bound to fail.4 These thoughts appear to cohere very much with the 
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concerns of my thesis. While I do not claim to have ‘mastered’ Wittgenstein’s corpus, 
I believe that there are useful resources to be mined for my project. In recent years, 
theologians5 have become more open to appropriating Wittgenstein’s insights. 
Standing squarely in that philosopher’s shadow is Rowan Williams who has urged that 
‘there are things which we must learn from Wittgenstein if we are to avoid paralysing 
or simply confusing ourselves as theologians, things that have to do with language as 
sheer practice rather than “simple” naming.’6 However, there are also those who 
have been hesitant to consider Wittgenstein, or found his writings of little value for 
their enterprise.7 Some who did draw on him are bashful that they had done so. A 
case in point is Anthony Thiselton’s appropriation of Wittgenstein for his celebrated 
work on hermeneutics. In that tome, Thiselton writes,  
…in our use of Wittgenstein, our concern is only to borrow from this 
thinker certain conceptual tools for the various tasks which we shall 
undertake in formulating hermeneutical theory and in expounding the 
text of the New Testament. To make a constructive use of a particular 
philosopher’s conceptual tools is not necessarily to subscribe to his view 
of the world.8  
For whatever reason, Thiselton is clearly being unnecessarily cautious here. In my 
opinion, one need not be defensive about applying Wittgenstein’s insights. As a 
philosopher, Wittgenstein is not at all concerned to convert anyone to his beliefs; his 
aim is strictly to stimulate thoughts.9 Recall his comments to his students, ‘What I 
should like to get at is for you not to agree with me in particular opinions, but to 
investigate the matter in the right way…’10 What Wittgenstein offers is more a 
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method of understanding, and it is this that we shall seek to apply. For what matters 
is whether his ‘way’ works, and whether we can learn how to use his ideas.   
Early Phase of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy 
Key Elements 
We begin with the views articulated in Wittgenstein’s earliest work, TLP with its 
theme about the nature of the world and its representation in thought and language. 
I shall first expand the key elements in his position that continue to be relevant to my 
discussion before turning to specific applications.  
Wittgenstein’s concern with language first emerged within a metaphysics of 
wanting to determine ‘the character of the world.’11 He was not primarily concerned 
with language per se.  In his very first statement in TLP, Wittgenstein declares, ‘The 
world is all that is the case.’12 The world, he further postulates, is a totality—
comprising not things or objects but facts; and as such, the world is represented by 
propositions of language.13 One may ask: why facts? It is because, to quote one of his 
interpreters, ‘facts are the way things are; they are even more fundamental than 
objects, because the latter are contingent.’14 To be sure, objects are ‘simples’ of 
reality: they ‘make up the substance of the world’15 and can be referred to only by 
being named. But facts, as Wittgenstein clarifies, determine ‘what is the case, and 
also whatever is not the case,’16 and are themselves described by propositions, which 
as he said, represent reality. The implication he would have us note is that ‘the stuff 
of the Universe does not consist of entities describable by nouns, but of objective 
counterparts of whole grammatical sentences.’17  
Admittedly, Wittgenstein’s account of language is not a simple matter to 
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understand or explain or even grasp. And, it is not only because of his use of a special 
terminology or aphorisms. It is also the fact that the numerous things that are said to 
be admitted to reality must seem odd to the common person who would not have 
dreamt of seeing them as constituents of the world. Perhaps, Norman Malcolm’s 
account of ‘a hierarchy of ordered structures’ in TLP may help. He explains: 
A state of affairs in the world is a structure of simple objects. A thought is 
a structure of mental elements. A proposition of language is a structure 
of signs. If a particular proposition is true there are three structures 
which, in a sense, are equivalent. There is a configuration of simple 
objects which constitutes a state of affairs. There is a configuration of 
mental objects which depicts that state of affairs. There is a configuration 
of signs, which also depicts that state of affairs. These are three parallel 
structures in the three different domains of reality, thought and 
language.18 
It is important that we understand what Wittgenstein means by ‘the world’ since he 
uses the term throughout the text. The world of TLP is neither the world of science, 
nor the world of sensible objects or things. It is rather the world conceptually viewed 
and analysed as ‘it funnels through the dynamism of the human mind.’19 This explains 
why Wittgenstein has insisted that the world is not the totality of things, but of facts. 
Being of facts, the world can both be encountered and represented in language. But 
most importantly, as Terrance W Klein points out, ‘a synthesis is presupposed as 
existing in the world and in language; through the latter we have access to the 
former.’20 Such a conception of the world is nothing new or original as philosophers 
have long been known to get at the fundamental facts about the world by considering 
the fundamental features of language. Plato, for instance, teaches that a given term 
such as ‘tree’ or ‘sharp’ can be truly applied to a large number of individual things—
even different ones—in more or less the same sense; this is possible only because 
there really exists some one entity named by the term in question, namely, tree-ness 
or sharpness.  
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Wittgenstein’s investigation into the nature of the world is strictly an exercise in 
logic which he believes ‘is prior to every experience.’21 Thus, he seems indifferent to 
defining or providing any actual examples of objects or propositions, making no 
appeal to empirical facts. Most of his claims, including the one that reality is 
represented by propositions, are a priori. ‘It is,’ he contends, ‘as impossible to 
represent in language anything that “contradicts logic” as it is in geometry to 
represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the 
co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.’22 In ‘Notes on Logic,’ Wittgenstein 
remarks, ‘Philosophy gives no pictures of reality, and can neither confirm nor confute 
scientific investigations. It consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis.’23 
Given such a conviction, what occupies him intensely is the question of how the world 
as it is, relates to the world known through the language he uses. Quite clearly, 
Wittgenstein’s order of investigation is in such manner: from the nature of logic to 
the nature of language and then to the nature of the world. At this stage of his 
philosophical development, he is clearly committed to the view that language has a 
basic and rational form, a form in which there is a correspondence between atomic 
propositions and atomic facts. 
The conclusion at which his early investigation arrived, we have said, is called the 
‘picture theory of language.’ Why such a theory is rejected and abandoned by 
Wittgenstein himself may now be briefly noted. Firstly, it has wrongly assumed that 
the ‘simples’ in a proposition and the world must correspond absolutely. The reality, 
as Wittgenstein comes to appreciate is: there is no such thing as a ‘logical form’ that 
can or must be held to identify once and for all the essence of language with the 
world. The other reason for jettisoning the picture theory is his recognition that a 
proposition need not have an absolutely determinate sense. A further reason is his 
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recognition of the limits of analysis.24 It is, however, necessary to clarify that 
Wittgenstein does not repudiate every insight in TLP. Otherwise, why would he be 
keen to have that book and PI published in a single volume and say that ‘the latter 
could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of 
my old way of thinking’?25 It would therefore be wrongheaded to consign TLP to 
oblivion; it is certainly not ‘like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock 
that did not tell you the right time.’26 Indeed, there are a number of ‘achievements’ 
which one can identify in the book that have provided the foundations for the 
development of a new dimension about human speaking, thinking and 
understanding.  
This brings us to the final sections of TLP where Wittgenstein makes the 
celebrated point that there are things which cannot be put into words but 
nevertheless show themselves.27 These are, he adds, ‘what is mystical.’28 It is not 
disputed that ‘the mystical’ is used by Wittgenstein to refer to God. To be sure, the 
term is also spoken of as having to do with ‘the sense of the world’, ethics, aesthetics, 
meaning of life, and so forth.29 But the most famous sentence that ends TLP, ‘What 
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’30 is still mired in controversy. 
One interpretation is that these words are an injunction against an over-confident 
and uncritical approach to doing philosophy.    
Applications 
In what follows, we shall be concerned to consider specific applications arising from 
some of the insights or themes gleaned from TLP as they relate to the use of religious 
language. Our discussion can be brought under three headings: (1) Language and 
metaphysics, (2) Meaning and truth, and (3) Reference(s) to God. 
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1. Language and metaphysics 
In TLP, we have noted, Wittgenstein is primarily concerned to arrive at an 
understanding of the nature of reality. His book is therefore properly a work of 
metaphysics, but with an important difference—the introduction of language to the 
undertaking. In the earlier philosophy held by Descartes, Locke and others, language 
had little or no role to play in how material objects were represented to the human 
subject.31 The belief was that reality was directly represented by ideas in the mind, 
not by words which functioned only to stand for ideas. Locke had held that ‘words in 
their primacy or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind 
of him that uses them.’32 Thus, if we look at, say, a square table from any position 
other than directly above it, we would not see square but trapezoidal. The mismatch 
between what we see and what the real object is, is said to be because we are not 
seeing the table but a representation of it. On this way of thinking, language simply 
‘interfered’ with the old schema of thought and representation. Admittedly, such a 
distinction can be quite useful, though to avoid confusion the tendency to regard 
thought, idea and sign as separate entities should be resisted. In his formulation of a 
proposition, Wittgenstein steers a balanced course, drawing a distinction between 
proposition, thought and sign, yet not treating them as different entities.33 The 
upshot of such an interpretative approach makes possible ‘the insight into the 
internal relations between thought, language and reality, construed… as intra-
grammatical relations between concepts,’ enabling the work of analysis of language 
to begin.34 If thought and language are one and the same thing, it follows that what 
can be known about the world arising from thought must find expression in language.    
For his part, Wittgenstein has long been convinced that there is always a 
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connection between his analysis of language and his conception of reality. The 
natural question is: how are the two entities—reality and language—related? 
Wittgenstein, we have noted, has presupposed that a synthesis exists between the 
world and language, and that consequently, one is able to access the former by a 
consideration of the latter. In this connection, Felicity McCutcheon is certainly right 
to suggest that ‘the assumption on which Wittgenstein’s method is based is that 
language matches the world at the deeper level of meaning and essence and it is this 
fundamental match that makes it possible for language to match the world at the 
empirical level of truth and facts.’35 At all events, language for him is a cipher, pointing 
beyond itself to what reality is. Wittgenstein errs, however, in positing that ‘a 
proposition is a picture of reality.’36 This so-called ‘picture theory’ is a plain but 
mistaken case of drawing ontological conclusions from premises based on logic. As 
we have already noted, the theory was later jettisoned by Wittgenstein himself. But 
in a sense, Wittgenstein was right to perceive the world as a linguistic one.  
This brings us to his insistence: ‘What can be shown, cannot be said’37 which is 
stated in the context of his discussion about the roles of propositions as pictures of 
reality. Let us first review what he has written,  
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot 
represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able 
to represent it—logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form, 
we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions 
somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.38 
Here an important point is being made. It is not so much that language is limited 
(though in a sense, it is) but that we as language users cannot jump out of our own 
skin and talk about language from some neutral Archimedean point. The following 
illustration is frequently drawn: a map depicting a certain terrain cannot thereby 
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depict its own method of depiction; a supplementary insert is needed to do that. 
Language is all that we have and we can use it to depict states of affairs and to speak 
about God, but we cannot assume a position outside it that would allow us to gain a 
pre- or extra-linguistic access to these realities. ‘There is no outside; outside you 
cannot breathe.’39 For this reason, Wittgenstein will later admonish us to bring 
language back from its metaphysical to its everyday use.40  The insight which is 
relevant to our study is that the problem of language about God is inevitably bound 
up with the limitation that we can never get at ‘languageless things-in-themselves’, 
to use Kerr’s words.41 That should also lead us to an admission of our human finitude, 
especially in relation to the use of language to speak of God.  
It therefore behoves those of us who reflect on theology or religion to undertake 
as a first task the analysis of the language we use. Broadly speaking, theology is the 
study of God, his nature and his dealing with humankind—among other things. Such 
a study is wholly dependent on the use of language in its formulation, development 
and communication. It is now widely recognised that theology not only involves the 
use of language, it even creates and reveals itself as language. As George Tavard 
(1922−2007) puts it well, ‘just as the thought is never separate from the word, just as 
one does not reflect save to the extent that one uses a language from which to draw 
the symbols of one’s reflection, so theology is inconceivable save in the measure that 
it is language.’42 We can thus expect that the careful analysis of theological language 
will also reveal a great deal about ‘the nature of all being’ and the experiences that 
give rise to theology. In applicable terms, what we can expect the analysis of language 
to accomplish for the language user are the following ends, namely, the elimination 
of misunderstandings, the resolution of unclarities, and the dissolution of 
philosophical problems that arise out of confusing features of the surface grammar 
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of natural language.43  
Wittgenstein’s remark, ‘what can be shown cannot be said,’ draws more than a 
fine line between ‘showing’ and ‘saying’; it further suggests that certain matters 
relating to human existence are of the sort that can be said, while others can only be 
shown. For Wittgenstein, matters pertaining to religion, ethics, and aesthetics belong 
to the latter category. The question for us is how are those matters which ‘lie outside 
the world’ shown, if they cannot be (adequately) spoken? One answer is by indirect 
means such as stories, literature and even plays. I suggest that in addition to 
language-use, we express these things in action and in our lives.  
2. Meaning and truth 
In the preface to TLP, Wittgenstein provides a generous acknowledgement which 
reads, ‘I am indebted to Frege’s great works and to the writings of my friend Mr 
Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts.’44 Under the influence 
of the two named philosophers, the young Wittgenstein had imbibed a number of 
suppositions, some of which were to have an influence in the development of his own 
thoughts. For example, he embraced a version of what he would later call 
‘Augustine’s picture of language.’ According to this view of language, the 
fundamental role of words is to name, and of sentences to describe; and the meaning 
of a simple name is the object for which it stands. All this is familiar enough. Now 
Wittgenstein, however, differed from Frege and Russell with regard to the relation 
between language and logic. The senior philosophers were of the opinion that natural 
languages are logically defective and so fail to adequately represent the subject-
matter of the truths of logic. Russell had held that the grammatical form of a 
proposition regularly causes the logical form to be hidden. To illustrate, he used the 
following example:  
The is of ‘Socrates is human’ expresses the relation of subject and 
predicate; the is of ‘Socrates is a man’ expresses identity. It is a disgrace 
to the human race that it has chosen to employ the same word ‘is’ for 
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these two entirely different ideas—which a symbolic logical language of 
course remedies.45  
Thus, a logically perfect or ideal language, namely the language of Begriffsschrift 
or Principia is needed to replace them.46 Wittgenstein, on his part, espoused the 
contrary view that ‘all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, 
are in perfect logical order.’47 In a letter to his friend, C K Ogden (1889–1957) recalling 
the differences he has had with Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein insists that ‘the 
propositions of our ordinary language are not in any way logically less correct or less 
exact or more confused than propositions written down, say, in Russell’s symbolism 
or any other “Begriffsschrift”.’48 In other words, our everyday ordinary language will 
do nicely, even if usually the words and propositions of such language are too 
complex or vague. For Wittgenstein, language and logic are closely related; indeed, 
the latter, he claims, is a ‘condition of sense.’49 Logic is even prior to every 
experience.50 Accordingly, ‘if a sign expresses a sense at all, then it is in good logical 
order; if it does not, then it is just a meaningless mark, and says nothing.’51 Against 
the views of Frege and Russell on the nature of the proposition, Wittgenstein 
maintains that a proposition is essentially either true or false; indeed, it must be 
bipolar. Frege has conceived of propositions as either of the true or false variety, and 
that there is no essential connection between the pair. The axiom: ‘Some 
propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white’ 
encapsulates Russell’s view—as if ‘true’ and ‘false’ signified two properties among 
others. Both philosophers, according to P M S Hacker (b. 1939), have thus failed ‘to 
apprehend the essential connection between the concept of a proposition and truth 
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and falsity.’52   
I have consciously belaboured the point espoused by Wittgenstein that a 
proposition is capable of being true, and capable of being false. A proposition can 
either assert that a state of affairs exists, or that it does not.53 In any event, it still has 
sense, for sense does not depend on its correspondence with a particular existing 
state of affairs. The following quotation may clarify what is being emphasised here: 
What corresponds in reality to a proposition depends upon whether it is 
true or false. But we must be able to understand a proposition without 
knowing if it is true or false. What we know when we understand a 
proposition is this: we know what is the case if it is true and what is the 
case if it is false. But we do not necessarily know whether it is actually 
true or false. Every proposition is essentially true-false. Thus a proposition 
has two poles (corresponding to case [sic] of its truth and case [sic] of its 
falsity). We call this the sense of a proposition. The meaning of a 
proposition is the fact which actually corresponds to it.54 
The distinction between the sense (Sinn) of a proposition and its meaning or more 
properly, its referent (Bedeutung)—a distinction borrowed from Frege—is skilfully 
drawn. Wittgenstein further elaborates, ‘A proposition shows its sense. A proposition 
shows how things stand if it is true.’55 Hence, ‘to understand a proposition means to 
know what is the case if it is true. (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing 
whether it is true.)’56 What Wittgenstein is expressing echoes the ground-breaking 
work of Frege whose elucidation of the distinction between sense and referent is 
worth quoting: 
It may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well-formed 
expression representing a proper name always has a sense. But this is not 
to say that to the sense there also corresponds a referent. The words ‘the 
celestial body most distant from the earth’ have a sense, but it is very 
doubtful if they also have a referent. The expression ‘the least rapidly 
convergent series’ has a sense; but it is known to have no referent, since 
for every given convergent series, another convergent, but less rapidly 
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convergent, series can be found. In grasping a sense, one is not certainly 
assured of a referent.57 
For our immediate purposes, there is an instructive way of regarding these 
considerations about the Sinn and Bedeutung distinction. This is simply to adopt the 
direction taken at the ‘linguistic turn’ of the early part of last century, namely, to 
move from a concern with the question of truth to the question of meaning. We are 
not saying that the question of truth is unimportant: it is, but it cannot be prior to 
that of sense. The obvious reason being that any statement or proposition, say, ‘all 
the disciples deserted him and fled’ (Matt 26:56) must be understood for what it is 
claiming or asserting before it can be shown to be true or false. We are to ask what 
we mean by what we say before we can be concerned with questions about what 
reality is or how it can be known. As we have earlier maintained, questions of 
meaning have overtaken questions of validity in priority. 
3. Reference(s) to God 
In TLP, God is mentioned four times but only the last of the references is not 
incidental to the subject of religion. Even then, it is a negative proposition which 
reads, ‘How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is 
higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.’58 The spatial expression ‘what is 
higher’59 should be especially noted as it is a reference to the realm in which—at least 
in Wittgenstein’s own ontology—ethics, aesthetics, religion and God are located.60 
The emphasis on the word ‘in’ is clearly deliberate on the part of Wittgenstein, the 
significance of which comes to light in his next remark but one, ‘It is not how things 
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are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.’61 Thus, Wittgenstein may be 
clarifying that he is not saying that God does not reveal himself, but rather that God 
is not like any fact, item or thing we know. Or, he might be intimating ‘that God 
reveals himself in the fact that the world exists, the fact that “there is what there 
is.”’62 In any event, we must remember that the term ‘world’ is used by Wittgenstein 
in a special way: it is, as we noted, what is conceptually viewed or portrayed. A 
theologically significant point thus becomes apparent, namely, that God is 
transcendent, being like no other. This markedly contrasts with the approach 
adopted by the so-called ‘militant atheists’ of our time who interpret belief in God as 
somewhat ‘analogous to belief in extra-terrestrials, the Loch Ness monster, or wild 
cats in the Scottish highlands.’63 For these atheists, God is just another object, albeit 
much more powerful, knowledgeable and moral, among others in our system. To be 
sure, that is also how many people, including religious believers, still think of their 
deity.  
It is, of course, open to us to draw the inference that given God’s transcendence 
and the gap that exists between him and us, the importance we attach to speaking 
about God may be the result of an illusion. That Wittgenstein continued to give 
attention to religion and engage in theological discussions is an indication that such 
an inference cannot have been intended by him. For years after writing TLP, he was 
still doing philosophy. In connection with what Wittgenstein is saying about God in 
the remarks cited, Klein perceptively notes, ‘a way of speaking is being censured 
here, not a subject matter.’64 A more persuasive alternative is perhaps to recognise 
that what we can talk about is measly compared with what we cannot. While we have 
learned from Wittgenstein that the concept of the world is a linguistic one, we must 
be mindful that ‘Propositions cannot express anything higher.’65 Our ability to speak 
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about God as Klein points out, ‘depends upon God as the unlimited horizon of each 
world’s limited horizon.’66 The reality to be faced and accepted is that language is 
self-contained and that it can only go so far; there are limits to what can be said about 
God. Perhaps all we can aim for and work hard to ensure, is that our words are clear 
and adequate enough to point to what can only show itself. 
Later Phase of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy  
Key Elements 
The later phase of Wittgenstein’s philosophical life is exemplified by his PI. Although 
the work deals with a wide range of subject-matter, namely the nature of philosophy, 
logic, the inner/outer relation, consciousness, and so on, it is almost wholly attentive 
to one central theme and its ramifications, namely language and meaning. That is 
perhaps why Wittgenstein writes, ‘Our investigation is therefore a grammatical 
one.’67  In TLP, language and meaning had also been a key focus, but, as we have 
noted, Wittgenstein’s earlier concern was with whether language refers rather than 
with the way it refers. His primary interest was in what could or could not be stated 
in words. Although the discontinuities—as well as the continuities—between the two 
masterpieces are not our present concern, it is useful to keep the contrast in mind 
when reading the Wittgenstein corpus and when seeking to understand the material 
aright. On this point, I have found Hacker’s juxtaposition of the doctrines of TLP with 
those of PI helpful not only in revealing essential differences, but especially in 
showing up key innovations (or ‘achievements’) that mark the later work:  
(i)  the one [Tractatus] characterised by a striving for a sublime 
Wesensschau, the other [PI] by ‘a quiet weighing of linguistic facts’ 
(Z §447) in order to disentangle the knots in our understanding; 
(ii) the one possessed by a vision of the crystalline purity of the logical 
forms of thought, language and the world, the other imbued with a 
heightened awareness of the motley of spatial and temporal 
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phenomena of language (PI §108), the deceptive forms of which 
lead us into conceptual confusion; 
(iii) the one obsessed by a craving for the revelation of the hidden 
essences of things, placing its faith in depth analysis, the other 
demanding for the purposes of philosophical elucidation no more 
than the description and arrangement of what is simple and 
familiar, ‘hidden’ only because it is always before one’s eyes and so 
goes unnoticed (PI §129).68  
These themes of PI, so skilfully detected, echo the author’s declared intention to 
make ‘a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always 
serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, 
good and evil, or anything else you please.’69 Admittedly, it had been a mistake to 
insist that a single theory of language operates to define ‘how things stand,’70 or ‘to 
look for something in common to all entities which we commonly subsume under a 
general term.’71 As a corrective, Wittgenstein proposes that we consider an 
alternative way of using words which recognises that they are of very different kinds 
and have different uses. He urges, ‘Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, 
pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The functions 
of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.’72  
In TLP, logic is all-embracing, standing over and even making possible all forms of 
human discourse. The mature Wittgenstein, however, comes to think otherwise: 
logic stands within language, and it is the latter that makes the former possible.73 For 
that reason, he turns away from logic’s univocity to embrace a ‘descriptive’ approach. 
His celebrated line is, ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone 
must take its place.’74 Whereas he has assumed that the workings of language can be 
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logically thought out a priori, he now stresses the need to ‘look and see how 
propositions really work.’75 He also dismisses ‘a one-sided diet’ in which ‘one 
nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example.’76 What is done by the 
positivist in defining a word like ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ according to a given formulation 
and insisting that such a word must always correspond to this definition is an example 
of a one-sided diet.  
To better account for the varied and, in his view, confusing ways in which 
language is used, Wittgenstein makes use of the notions of ‘language-games’ and 
‘form of life’. As both terms had been discussed in the previous chapter they need 
not detain us here, though we shall shortly return to them to consider how they may 
be applied.  
Applications 
We shall now proceed to take up some of the themes mentioned above and explore 
their ramifications in so far as religious language-use is concerned. The discussion to 
follow will fall under the following headings: (1) Diversity of functions of language, 
(2) Meaning as use, and (3) Language-games. 
1. Diversity of functions of language  
In dismissing religious language as cognitive nonsense, the logical positivists had 
assumed a certain ‘logic’, namely, that a sentence is meaningful only if it is analytic 
or can be verified through sense experience. Based on the view that scientific 
knowledge is the only kind of factual knowledge, this logic was then applied across 
the board as though it was the paradigm to which every other kind of language must 
conform in order to be considered meaningful. So, when the logical positivists say 
that a religious statement is not ‘meaningful’ or ‘cognitive’, they are saying no more 
than that it does not have meaning or cognition in the way that scientific statements 
have meaning or cognition. Although logical positivism is nowadays passé, the 
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hegemonic mode of thinking it has inspired, appears to die hard. For instance, in 
Peter Donovan’s otherwise even-handed book, Religious Language, we find him 
urging that the empirical ways of verifying religious language be adopted.77 He writes, 
‘Putting to the test of investigation through the senses is, after all, our most usual 
way of distinguishing what is the case from what is not.’78 Sam Harris (b. 1967) , one 
of the so-called ‘New Atheists’, has recently expressed a view that is redolent of pure 
scientism. He says, ‘Religious language is, without question, unscientific in its claims 
for what is true. We have Christians believing in the holy ghost, the resurrection of 
Jesus and his possible return—these are claims about biology and physics which, from 
a scientific point of view in the 21st century, should be unsustainable.’79 The 
presupposition that underlies these remarks is fine as far as it goes; it is one that 
embraces a long-held conception of language as a system of signs, ‘an instrument 
which serves to point to things known independently of it and to utter thoughts 
formulated prelinguistically.’80 In his Tractarian phase, it may be recalled, 
Wittgenstein had espoused a similar account of language. However, through careful 
observation, he later came to see language in a totally different light—no longer as a 
single calculus, but as a tool with a diversity of functioning and possibilities. For him, 
language simply did not have the sort of homogeneity that he once thought it had. 
His analogy comparing language to the handles in a control room of a locomotive is 
illuminating: these handles look almost alike, even have a common feature in that 
they are hand-operated, but are functionally different.81 He further exemplifies that 
even a simple linguistic notion like ‘describing’ is susceptible to being variously 
interpreted, for the reason that ‘many different kinds of thing are called 
“description”.’82 All of this must have prompted him, in words we have earlier 
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quoted, to make ‘a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one 
way.’ An important corollary to his later philosophy we can draw is that religious 
language should not be reduced to a physical or scientific language. This in turn calls 
for a reassessment of the tendency to shoehorn the workings of religious language 
into the structure of some preconceived linguistic paradigm. It need to be said that 
scientifically-minded people are not the only ones who seek such reductions. Certain 
currents in Evangelical Christianity with their conception of religion as a rational 
account of the origins of the cosmos and humanity’s place in it, come close to using 
religious language as in science. For instance, Carl F H Henry (1913–2003) writes, ‘The 
bible is not a textbook on science or on history. But attention to the Bible’s 
statements bearing on the physical sciences and history… will enable its readers to 
avoid many misconceptions to which empirical inquiry remains ongoingly 
vulnerable.’83 
2. Meaning as use 
In no other area of thought is the dissonance between the early and later works 
of Wittgenstein more marked than that pertaining to the notion of meaning. To 
recollect, the early Wittgenstein had held that the meaning of a word is that to which 
the word refers. His assumption then was that a proposition offers a ‘picture of 
reality.’84 Meaning, which he postulated as essentially concerned with ‘picturing’, is 
thought to be a correlation between a word and an object. Somewhat casually put, 
meaning is the ‘hook’ between the two.85 In his later philosophy, this view was 
jettisoned as inadequate for reasons we had previously discussed. Instead, a very 
different conclusion came to be proposed, namely, that language acquires meaning 
as an outcome of the uses through which it is put. Or, in Wittgenstein’s words, ‘One 
cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.’86 
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By means of such a suggestion, some of the past theological disputes over words 
might have been avoided. Thus, for instance, had scholars attended to the various 
uses to which a word has been put, the argument over the concept of ‘revelation’ 
might not have lingered on.87 
There is, to be sure, no mystique about the notion of use; use is not a thing or an 
object of some kind. Nor is meaning simply to be equated with use. To illustrate this, 
Wittgenstein proposes that individual words be likened to chess pieces, each being 
defined in terms of its function.88 In chess, one is not concerned with the physical 
movement of wooden figures or with their physical properties; the game consists in 
the movement of certain pieces designated as king, queen, bishop and so forth 
according to rules and a grammar. So the question ‘What is a word?’ then becomes 
analogous to the question ‘What is a piece in chess?’ or, if we wish to be specific, 
‘What is a knight?’ Jerry H Gill elaborates the suggested approach for us: ‘The idea 
here is just that as one answers the question “What is a knight?” by explaining and 
showing the ways in which a knight may and may not be moved, so one answers the 
question “What is knowledge?” by explaining and illustrating how the word 
“knowledge” functions. By distinguishing the ways in which the word is used, and the 
situations in which it is accepted or rejected, one comes to an understanding of what 
the term means.’89  
Naturally, Wittgenstein’s remarks about ‘meaning as use’ apply to language in its 
religious as well as non-religious use.  It is still often the case that when one wants to 
establish the meaning of a word one will try to connect some object-references with 
the word in question. One’s assumption would be similar to that held by the early 
Wittgenstein—that the meaning of a word is correlated to the object for which the 
word stands—though one may not have articulated the underlying conception in 
                                                     
87 See F Gerald Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation? (London: SCM Press, 1964) and James Barr, 
The Concept of Biblical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1999). The said dispute is revisited in 
Downing, Formation for Knowing God. Imagining God (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2015). 
88 See PI, §108. 




quite so explicit a manner as Wittgenstein has. One is even certain that one can 
understand a whole sentence by simply putting together the meanings of the 
individual words that comprise the sentence. Wittgenstein does not say that the 
approach to meaning we have described is simply wrong, but that it is not 
appropriate for every case of linguistic inquiry. Accordingly, he wants us to move 
away from ‘the idea that using a sentence involves imagining something for every 
word.’90 Hence, words like ‘God’, ‘love’, ‘grace’, ‘redemption’, and so on, are not 
learned by simply looking up their dictionary definitions or linking them to observable 
objects to which they refer. Rather, these words are learned by deriving their 
meaning from the role they play in the lives and experience of believers, or, to put it 
another way, by drawing their meaning from the application that believers make of 
them. And to speak about application or use is to call attention to the context in 
which words are used. Thus, a fixation with certain words and statements taken out 
of their life-context is a sure recipe for theological confusion or quarrels.  As Patrick 
Sherry rightly observes, ‘if religious language seems meaningless to people today this 
may be because they have lost sight of the practices and the contexts with which 
language is associated. The remedy would be to return to the way of life in which the 
linguistic practices were born, to learn to be contrite, forgiving, long-suffering, 
hopeful and so forth.’91  
The considerations just noted point to a feature of religious language-use which 
is often overlooked, namely, that the employment of language is almost always 
directed towards some telos or purpose, spoken within a community of faith that 
unites around the same.92 Language and meaning are thus ‘bound up with a context 
of practice that is more than the repertoire of our words, and that penumbra of 
practices and action is essential to constituting the meaning of our words.’93 In this 
connection, Wittgenstein’s distinction between ‘surface grammar’ and ‘depth 
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grammar’ may be recalled. Surface grammar is that which ‘immediately impresses 
itself upon us about the use of a word… the way it is used in the construction of the 
sentence, the part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in by the ear.’94 By 
depth grammar he, of course, meant the opposite, that is, those rules of usage that 
are not revealed on the superficial level. The sentences, ‘the candidate passes her 
examination’ and ‘the peace of the Lord passes understanding’ appear similar in 
form, but they are profoundly different. In terms of its depth grammar, the verb in 
the first instance describing an event does nothing of the sort in the second. Thus, to 
understand what a particular passage means requires us to look beyond its form of 
words (i.e. its surface grammar).     
Wittgenstein’s notion that ‘meaning is use’ has a further role. It deters us from 
assuming that religious terms or expressions are merely acts or dispositions in one’s 
mind. When considering words like ‘faith’, ‘conversion’, ‘grace’, ‘sin’ and so on, we 
should take into serious account certain behavioural criteria which they epitomise. 
Thus, a term like ‘righteousness’ or ‘holiness’ must be recognised by its ‘fruit’, and 
not be treated as if it were merely a mental object. To a question as to what belief 
amounts to, Wittgenstein’s comment that ‘an “inner process” stands in need of 
outward criteria’95 serves to remind us that belief must always be manifested in 
behaviour. By the same token, one’s belief in God or some other tenet of faith, if 
genuine, will show up at various points in one’s life.  
3. Language-games  
The notion of ‘language-games’, Wittgenstein writes, ‘is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form 
of life.’96 His intention, we have noted, is to call attention to the indissoluble 
connection between language and human activity. That connection seems obvious 
enough, but Wittgenstein rather insists that forms of human activity are the ultimate 
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basis of all linguistic project: ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could 
say—forms of life.’97 For like moves in games, words or statements are context-
dependent, or else they would not make sense. That is to say, their meaning is tied 
to their use in the context of life: ‘Only in the stream of thought and life do words 
have meaning.’98 These remarks linking meaning to use have an obvious application 
to religious language, as well as language in general. It is that to a large extent, one 
must participate in a particular form of life, or be in some sympathy with it, if one is 
to properly understand the language it uses. Missionaries have found out that in 
order to communicate with a tribe, they must not only learn its language but listen 
to how the tribesmen and their folks ‘play’ with language. Something about the tribe 
may be learned even from jokes which are shared within it. As Wittgenstein once 
remarked, ‘a serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely 
of jokes’.99 
Wittgenstein’s stress on the multiplicity of language-games does an added 
service—disabusing us of thinking that logic is both prior to language-use as well as 
constitutes the a priori order of all experience.100 But if every game has a logic of its 
own, may it not be that ‘logic is found within the various language-games 
themselves’?101 It thus stands to reason that one can expect different shades of sense 
and nonsense to apply in different cases of language-use, even learning to distinguish 
sense from nonsense. Consider the sheer aptness of Wittgenstein’s image of 
language as an ancient city with its maze of little streets and squares of old and new 
houses.102 Under the former assumption of an overarching logic, one is likely to end 
up treating all of language as functioning in one same, singular way. In a recent essay, 
the philosopher, John Caputo (b. 1940) has appropriately picked on the notion of 
language-games to argue against the reductionist tendency. Given the integrity and 
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idiosyncrasy of each language-game, Caputo contends that ‘it would go against the 
idea of language games, and therefore against the very idea of language itself, to 
declare that everything that is going on in all the other languages can be translated 
into the language of just one of them.’103 Recalling the hegemony formerly exercised 
by theology in pre-modern times, he warns of the reduction of human values to 
scientific objects: ‘So if someone said that human compassion (ethics) is nothing 
other than a certain evolutionary coping mechanism (biology), that would be unfair 
play, a scientific reductionism, a reduction of the irreducible.’104  
In Chapter 2, we noted that the parallel between language and the diversity of 
games had facilitated the analysis of language into separate concrete entities that 
can be examined in isolation.105 Such an analysis grants that words and sentences 
may function in any context of conversation whether it be, say, about religion or 
science, and that they still get their meaning by playing their part in that context. The 
language of religion and the language of science, to keep to our examples, remain 
fully susceptible of criticism, justification and reflection within their respective areas 
of experience. Where religious words are concerned, we can expect their meaning to 
differ from their use in ordinary contexts. Thus, if one were to say ‘God’s eye sees 
everything’106 one is hardly talking about eyebrows and the like. Similarly, the words 
said at the Eucharist about eating the body of Christ or drinking his blood are not to 
be taken as suggestive of cannibalism. A Catholic is perfectly entitled to claim she is 
being fed ‘a resurrected and transfigured “super body” that foreshadows the new 
reality of a new Heaven and a new earth.’107  
This brings me to an important observation about the workings of language-
games that speaks directly to what I wish to argue in this study, namely the thesis 
that although religious language is fact-stating, it cannot be expected to yield exact 
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definition or complete explanation about its object. In an interesting passage, 
Wittgenstein tauntingly asks his imagined interlocutor who reproaches inexactness 
but praises exactness to think about these questions: 
If I tell someone ‘Stand roughly here’—may not this explanation work 
perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too? But isn't it an inexact 
explanation?—Yes; why shouldn't we call it ‘inexact’? Only let us 
understand what ‘inexact’ means. For it does not mean ‘unusable’. And 
let us consider what we call an ‘exact’ explanation in contrast with this 
one. Perhaps something like drawing a chalk line round an area? Here it 
strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour-edge would be 
more exact. But has this exactness still got a function here: isn't the 
engine idling?108 
Wittgenstein is clearly not persuaded that exactness is the holy grail to be pursued at 
all costs. What is important, he proceeds to argue, is the attainment of one’s goal in 
a discourse situation: ‘Thus the point here is what we call “the goal.” Am I inexact 
when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or tell a joiner the 
width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?’109 We may be tempted to 
think the statement ‘The Scottish Fold is on the mat’ is more exact than ‘the cat is on 
the mat,’ but is the matter of exactness so clearly settled? The first statement is 
merely more detailed than the second, unless it is our intention to specify what kind 
of breed of cat is on the mat. 
It must be said that we are not saying that Wittgenstein is making short shrift of 
the concept of exactness or giving endorsement to vague and fuzzy use of language. 
For him, as we have just shown, what counts is whether one succeeds in meeting 
one’s need in making one’s meaning intelligible. He goes on, ‘One might say that the 
concept “game” is a concept with blurred edges.—"But is a blurred concept a concept 
at all?"—Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an 
advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one 
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often exactly what we need?’110 Whether or not an indistinct picture is preferable to 
a sharp one, I suspect the passion for exactness, or conversely, the worry over 
imprecision in religious language, is nourished by an underlying empirical scientism 
that characterises our culture and permeates our religious thinking. To be sure, most 
people, including believers, generally presuppose the methodology of the hard 
sciences to apply to all discourse situations, including God-talk—such is the extent of 
empirical colonisation. Congruently, most believers would regard the statements 
they make about their religion as objectively true. However, to free religion from the 
grip that the scientific methodology has on it, one need not push to dichotomise 
between language and reality, for that may well lead to scepticism. Far better to point 
out that the quest for complete objectivity in scientific language is illusionary, let 
alone in religious language. For, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘if there were evidence, this 
would in fact destroy the whole business.’111 The present issue is perhaps best 
understood in terms of the concept of language-games. Exactness and inexactness, 
precision and imprecision and other conceptual binaries are themes being played out 
in, and as, different language-games. They should be seen as such, rather than as 
extralinguistic moorings. But taking them out of their language-games will only create 
unnecessary philosophical muddles.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have re-visited the main features of both the early and later phases 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and picked out several of his insights or ideas which I 
think might have a bearing on our understanding of religious language. Given the 
subtlety of his work, there are potentially more applicable insights than I have been 
able to detect. Doubtless there are also aspects and dimensions I have outlined which 
I have not succeeded in teasing out their applicability to actual situations of language 
use or misuse. Nevertheless, I think we have put together a simple framework for 
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looking at how language works, not least in religion. Let me provide a summary, going 
back to some of the ground which has been discussed. 
The first thing I have sought to do was to line up with Wittgenstein in recognising 
that the problems of philosophy (and theology) arise mainly ‘through a 
misinterpretation of our forms of language.’112 Questions of proof or justification of 
religious belief are naturally posterior to those regarding the functioning of language, 
for the reason that we can only judge whether something is true or false after we 
have agreed ‘the workings of language.’113 It does help to know that the concern of 
my thesis, which proposes a nuanced way of noting the cognitive status of religious 
language without insisting on absolute precision or completion, is a proper one.  
Wittgenstein, we have seen, overturned his earlier view that a proposition 
‘pictures’ a situation in the world.  Correspondingly, he moved away from the notion 
that the meaning of language is that to which it refers. He, however, continues to 
perceive the world as a linguistic one, but no longer in the sense of an absolute 
correspondence between language and the world. The upshot is language comes to 
be seen as a cipher, pointing beyond itself to what reality is. Being such a tool, 
language will do nicely in making its referent intelligible, but neither completion nor 
containment should be expected. 
I have also belaboured the point espoused by Wittgenstein that a proposition is 
capable of being true or false. That was done to show that any statement can still 
have sense, even if its content does not correspond with a particular existing state of 
affairs. The obvious application to my thesis is that we can say that language about 
God is meaningful, regardless of whether or not it secures reference. However, what 
I am not suggesting is truth should take a back seat to meaning or meaningfulness. 
The early Wittgenstein was often mistaken as being against religion or 
metaphysics. What he wrote in TLP about the mystical presents a very different story. 
As noted, Wittgenstein’s understanding of God is that God is not like any fact, item 
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or thing in the world. In other words, we could say of Wittgenstein that he was 
mindful and respectful of divine transcendence, that he accepted that language could 
never adequately bridge the distance between God and us. Hence, his famous 
injunction to keep silence. For my part, I am not for silence in the face of divine 
alterity; instead, I am concerned to enter the case that God can be spoken of—he is 
not ‘beyond language’—but that he cannot be fully defined or contained by language. 
Such an approach, I maintain, both honours transcendence, and caters for the need 
for reflection.   
In a culture accustomed to associating with the findings of science, my thesis 
proposing such a nuanced way of speaking about God may be met with derision for 
being vague, indeterminate or even empty. That is going by a certain logic, namely 
the logic of scientific enquiry. We have seen Wittgenstein rejecting the idea that the 
language of science should be paradigmatic for all language, given that language is 
not a single calculus. Dismissing my thesis for the reason mentioned is as 
wrongheaded as it is to analyse religious language by the same techniques we use for 
handling scientific discourse.  
From Wittgenstein’s insight that meaning is something we use, two important 
corollaries have been drawn, namely, (i) language is not only for ‘picturing’ things or 
making references to them, but also for expressing beliefs and emotions and even ‘to 
do things’; and (ii) language is a social phenomenon given that ‘use’ must occur in a 
human context and involve human agency. These inferences are much in consonance 
with my own line of thought. For one thing, they express a similar concern to prompt 
a view of religious language that is ‘more’ meaningful for going beyond the business 
of making objective reference to being expressive of one’s beliefs, convictions, 
values, and the like. If language is a social phenomenon and ‘acquires meaning from 
the various procedures through which we give it particular uses in the course of our 
common life,’114 does it not follow that the entire process in which we express, 
interpret and understand words is, like their human users themselves, fallible? While 
                                                     




I could then say that any claim that one can obtain exactness, precision or completion 
in words is naïve, I do not rule out that religious language can be ‘sufficiently precise’ 
within a community of practice that learns its use.115  
 Much has been said about the language-games analogy. The idea it represents 
has been enormously influential. We have generously drawn on it to reject the 
hegemony of scientific language over religious language (or any language, vice-versa), 
suggest that words can only be understood in their particular ‘forms of life’, and 
explain how exactitude and precision need not be viewed as the ‘working’ norm in 
the religious language-game. Transposed together, these insights and resources from 
Wittgenstein will make a compelling case for the nuanced position I am proposing—
that religious language is cognitive but it cannot yield precise definition and complete 
explanation about its referent. Asking how religious language actually matches or 
captures the divine reality, and to what extent, may hopefully lead one to reflect on 
whether one’s way of living is being shaped by the language one uses.116 
 From Wittgenstein’s perspective, no absolute statements about the divine are 
possible because the subject-matter of religious discourse is that of which we cannot 
speak, that is, the mystical. This resonates with the Christian view that God is beyond 
the grasp of human capacity. Wittgenstein, however, allows that the mystical ‘shows’ 
itself, thus bequeathing to us a system that is not entirely closed to transcendence. 
In his later phase, Wittgenstein maintains a respect for and an openness to the 
mystical, though it is not named as that.  In the following chapter, we shall explore 
this subject more fully, and ask how we can acknowledge the mystical without 
renouncing expression.  
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The Mystical: What We Cannot Speak About 
 
The way you use the word ‘God’ does not show whom you mean—but rather 
what you mean.1 
                                                                                                         Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction 
In the final sections of TLP, Wittgenstein turns to a discussion of ‘the mystical’ (das 
Mystische). His foray into logical analysis has led him to see a necessary connection 
between language and the world, and to the conclusion that ‘the sense of the world 
must lie outside the world.’2 He continues, ‘How things are in the world is a matter 
of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world 
[...]. It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.’3 To be 
sure, the ‘world’ that Wittgenstein is ruminating here is not the world of empirical 
data, sensations and science; rather it is the world of facts as portrayed in 
propositions.4 His next remark which characterises ‘what is mystical’ also 
presupposes a limit to the articulatable realm: ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot 
be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.’5 The 
delineation he speaks of—between what can be expressed (gesagt) and what cannot 
be expressed but only shown (gezeigt)—is later presented as the ‘cardinal problem’ 
of his early philosophy.6 In a final direct remark on the mystical, he identifies it with 
a certain way of viewing or feeling the world. This is how he puts it, ‘To view the world 
sub specie aeterni [sic] is to view it as a whole—a limited whole. Feeling the world as 
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a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.’7 As is well known, these sayings and 
elucidations about the mystical culminate in the oft-quoted Proposition 7 which 
concludes the Tractatus, namely, ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence.’ These words, unlike those ancillary to his other propositions, are not further 
elaborated; they simply invoke silence, and are generally taken to be his injunction 
against any metaphysical or religious speculation that is conducted on the basis of a 
methodology borrowed from the empirical sciences. 
The obvious comment should perhaps be made at this point that the precise 
meaning of the various passages I have cited is still controversial. The term das 
Mystische appears altogether only three times in the whole of TLP.8 Used in a broad 
sense, it is linked by Wittgenstein to matters which are different but related, namely, 
‘the sense of the world,’9 ‘ethics,’10 ‘the will,’11 ‘death,’12 ‘immortality,’13 ‘the 
problems of life,’14 ‘the solution of the problem of life,’15 and—‘God.’16 On the other 
hand, it is also used in a narrower sense to specify one form of what cannot be said 
but which nevertheless makes itself manifest. The term is also used interchangeably 
with words like ‘transcendental’, ‘inexpressible’, and ‘ineffable’. The use just 
mentioned is, linguistically, not a problem. The same, however, cannot be said about 
the identification of the mystical with the fact that the world ‘is’, that it is, or that it 
is a limited whole. Evidently, Wittgenstein is on to something very profound, 
significant and—mysterious.  
                                                     
7 TLP, 6.45. This notion of seeing things sub specie aeternitatis, that is, under the aspect of eternity, 
can be traced to Spinoza; see Wiep van Bunge, Henri Krop, Piet Steenbakkers, Jeroen van de Ven 
(eds), The Bloomsbury Companion to Spinoza (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 319–320. 
8 The term also appears a few times in NB but they do not add anything new or significant to our 
present discussion. 
9 TLP, 6.41. 
10 TLP, 6.421. 
11 TLP, 6.423. 
12 TLP, 6.4311. 
13 TLP, 6.4312. 
14 TLP, 6.52. 
15 TLP, 6.521. 





In this chapter, I shall be concerned to explore Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘mysticism’, 
or to use his preferred terminology, das Mystische. As I have briefly stated in the last 
chapter and will explain more fully below, this notion is of interest to us because the 
mystical is properly the subject-matter17 of religious language; it is what concerns the 
whole enterprise of God-talk. Whether or not we think we can speak of the mystical 
will affect how we perceive or use language in religion. Sallie McFague (b. 1933) goes 
even further to remark that unless we have a sense of mystery, we ‘will most likely 
identify God with our words.’18  In what follows, our specific task is to consider what 
Wittgenstein might have in mind referring to the mystical, and why he decides to use 
the term. This term, as Cyril Barrett (1925–2019) points out, ‘appears in the Tractatus 
without preparation, as though it were a household word, as if everyone was 
expected to know what it meant.’19 We learn from another source that Wittgenstein 
was simply taking over the term from his philosophical mentor, Bertrand Russell, who 
had used it to refer to an entirely ordinary feeling.20 Still, Wittgenstein does apply his 
own meaning to it, while somewhat retaining the traditional sense associated with it. 
Unsurprisingly, his notion of the mystical is often seen as a mere peculiarity which 
does not belong to the heart of his philosophy or it is given a wide range of variant 
interpretations. Other than the inquiry of meaning of the mystical, I will also be 
attending to the all-important question about the relevance of this notion for 
theology. Following Wittgenstein’s advice, I shall ‘look and see’ what insights or ideas 
may be appropriated to advance my claim that religious language cannot yield 
precise definition or complete explanation about the mystical—that is, God. 
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Bifurcation or Unity? 
From a certain perspective, the account of the mystical does seem to introduce a 
bifurcation to TLP, splitting it between a majority first part of the book which deals 
with logic and language, and those last few pages in which the notion of the mystical 
emerges. Some have observed that the gulf between the two discussions appears 
large and unbridgeable21; others have differed. Those who think there is a split tend 
to view the treatment of the mystical as no ‘more than just an accidental part of the 
Tractatus.’22 They are also likely to dismiss those final passages on the mystical as 
obiter dicta or just curious addenda.23 For my part, I consider the philosophy of the 
mystical as a culmination, rather than an afterthought, of what was discussed and 
developed in the preceding parts of the treatise. I am thus with those who deny any 
bifurcation, implying the view that Wittgenstein sees his conclusions about the 
mystical as following from his treatment of facts, objects, logic and language in the 
earlier part of the book. I expect that any gain in an understanding of Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of the mystical will result in a further illumination of aspects of his overall 
philosophy, such as how logic and language are connected to religion and ethics. Eddy 
Zemach (b. 1935), who has also argued that the philosophy of TLP is ‘a complete 
philosophy’, would probably endorse what I have just said given his approach to the 
interpretation of the work: ‘Just as the later part of the Tractatus presupposes the 
earlier, the earlier finds its natural and necessary completion in the later.’ 24  Finally, 
I am also not perturbed that the writer of TLP has devoted a greater part of his work 
to presenting a view of the nature of language and how it is possible to make literal 
and meaningful statements, only to declare towards the end that there are things 
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which can be only shown25 (as opposed to saying or speaking about them). I reason 
that Wittgenstein is intentionally leading his readers to climb up a ‘ladder’26 to reach 
an awareness that the ‘logical form’—what propositions have in common with reality 
in order to be able to represent it—is ineffable.27  
Why the Mystical is of Interest 
At this point, let me, as indicated, briefly explain why the discussion of the mystical is 
of interest to our present study. In common parlance, the word ‘mystical’ is 
understood as referring to that which is transcendental, ineffable, supernatural, and 
hence, awe-inspiring. Thus, we would expect any event, experience or happening 
that is truly mystical to be totally inexplicable or unrecognisable. Now even if we 
agree with G E M Anscombe that ‘mysticism’ is an odd name28 for what Wittgenstein 
is referring to in those Tractarian passages we have cited, we must still acknowledge 
his acuity in pointing out that the mystical is something about which we must 
naturally be silent. Such an understanding of mystery, however, has the negative 
implication that it is therefore logical to question the very speakability of God. In 
Buddhism, for instance, the proper response to the mystical is complete or almost 
total abstinence from God-talk. In contrast, the argument I am advancing in this thesis 
is that it is still possible to speak about God—he is not ‘beyond language’—without 
denying divine mystery. The New Testament understanding seems to me to strike the 
right note here, that it is an essential feature of mystery that it permits itself to be 
grasped, though it resists objectification.29 This is also the main thrust of my 
argument—that the divine cannot be fully explained or contained by language.  
The present discussion on the mystical is relevant in yet another direction. Silence 
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before God, which Wittgenstein has urged, is generally held to be the authentic 
response, given that human language cannot reach him. Indeed, it is often argued 
that silence is more powerful than speech. This raises the question as to whether we 
still need language at all. We recall the logical positivists’ antagonism toward 
metaphysical talk, and their acrid criticism that religious language is meaningless or 
nonsense. The retort is that silence is itself ambiguous and must be mediated by 
language for it to be meaningful. The stance of silence is that God cannot be spoken 
of, but the very expression of such a statement implies that one is already saying 
something about God. Indeed, one cannot even be silent by claiming that one’s 
proper response to divine mystery is silence. Although set in the context of prayer, 
Jeff Astley’s remark, ‘it is words that frame and lead into silence’30 holds true for the 
present discussion. He also observes: ‘Those who pray speak into the silence, then, 
and in responding to the silence they come to speak better.’31 As to whether language 
is needed in religion, a straightforward answer may be that it is essential in giving it 
a ‘form’ by which it can function, communicate and extend. Without language as a 
medium, a religion would have no ‘continuing points of contact with wider human 
experience and knowledge.’32 Such a religion would be largely a private affair, one 
between a believer and his or her deity. Paradoxically, in the apophatic tradition of 
the church with its practice of moving beyond words in the face of the divine mystery, 
there is a reliance on language—to articulate what God is not (apophasis), rather 
than what God is. Indeed, some of the writings from that tradition can be as extensive 
as they are illuminating. 
‘The Mystical’ or ‘Mysticism’? 
To be sure, Wittgenstein never uses the term ‘mysticism’ in all his three references 
to the mystical. I believe he is well aware that there is a slight but significant 
difference between ‘mysticism’ and das Mystische. The former implies a system or 
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body of beliefs held by mystics, whereas the latter does not. In choosing not to use 
‘mysticism’ I think Wittgenstein is being consistent with his declared conviction that 
what properly constitutes the ‘business’ of philosophy is the ‘logical clarification of 
thoughts,’ rather than theories, ideas or dogmas. In his own words,   
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work 
consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 
‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task 
is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.33 
Still, one need not be overly unsettled if occasionally the two terms are used 
interchangeably by commentators or even by oneself. After all, both are cognates of 
the same word. The root word, ‘mystery’ has quite an evolution, having been derived 
from the Greek. As musterion it can be traced to rites, rituals or ceremonies in ancient 
religions where only a closed circle of priests, adherents, new converts or associates 
are allowed to take part in. Should something be disclosed at one of these ‘mystery’ 
meetings those present must be silent about it and keep the secrecy of everything 
that transpired. In the New Testament, Paul and John have both mentioned and 
written about ‘mystery’ on a number of occasions. This example from Paul will 
suffice: ‘I became a minister according to the divine office which was given to me for 
you, to make the word of God fully known, the mystery hidden for ages and 
generations but now made manifest to his saints. To them God chose to make known 
how great among the Gentiles are the riches of the glory of this mystery, which is 
Christ in you, the hope of glory.’ (Col 1:25–27). In time, musterion came also to be the 
word used for the sacraments of the Christian Church.34 Earl Stanley B Fronda, whose 
critique of Wittgenstein’s apophaticism will be discussed shortly, has given a 
generally broad definition to ‘the mystical’. He writes, ‘one can suppose that any 
philosophy, school of thought, or discursive activity (e.g. poetry) that highlights that 
which is ineffable and calls for silence over it, is “mystical”.’35 My dissatisfaction with 
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that is: it fails to mention an aspect of mystery that is of great significance, namely, 
that ‘what is mysterious cannot lose its mysteriousness even when it is revealed.’36 
Otherwise, as Paul Tillich (1886–1965) argues, what is revealed is not essentially 
mysterious but only seems to be mysterious.  
Wittgenstein & the Logical Positivists  
Having cleared the ground so far, let us now try to get at an understanding of what 
Wittgenstein may have meant by das Mystiche. For this, I propose to recall, as my 
starting point, an ‘object lesson’ which Wittgenstein is purported to have taught a 
number of logical positivists at a meeting of the Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis)—to 
impress upon them that the mystical cannot be discounted in their philosophical 
discourse. But first a brief background about the logical positivists and their attitude 
towards Wittgenstein.  
The movement known as ‘logical positivism’ developed in the 1920s around 
Moritz Schlick who initiated the Vienna Circle. Membership of the Circle included 
noted thinkers like Otto Neurath (1882–1945), Hans Hahn (1879–1934) and Rudolf 
Carnap (1891–1970). (A J Ayer through his 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic 
introduced the movement to Britain, but he was not an original member of the 
group.) Essentially, the doctrine of logical positivism is that with the exception of 
mathematical and logical propositions (also called ‘logical constants’ or tautologies), 
all significant propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions.37 Thus, a 
statement is meaningful only if it is capable of being empirically verified as being true 
or false. For this reason, logical positivists came to reject metaphysics, treating such 
discourse as meaningless or nonsense. As religious utterances are in principle 
unverifiable they too are included in the category of meaningless or nonsensical 
discourse. Unlike the prevailing philosophical outlook at that time which celebrated 
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science’s ability to explain the world, and was thus unenthusiastic towards 
Wittgenstein’s work, logical positivism embraced TLP, assuming it to belong to the 
empiricist tradition of modern thought. Wittgenstein was therefore seen and 
regarded as a key ally. Specifically, he was credited for the ‘insight that many 
philosophical sentences, especially in traditional metaphysics, are pseudo-sentences, 
devoid of cognitive content.’38 One of the passages in his book was widely embraced 
and used by the logical positivists as a paradigm for illustrating how the principle of 
empirical verification applied. As a matter of historical interest, that passage is worth 
recalling: 
But in order to be able to say that a point is black or white, I must first 
know when a point is called black, and when white: in order to be able to 
say, ‘“p” is true (or false)’, I must have determined in what circumstances 
I call “p” true, and in so doing I determine the sense of the proposition.39 
Despite being well received by the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein however kept his 
distance, maintaining only occasional contacts with them. He knew he had been 
misread, especially with regard to his position on metaphysics. This was later 
confirmed by Carnap who disclosed that he and the rest of the Vienna Circle had 
erroneously believed their attitude toward metaphysics was similar to 
Wittgenstein’s; they had, he further admitted, ‘not paid sufficient attention to the 
statements in his book about the mystical.’40 An agitation that Wittgenstein had long 
felt and which drew him further away from the logical positivists may well have been 
their ‘false confidence’ in a scientism that made ‘it appear as though everything were 
explained.’41 Brad J Kallenberg sketches out the differences between the two parties, 
as follows,  
…Wittgenstein never intended to refute the metaphysicians. He merely 
intended to discipline their use of language. Wittgenstein thought that 
religious mystics (such as Tolstoy) were on to something of utmost 
importance. He contended that the nature of language prevented direct 
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talk about the mystical. But he never disdained the role that religious 
mysticism played in the life of mystics. In contrast, Wittgenstein did 
repudiate logical positivism for the way their scientism discounted that 
which is truly important.42 
Theology today still finds itself wedged between two not dissimilar poles, a fact 
to which I have alluded in my introductory chapter. Either language is naively 
assumed to be fully competent to render the ‘whole truth’ and to tell us precise and 
literal information about God, or, given the prevailing spirit of scepticism, that the 
language of religion can have no epistemic access to reality and is only good for 
expressing moral or ethical intentions. The latter is well illustrated by the writings of 
Don Cupitt (b.1934).43 Both tendencies have arisen from the dualism of the mental 
and the physical—the Cartesian-inspired separation of the mind and the body.44 
Whereas the first tendency assumes that God is univocally and literally designated in 
scripture or creed, the second assumes God to be completely out of reach by means 
of language. Both, if I may say, need to be ‘disciplined’ in their respective uses of 
language. For the consequences of how we then proceed will range from 
dogmaticism, idolatry and absolutism and, in the case of the tendency to deny the 
possibility of language to express God, relativism or even nihilism.  
Against this background, we return now to the object lesson that I said we would 
recall for the purposes of our discussion. It is on record that at a meeting of the 
Vienna Circle to which he was invited to speak, Wittgenstein did something rather 
odd.45 He had grown impatient as the discussion veered towards a positivist 
direction. To everybody’s surprise, he abruptly stood up, turned his back on those 
present, and while still facing outwards, read aloud the poetry of the Indian mystic, 
Rabindranath Tagore (1861−1941). It was a grand gesture on the part of 
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Wittgenstein, one that, I believe, delivered a powerful object lesson ‘that the 
boundary of the language of logical positivism—expressed by the tight circle in which 
they all sat—simultaneously traced the inexpressible das Mystische which lay beyond 
it.’46 This interpretation of Wittgenstein’s action is consistent with what he is trying 
to say in TLP—but which was misunderstood by the logical positivists—that there are 
certain things in life about which we must be silent. The logical positivists, we recall, 
had mistaken Wittgenstein to be wholly with them in drawing the line between what 
we can speak about and what we must be silent about. They had, however and, most 
importantly, failed to appreciate the key point of difference between them: that 
while they have nothing to be silent about, ‘Wittgenstein passionately believes that 
all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent 
about.’47  
‘That it exists’ 
For Wittgenstein, we have noted, das Mystische is beyond the scope of articulation—
it lies all together outside language. Recall those locutions that assert this ineffability: 
‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical’48; ‘Propositions cannot express anything 
higher’49; ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'.50 The view that 
the mystical is outside the scope of language must imply the view that nothing can 
be said about it. Arguably, one may even infer that it is not possible to know that the 
mystical is there. Such an agnosticism would be nearly atheistic, since to deny the 
possibility of knowing the existence of the mystical comes close to discounting the 
mystical itself. Little wonder that the logical positivists saw him as an ally. But they 
had misread him, thinking he was both renouncing the expressions of, as well as 
denying, the mystical. I will express my disagreement with him involving the point of 
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silence in a little more detail shortly.   
At first blush, Wittgenstein’s statement that ‘God does not reveal himself in the 
world’51 appears to lead in the direction of atheism too. But once the wider 
philosophical context is factored in, a different impression is perceived: Wittgenstein 
is not saying that God does not exist, only that God is not within the ‘world’ of facts. 
If he were part of such a world, he would be one fact among other facts, and that is 
precisely what the mystical is not.  
Given Wittgenstein’s special way of using the term ‘world’, it is also plausible to 
interpret him as saying that God does not reveal himself in ways accessible to 
scientific or other factual investigations. Thus, we may say that though the approach 
that Wittgenstein has adopted holds that it is not possible to speak logically about 
the mystical, he does not deny that it exists. Indeed, something like God or das 
Höhere is clearly assumed; otherwise, how is one to account for the mystical fact that 
the world exists?  
It is, however, not the case that Wittgenstein is uninterested in what philosophical 
thinkers have always returned to time and again—the case for or against the 
existence of God. What may have mattered more to him is the concern that one 
should have an appropriate attitude towards the world, an attitude in which one 
views and feels the world sub specie aeterni and ‘as a whole—a limited whole.’52 In 
consequence, the world is seen as ‘a cipher of transcendence’. I think Wittgenstein 
would be quite happy to recognise such an attitude towards the world as a truly 
religious one. After all, as he tells us, ‘it is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical, but that it exists.’53 If, however, the attitude he is urging upon us is one 
which requires us never to articulate by saying God exists, we shall have to express 
our strong disagreement. This involves the point about silence that I made a while 
ago. We would have reason to think if he has not gone altogether too far in drawing 
alongside the logical positivists. Admittedly, it is a challenge to express adequately 
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what is totally ineffable, but it is one that requires ‘extreme caution’, not total silence. 
To say that something cannot be expressed does not imply that it cannot be 
expressed at all. Those of us who believe in God ‘have heard about him and were 
taught in him’ (Eph 4:21; emphasis added), and we have an obligation to give a report 
(1 Pet 3:15). If we find ourselves caught between the poles of absolute objectivity 
and total silence, the proper response is to navigate between them by means of a 
non-objectifying form of religious language which, as I said before, honours divine 
transcendence and caters for our need for expression. After all, as Wittgenstein 
himself has been careful to point out, what is mystical ‘shows itself’; if that is indeed 
the case, I believe some expression of ‘itself’ must be possible through the language 
of religion.54   
We should also not imagine that Wittgenstein’s reluctance to address the 
question of the existence of God is due to any deficiency on his part about his 
religious belief. Based on our findings on his religious life in Chapter 2, we can almost 
certainly rule out such a reason. While in TLP we are given some hints about his faith, 
in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks we are shown a more articulate believer who identifies 
God with ‘the meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world.’55 Over the years, 
Wittgenstein has come to believe that questions of meaning are central to 
philosophy, rather than questions of truth. As to whether God exists or not, such a 
question must necessarily involve a decision or assessment about certain statements 
being true or false. We know from his analysis of language, Wittgenstein is loath to 
engage in any enterprise that requires the objectification of God, a task that will 
inevitably, on his view, stretch language to go beyond its limits.  
Let us be clear that to Wittgenstein’s way of thinking, the reason God does not 
figure is not that God does not exist, but that the vocabulary for this kind of non-
factual discourse is lacking. As he has already declared, ‘Propositions can express 
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nothing that is higher.’56 Thus, Wittgenstein would probably regard any attempt to 
say what cannot be said in factual language as the spilling of nonsense. In a 
conversation with Drury, Wittgenstein disparagingly remarks, ‘Can you imagine St 
Augustine saying that the existence of God was “highly probable”?’57 That last remark 
by Wittgenstein is surely an exaggeration, for it is not only perfectly imaginable for 
theologians and philosophers to speak of the existence of God as highly probable, 
many have done so. Richard Swinburne, for instance, has argued:  
It remains to me, as to so many who have thought about the matter, a 
source of extreme puzzlement that there should exist anything at all… But 
there does exist something. And if there is to exist something, it seems 
impossible to conceive of anything simpler (and therefore a priori more 
probable) than the existence of God. The intrinsic probability of theism 
may be low; but it is, I suggest, relative to other hypotheses about what 
exists, very high.58 
While still on the question of God’s existence, a task now befalls me to share a 
point of application with regard to the practice of theological reflection. We have 
noted Wittgenstein’s reluctance to stretch language to do what it cannot do. In his 
later philosophy, Wittgenstein would advise that words be brought back from their 
metaphysical to their use in an everyday context. He tells us why we should do so: 
‘When philosophers use a word—“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, 
“name”—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is 
the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original 
home?’59 Likewise, in our theological reflection, we need to be mindful of the context 
within which the words and phrases we use are located, or from which they are 
drawn. Here is Kerr’s extremely clear-headed counsel to all who engage in cerebral 
discourse about God and religion, ‘Whether I mean the same by saying ‘I believe in 
God’ as other people do when they say the same thing will come out at various places 
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in our lives: our practices, aspirations, hopes, virtues, and so on. It will show in the 
rest of what we do whether we have faith in God. It will not be settled by our finding 
that we make the same correlation between our words and some item of 
metaphysical reality.’60 
Wittgenstein’s Experience of the Mystical 
There are indications in the literature that Wittgenstein’s mysticism is more than an 
idea or hypothesis for philosophising. Recall his remark about viewing the world sub 
specie aeterni and feeling it as a limited whole.61 The words ‘viewing’ and ‘feeling’ are 
clearly suggestive of experience rather than theory. In this regard, one can perhaps 
understand why Ogden’s translation of ‘view’ (Anschauung) to ‘contemplation’ has 
fallen out of favour with some readers: Ogden’s rendering diminishes the experiential 
aspect that Wittgenstein has in mind.62 Further textual evidences are to be found in 
the closing sections of TLP. The relevant passages have been cited earlier but we shall 
repeat them here in order to show that each of the situations related by 
Wittgenstein, namely, ‘the sense of the world’, ‘ethics’, ‘the will’, ‘death’, 
‘immortality’, ‘God’, ‘the problems of life,’ and ‘the solution of the problem of life’ is 
an aspect of both the view and the experience of the world as mystical. The question, 
as Brian F McGuinness (b. 1927) has fastidiously argued, is not whether 
Wittgenstein’s mysticism is rooted in experience but whether ‘these various aspects 
of the Tractatus are concerned with a single feeling or experience or realm of 
experience.’63  
In an article entitled ‘Lectures on Ethics’, Wittgenstein confesses to having had 
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several experiences that may be characterised as mystical.64 He considers them to be 
of absolute value.65 The first is the experience par excellence of wondering ‘at the 
existence of the world.’66 Another is the experience of ‘feeling absolutely 
safe…whatever happens.’67 Then, there is the experience of ‘feeling guilty’ over doing 
something that God disapproves of.68 These experiences which he recalls are clearly 
reminiscent of what Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) has famously termed numinous 
experience, the experience of the Holy or the mysterium tremendum et fascinans.69 
Even Wittgenstein’s invocation to silence in the concluding sections of his work 
strikes us as a possible parallel with the ‘necessity of silence’ felt by Otto in his 
response to the numen praesens of Yahweh.70 In some of Wittgenstein’s earliest 
passages, such as those cited below, we are given glimpses of his mystical experience:  
The world is given me, i.e. my will enters into the world completely from 
the outside as into something that is already there. (As for what my will 
is, I don’t know yet.) That is why we have the feeling of being dependent 
on an alien will. However this may be, at any rate we are in a certain sense 
dependent, and what we are dependent on we call God. In this sense God 
would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world—which is 
independent of our will.71   
How things stand, is God. God is, how things stand.72 
Admittedly, the God presented in these notes appears to some to be a God of 
pantheism. Several commentators have arrived at such a conclusion. McGuinness, 
for example, writes, ‘True, there are references to God in the Notebooks and even in 
the Tractatus but clearly to a God who is identical with nature: Deus, sive Natura. At 
best Wittgenstein allows a form of pantheism… he might be said to hold that if there 
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is any God, then the world is God.’73 Wittgenstein is also said to be some sort of a 
nature mystic who seeks to have mystical union with the divine. Discussing the 
question of whether Wittgenstein was a pantheist, theist or even deist in any detail 
would take us too far beyond the concerns of our present study. I should like, 
however, to point out that some key statements in TLP clearly cannot be read to fit 
the pantheistic mould (e.g. TLP, 3.031; TLP, 6.41–6.43; TLP, 6.432 and TLP, 6.44).74 
Moreover, the traces or hints of ‘nature mysticism’ in Wittgenstein’s writings may 
well have been included to serve the overall aim of conveying his grand thesis—that 
the mystical cannot be described or talked about, but which nevertheless, shows 
itself. Be that as it may, we can quite confidently say that Wittgenstein ‘had a 
certainty about having come in contact with a reality beyond his own 
consciousness.’75 What we might have considerable less confidence about is to make 
the claim—as James William McClendon (1924−2000) and Brad J Kallenberg have 
done—that Wittgenstein was ‘an authentic Christian (albeit an undogmatic and thus 
perhaps an irregular one).’76 As I discussed in Chapter 2, the matter of his personal 
religious faith cannot be easily settled, as he did not make any profession of faith, nor 
was he formally linked to any church. 
Wittgenstein’s Apophaticism 
Wittgenstein is of course not the first thinker to suggest that the mystical cannot be 
expressed; indeed, one may even go so far as to say his understanding of the mystical 
is not really novel.77 The fact is many philosophers and theologians have struggled 
with and written about the inadequacy of language in this regard—possibly, with the 
exception of Descartes who seems to think that one can have a ‘clear and distinct 
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idea’ where God is concerned. Long before Wittgenstein and within the earliest 
Christian centuries, the ‘apophatic’ trail has been set ablaze by Dionysius the 
Areopagite (whom we said was also known as Pseudo-Dionysius and whose work we 
have cited). This trail, we have noted above, takes the theological approach that God 
is best described by negation, that is, God is spoken of only in terms of what he is not, 
rather than what God is. It may be noted that although Aquinas opts for the way of 
analogia to understanding religious language, he considers the via negativa an 
important first step.78  Today, apophatic theology or mystical theology is the hallmark 
of the Eastern Orthodox branch of Christianity, with elements of it embraced by 
Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians. We may safely say that the view that God 
is transcendent or ‘wholly other’ and ineffable is standard doctrine within the 
Christian religion. The same, however, cannot be said about the view I am urging—
that God is also beyond the limits of human language to contain or fully express. It is 
something that religious people need to be mindful of.  
In his consideration of the Wittgenstein corpus, Fronda has concluded that the 
theology of Wittgenstein ‘is much more impressive for its negative suggestions than 
it is for its affirmative ones.’79 This observation is borne out by the fact that in the 
pages of TLP although ‘God’ is mentioned four times, it is only in the last of these 
occasions that Wittgenstein says anything about God, and even then what he says 
about God is a negation—that God does not reveal himself in the world. Fronda 
enumerates a number of so-called ‘negative suggestions’ inferred from 
Wittgenstein’s apophaticism. We shall consider three of them, under these headings: 
(1) Wittgenstein’s God is beyond sense, (2) Wittgenstein’s negative theology 
evidently predominates over his affirmative theology, and (3) Statements about God 
are not propositions with sense. 
1. Wittgenstein’s God is beyond sense.  
Fronda has proposed that the God of Wittgenstein’s apophaticism is a God who 
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is beyond sense. Thus, with Wittgenstein one can go only so far as to identify God 
with but not as. The with versus as distinction is easily explained as follows, ‘If x is 
identified as y, then that is to say that x is y. If x is identified with y, then that is to say 
that x somehow shares a property or belongs to a domain common with or otherwise 
is somehow related to y; nonetheless x has a distinct identity from y.’80 If we accept 
that Wittgenstein refrains from saying who God is, then the oft-made claim about 
him being a pantheist would be defeated simply on the basis that even a pantheist 
has to make a claim about divinity. I would, however, not go so far as to say that 
scepticism must then be conceded. The fact that Wittgenstein had characterised God, 
albeit by negation, should lead us away from supposing that nothing can be said 
about the divine. More rightly to suppose is the nuanced view I am concerned to 
defend in this study, that the God who is beyond sense, cannot be fully described or 
contained by what we say about him.  
2. Wittgenstein’s negative theology evidently predominates over his affirmative 
theology.  
This is seen by Fronda as a ‘complete reversal’ since in his Notebooks phase 
Wittgenstein had made many notable and affirmative statements about God.81 We 
recall the following statements: 
What do I know about God and the purpose of life? I know that this world 
exists… The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call 
God. And connect with this the comparison of God to a father. (11.6.16). 
In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The 
world—which is independent of our will… I can make myself independent 
of fate. Certainly it is correct to say: Conscience is the voice of God. 
(8.7.16) 
How things stand, is God. God is, how things stand. (1.8.16). 
Against the view that the above entries indicate that Wittgenstein’s understanding 
of God is pantheistic, Fronda counter-argues that ‘the theological themes in NB are 
but one side of a theological position yet to be fully shown—TLP subsequently shows 
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the other side,’ or that they are ‘merely initial sketches of Wittgenstein’s attempt at 
presenting his position on God.’82 Even better put, I think, is Fronda’s suggestion that 
the so-called pantheistic entries, as with the whole of NB, are but a ‘ladder’ on which 
Wittgenstein climbs up towards TLP.  
To my way of thinking, whether Wittgenstein’s theology veers more towards 
pantheism or not is a question that can be left to one side.  What Wittgenstein was 
saying during a particular phase or under a particular circumstance, was an attempt 
on his part to approach the mystical in his own way. He presents us with a variety of 
theologies, none of which can claim to have a full grasp of the object of theology. 
Naturally, it is disconcerting to think that we might be faced with an indefinite variety 
of languages and meanings. This, as we have noted repeatedly, does not mean that 
God cannot be intelligibly spoken of, only that he cannot be fully contained by our 
speech.          
3. Statements about God are not propositions with sense.  
The reason statements about God are not viewed as ‘propositions with sense’ is 
that they are not intended to picture ‘some possible fact within the logical space 
covered by language.’83 These statements would be labelled meaningless or 
nonsensical by the logical positivists and even by Wittgenstein himself, since they are 
not capable of being verified or falsified. A valid point is made that even if one were 
to resort to the via negativa methodology to speak of God, the statement(s) that one 
makes would still be dismissed as not making sense. The ‘unsayable’ is unsayable 
either by positive or negative terms. Even so, the above remarks about propositions 
have some relevance to my thesis. They may help to ease the hardened position of 
seeing language as essentially pictorial or referential. Perhaps, they can also explain 
why some religious people are usually unfazed when presented with contrarian 
positions seeking to refute their beliefs, and why they can go on reciting creeds, lines 
of scripture and the like, of which they have little or no understanding. 






Why the Mystical is broached  
In this section, I shall attempt to explain why the notion of the mystical is broached 
in TLP. I begin with ‘how the world is’, that is, the world as it is conceived by 
Wittgenstein.84 The reason is that I want to show that the notion of the mystical is an 
upshot of Wittgenstein’s complex thinking concerning ‘the world’ in its relationship 
to language.  
In Wittgenstein’s account, the world is very much the reference point around 
which the mystical is presented. Recall if you will, the following propositions: (a) ‘It is 
not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists’85; and (b) ‘Feeling 
the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.’86 Earlier, at the beginning of 
his treatise Wittgenstein has provided a rather aphoristic description of the world: 
The world is everything that is the case.  
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.  
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.  
For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that 
is not the case.  
The facts in logical space are the world. 
The world divides into facts.87 
What is clearly communicated here is that the world is all-inclusive: ‘it is everything 
that is the case’. In Wittgenstein’s philosophical mind, as we have noted, the world is 
not the world of empirical data and sensations or science, but the world of facts as 
portrayed in propositions. He is, in my opinion, consistent in holding to this 
understanding of the word ‘world’ throughout his philosophising years.88 But at this 
phase, he is still operating according to the theory that language pictures or mirrors 
the world, and that meaningful language is about ‘what is the case’. This view of 
language, the so-called ‘picture theory’ has been discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
Without letting it detain us, let us mention the all-important fact that in the thought 
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of Wittgenstein, ‘his world’ is matched by a particular kind of language, one that can 
adequately depict it. ‘A proposition,’ he has explained, ‘is a picture of reality.’89 That 
correspondence between world and language leads him to further posit that within 
his world, he can work out a system of absolute necessity, objectivity and logicality—
by means of language.  It will be a world marked out, as he says, by a ‘totality of facts’, 
and one in which the principles of certainty apply, and factuality obtains. Admittedly, 
many will find such a world difficult to conceive, for it is missing what makes a ‘world’ 
world, namely, people, human activity, beliefs, means of expressions, and so forth. 
Throwing a spanner in the works, Wittgenstein himself famously sets out to mark 
out a limit to the expression of thought (in language). Recall his byword, ‘the limits of 
my language mean the limits of my world.’90 For he has come to recognise that there 
exists an entire realm of human life which he did not or could not account for in his 
world-view and language-concept. Paradoxically, the drawing of a limit has enabled 
him to ‘think of both sides of this limit.’91 The case, as he would say, ‘is altogether like 
that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye.’92 While 
Wittgenstein does not explicitly affirm the existence of an ontological domain 
comprising things which language is inadequate to express, he goes on to speak of a 
two-realm distinction—one ‘within the world,’ and the other ‘outside the world.’93 I 
refer to the following passages, 
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything 
is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—
and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does 
have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is 
the case.94 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, this is the distinction or divide between what can be 
said and what cannot be said but nevertheless shows itself. From the textual evidence 
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of TLP, we can infer what must lie outside the world: the mystical, i.e., values, religion, 
ethics, aesthetics and the like. All this while, Wittgenstein has expressed a craving for 
a realm or order ‘in which the answers to questions are symmetrically combined—a 
priori—to form a self-contained system.’95 As he discloses, his urge towards the 
mystical arises from that craving, as well as from his own dissatisfaction with science 
which, he claims, can only provide answers to scientific questions but not to the 
problems of life.96 Thus, the realm of the mystical is for him that realm which he could 
not account for in his language schema.  
It might be helpful to consider two attempts at explaining how the notion of the 
mystical came to be shaped. The first is by Christopher Yorke who believes that the 
notion of the mystical has been posited as a ‘remedy’ in Wittgenstein’s overall 
philosophical schema which, he thinks, lacks foundation.97 Yorke begins by properly 
crediting Wittgenstein for succeeding ‘in driving home the point that philosophy 
cannot exist apart from the language that gives it intelligible form.’98 Yet, he finds 
somewhat incongruous Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘language alone can tell us that 
language can mislead us.’99 It is, as he says, an issue for him because such a position 
amounts to a case of having one’s cake and eating it. The grievance has a familiar ring 
to it: it distantly echoes the criticism voiced by Russell that ‘Mr Wittgenstein manages 
to say a good deal about what cannot be said.’100 The other issue with which Yorke is 
concerned is Wittgenstein’s exclusive focus on the linguistic in his philosophical 
methodology. The resultant ‘deflationary antiphilosophy’, as Yorke calls it, lacks 
foundation, or in his words, ‘an ultimate grounding or justification outside of 
references to entrenched linguistic practices.’101 The upshot of Wittgenstein’s overall 
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project is ‘a foundational circularity, albeit a tightly coherent one.’102 It is a situation 
that needs to be overcome if an infinite regress is to be avoided. Yorke gives us an 
outline of the steps taken by Wittgenstein and the ontological completion achieved, 
as follows, ‘This exclusive focus on the linguistic leaves us with a picture of the world 
that is incomplete; a yin bereft of its accompanying yang. Wittgenstein himself 
acknowledges this lacuna, and attempts to remedy it in his philosophic schema, via 
his positing of the “mystical”, that which transcends language, and which no language 
can describe. This move brings completion to the Wittgensteinian ontology. There is 
the world, the totality of all articulatable facts; and there is the mystical, that which 
cannot be captured by the language of facts—and these two categories exhaust the 
set of what is and what can be.’103  
In the second suggestion which is by Lazenby, the notion of the mystical is said to 
be raised because Wittgenstein has determined that ‘the vocabulary of factual 
language is the only vocabulary there is.’104 Because facts, according to the Tractarian 
schema, are what can be expressed in language, there is no longer place for any ideal 
of ‘moral facts’, ‘religious facts’ or ‘philosophical facts’. As is frequently heard, 
philosophy and theology are left with an impaired language. This follows from 
Wittgenstein’s successful attempt at absolutising the division between fact and value, 
a division entailed by the separation between the world and God. Thus, God who is 
not a fact, but value, lies outside the reach of language. With the world now limited 
to facts, the mystic—and Wittgenstein is certainly one—must either transcend it to 
have union with the mystical or remain silent. If my reading of Lazenby is correct, I 
think he is implying that the notion of the mystical is posited by Wittgenstein, the 
mystic, as a way of overcoming the limitation of language. Consider these words: 
‘Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about 
them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not 
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what they are.’105 How Wittgenstein proceeds from this point is perceptively 
captured by Kallenberg: 
…rather than consign the ineffable to the metaphysical dust bin, as did 
the logical positivists, Wittgenstein concluded instead that the route to 
the beyond-the-world cannot lie within language. The logical positivists 
stood on the road toward the mystical (das Mystische) in order to block 
the way and turn travellers back toward home. However, Wittgenstein 
stood as a moral sage at the crossroads not to turn travellers back but to 
warn them which fork is a dead end. His intention all along was to draw 
attention to the mystical by showing that the limits of our worldly island 
are simultaneously the shoreline of a vast ocean.’106   
From Logic to the World 
The proposal by Lazenby seems to me to have rightly recognised the central place of 
logic in Wittgenstein’s philosophical undertaking. This should hardly come as a 
surprise. In his Preface to TLP, Wittgenstein has intimated that the problems of 
philosophy are due to the logic of language being misunderstood. He has also claimed 
that it is impossible to represent in language anything that goes against logic.107 His 
thoughts on logical form and his notion of correspondence between ‘what pictures’ 
(language) with ‘what is pictured’ (reality) are the outcomes of an exercise in 
armchair logic. It is thus my contention that Wittgenstein’s view of the mystical or 
God has also been partly determined by his own logical analysis. Interestingly, we 
read Russell aptly capturing this in his introduction to TLP:  
[Wittgenstein’s] attitude upon this grows naturally out of his doctrine in 
pure logic, according to which the logical proposition is a picture (true or 
false) of the fact, and has in common with the fact a certain structure… 
Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the 
expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in 
language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense. This 
inexpressible contains, according to Mr. Wittgenstein, the whole of logic 
and philosophy.108 
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The Mystical in Later Wittgenstein 
In this last section, I should like to briefly attend to a conundrum: if the mystical 
concerns the whole approach and intention of TLP, as we have claimed, why does it 
seem altogether absent from PI? One may be tempted to conclude that because 
Wittgenstein has jettisoned the logical schema of his earlier phase of philosophy, he 
has also abandoned the mystical in his later phase.  It is, of course, true that in PI a 
very different schema to language and logic obtains. Whereas he was earlier 
concerned with the structure of language and its logical form, he now looks at the 
way language properly functions in the context of the everyday. But as we have seen, 
more recent scholarship on Wittgenstein has rejected the view that his earlier and 
later philosophical positions are diametrically opposed. In the specific case of the 
treatment of the mystical, Wittgenstein has been consistent throughout in drawing 
limit(s) between what can be said and what cannot be said. To be sure, he still speaks 
of limits of language,109 but no longer, as he did in TLP, of ‘the’ limit. This variation 
finds expression in TLP in the quest for the structure of language, and in the later 
work, by bringing language back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. The 
reason for what amounts to fine-tuning in this case is that he has come to realise that 
there is no one definite limit to language, marking out what cannot be said 
meaningfully. If I am right that his basic view of philosophy has remained 
fundamentally unchanged over time, then the fact that nothing is said in his later 
work that hints of his abandoning a belief in the mystical must imply that his thoughts 
on the mystical are firmly in place.110 If in PI he has been silent about that reality, it is 
probably because he is heeding his own injunction to remain silent in the face of what 
he cannot speak. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the concept of the mystical which emerges 
towards the end of TLP. We have read closely what Wittgenstein has written about 
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and outlined his position on the mystical—one which I believe is a culmination of his 
philosophical development. By that term, Wittgenstein clearly has in mind ‘God’, but 
he is careful to include a range of other related concerns such as ethics, values, 
aesthetics, logic, and the like. In fact, his own working definition of ‘what is mystical’ 
says it all: that which is inexpressible but nevertheless shows itself. Also, we have 
noted that the mystical is posited by Wittgenstein to bring completion to his 
ontology. The ‘mystical’ presence, in my view, can be traced through his later work, 
even though the word itself is not used in PI.  Lest we join his critics in accusing him 
of wanting to ‘talk only about words,’111 I have drawn attention to his unpretentious 
call ‘to view the world sub specie aeterni [sic]’, offering textual indications that he 
does indeed have an experience of, and not just a theory about, the mystical. It is 
evidently clear that the mystical or contemplative certainly manifests itself again and 
again in his life and thought. 
I wish here to summarise and further comment on some of the ways in which 
Wittgenstein’s notion of the mystical can apply to the claims of my thesis about 
religious language elaborated in my introductory chapter. Let me first touch on 
Wittgenstein’s confession that the mystical exists, or better, that the mystical simply 
‘is’. The claim is basic, for unless God or some divine reality exists, there is simply no 
religion. In general, we might say that religion must involve the use of language to 
speak about God’s existence or argue that he ‘is’. If or when we use language in such 
wise, we must do so with care and restraint in order not to inadvertently foster the 
view that the divine is one thing or fact among other things or facts in the world. That 
is certainly not a conception of God we wish to evoke, out of respect for divine 
mystery, not to mention that we might be overstepping the bounds of language into 
a realm that is beyond language.     
Wittgenstein, we have seen, characterises the mystical as ‘inexpressible’. It is so 
because it ‘lies outside the world’ and is beyond the limits of language. He urges total 
silence on our part in the face of that reality, a position I have criticised as ‘going 
                                                     




altogether too far’. Nonetheless, we must agree with him that keeping silence is 
mostly an authentic response, especially if we do not mean ‘the silence which takes 
rescue in the ineffable, but rather the silence which is implicit in language.’112 Also, 
being silent is not an inappropriate posture towards that which is not entirely 
intelligible to us. At all events, Wittgenstein’s stricture does not mean that we cannot 
talk about God, only that we cannot claim to have grasped him, or have him 
contained in words. Thus, what theology must never claim is full knowledge of, or 
complete explanation about God’s being. For the reason that theology’s proper 
object is the mystical, a reality of which our interpretation is to be continually 
revisited, it follows that the language of religion must not yield to the temptation of 
formulaic expressions or fixed formulations.  
At TLP, 6.522, Wittgenstein asserts that what is mystical makes itself manifest, 
that is, it shows itself. The logical positivists, we have seen, denied this. We can, and 
must, criticise Wittgenstein for not saying more about how the showing happens, or 
how one can come to know what is shown. One is left wondering if there is something 
of significance that, while not said, is perhaps shown? I believe there is. The idea that 
the mystical shows itself challenges me to ‘discipline’ my use of language in ways that 
will make possible the object of my discourse to be meaningfully communicated and 
understood. This illustration by Wittgenstein gives me pause: ‘The proposition is a 
picture of reality…  I understand the proposition, without its sense having been 
explained to me.’113 Paradoxically, religion, like philosophy, must ‘signify what cannot 
be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.’114 In other words, it is possible to 
show or communicate what cannot be said.  
Wittgenstein, we may recall, tried to read the poetry of the Indian mystic, Tagore 
to the logical positivists as his way of directing them to the touch of das Mystiche. He 
was later to speak of having read another poem, that of Uhland’s Graf Eberhard’s 
Weissdorn, and finding it to be another instance of what he would regard as the 
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mystical making itself manifest.115 The poetry of those just cited as well as those by 
Dostoyevsky and Goethe, and books like Tolstoy’s, certain detective stories and films 
and dramas had all been for him the vehicles through which the mystical can manifest 
itself. Speaking of poetry’s role in all of this, some light is cast by David Jasper (b. 
1951) on its relationship with religion: ‘Just as poetry… requires religion and draws 
inspiration from the definitions of theology, so poetry may serve as a necessary 
reminder to theology of mystery, hesitation and hiddenness of religious experience. 
Poets often understand well the nature of “mystery”.’116 I believe it is the depth of 
honest reflection about life in poetry and other forms of art, as well as their 
genuineness in expressing emotions, describing situations or even telling us 
something about ourselves that render them fit instruments whereby the mystical 
might show itself. Most certainly for us too, the mystical can be made manifest 
through these very same means. As we have been warned, we neglect the insights 
and beauty of poetry and the art of literature at our peril.117 We can also expect the 
mystical to show itself in and through our use of first-order religious language such 
as prayer, worship and confession. This is amply borne out in our own experience and 
practice.  
Finally, if art (poetry included) is a sphere in which Wittgenstein thought the 
mystical can show itself, surely human action is another. This is in line with the 
teaching of most religions that one’s conduct, deed and action testify to the God one 
believes in. Jesus, for instance, tells his followers, ‘Let your light so shine before men, 
that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven.’ 
(Matt 5:16). In Wittgenstein’s case, we understand that he ‘made a conscious effort 
to live out the implications of the Tractatus, that is to do what could not be said but 
could be shown.’118  
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The mystical, we have seen, is that which nothing whatsoever can be said about 
except that it is mystical. Even so, we have argued that it might still be possible to 
talk about it, since it shows itself. To say that the mystical is inexpressible is already 
to put the ‘property’ into words.  However indirectly or partially, light on the mystical 
to be shed by means of language, one would be concerned with the ‘truth’ of what is 





The Question of Truth: Finding ‘the Road from 
Error to Truth’ 
 
We must begin with the mistake and transform it into what is true. That is, we 
must uncover the source of error; otherwise hearing what is true won’t help 
us…To convince someone of what is true, it is not enough to state it. We must 
find the road from error to truth.1  
                                                                                                         Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Introduction 
We have seen in previous chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) that for Wittgenstein—at least 
in the pre-Tractatus and Tractatus phases of his philosophising—a certain connection 
always exists between his analysis of language and his conception of reality. Recall 
the following entry in NB, ‘The theory of logical portrayal by means of language says—
quite generally: In order for it to be possible that a proposition should be true or 
false—agree with reality or not—for this to be possible something in the proposition 
must be identical with reality.’2 Or, consider his remarks in TLP that ‘a proposition is 
a picture of reality,’3 and that ‘one can actually see from the proposition how 
everything stands logically if it is true.’4 On Wittgenstein’s view, language and reality 
are internally related, the nature of their relation resting on a ‘picturing’ function. 
Propositions, he further remarks, are contingent, that is, they can be either true or 
false: their sense or meaningfulness as pictures of reality is independent of whatever 
facts that obtain. So, if a proposition is true, it corresponds to a fact and depicts how 
things are in the world; if false, it does not have these characteristics though it 
nevertheless remains meaningful. Given this view about propositions and the 
assumption that language matches the world, we are presented with a vision of the 
world as comprising and determined by facts.5 This ‘world of facts,’ to borrow the 
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description from a recent research on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, ‘floats in a space of 
possibilities, and true propositions, reporting those facts, are surrounded by a space 
of meaningful but false propositions.’6 Curiously, how one comes to know whether a 
proposition ‘is true’ or ‘is false’ is a problem that is not addressed; it is simply assumed 
a priori that one knows what is true and what is false. For many, and especially those 
of us who are involved in theological reflection, Wittgenstein’s postulation about 
language and its relation to reality naturally raises the all-important question of truth. 
It is all too well known that in the later phase of his philosophical enterprise, 
Wittgenstein has had a change of view with regard to language. I have discussed this 
in Chapter 2 and considered the various reasons why he had found the so-called 
‘picture’ theory inadequate. For our present purposes, we shall single out just one of 
the reasons for further mention. It is the issue he has had with the premise that there 
is a one-for-one correspondence between the simples of language and of reality. 
Something of his dissatisfaction with that feature is conveyed in the following 
passage,  
But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?—
What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The bits of wood of 
which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms?—‘Simple’ means: not 
composite. And here the point is: in what sense ‘composite’? It makes no 
sense at all to speak absolutely of the ‘simple parts of a chair’.7  
Accordingly, he introduces another manner of conceiving language which may be 
conveniently designated ‘meaning as use’. This is the idea that what gives words or 
sentences meaning is not their correspondence with objects or states of affairs but 
their use in everyday activities. Wittgenstein himself offers a summary of that notion 
as follows, ‘For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the 
word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.’8 With this shift of focus—from correspondence to use—the question of 
what counts as true or false arises even more strongly to the fore. Unlike the ‘picture’ 
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theory of language, judgement about a proposition with respect to its truth or falsity 
is no longer simply a reflection of an already given order, that is, in the form of 
objects. Determining whether words or signs of language are true or false now 
requires an investigation into their use within a definite language system. As Derek 
Bolton has pointed out, ‘if the use of a sign is to constitute judgement, there must be 
“correct” applications of the sign, contrasted with “incorrect”.’9 
These initial remarks may have seemed to suggest that the question of what is 
true and what is false is only incidental to Wittgenstein’s philosophical concerns. That 
would be quite mistaken. In fact, the question of truth is ever before him, constituting 
a key element in his work. As we shall see, his views and arguments with respect to 
truth in both phases of his philosophical life are no musings casually offered; rather, 
they are premised upon tacit, even pre-conceived, assumptions of what is required 
to call a statement ‘true’. For instance, what Wittgenstein says in TLP about 
propositions being contingent seems determined by some a priori concepts of truth 
and falsity. It is thus understandable for Hans-Johann Glock (b. 1960) to make the 
claim in his dictionary article that ‘there is no theory of truth which has not been 
ascribed to Wittgenstein.’10 Still having Wittgenstein in mind, Glock further remarks, 
‘He has been “credited” with a coherence theory, a pragmatic theory, a consensus 
theory. The reality of the matter is straight-forward. The early Wittgenstein 
developed a sophisticated version of the correspondence theory, while the later 
Wittgenstein, together with Ramsey, pioneered the redundancy theory.’11 That in 
Wittgenstein’s major works certain underlying theories of truth have been detected 
and analysed is also an indication that the ‘truth’ theme has been much ruminated 
upon, never mind that scholars and commentators on Wittgenstein are not agreed 
as to which theory of truth should properly be ascribed to which period of his 
philosophy. Later in the chapter, we shall have opportunity to consider some of the 
theories which are said to have guided Wittgenstein in his conception of what truth 
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Before proceeding further, I should explain why the question of truth, besides being 
important, is relevant to our overall consideration of the place of language in 
speaking about God. My earlier discussion has underlined the priority of meaning 
over truth. This is correct as far as it goes; it is, however, not intended to sidestep 
concerns about the truth or falsity of particular religious concepts. Indeed, our 
understanding of a statement is facilitated by our having some knowledge of what it 
would have to obtain for it to be true, and possibly how it is to be verified. Moreover, 
in arguing as I do in my thesis, that religious language is fact-stating (though not 
revealing or disclosing all there is to know about the divine reality), I cannot expect 
to duck the question of its truth or falsity. The language-user not only has to distil fact 
from ‘noise’, he or she may even have to negotiate an agreement on what fact is. 
Thus, taking up the truth question here is required of us. On the part of Wittgenstein, 
meaning and truth are never collapsed into a single whole. He distinguishes between 
them in the following remark:  
If I were to say ‘I have never been on the moon—but that I may be 
mistaken’ that would be idiotic. For even the thought that I might have 
been transported there, by unknown means… would not give me any 
right to speak of a possible mistake here.12 
In the present chapter, we shall attempt to get a grip on what Wittgenstein means 
by ‘truth’ or by the predicate ‘is true’, terms he regularly uses in his writings. Our 
study will necessarily draw us into an engagement with some of the theories of truth 
attributed to Wittgenstein and whether his position is more reflective of realism or 
anti-realism. We shall, however, not be drawn into the debate between realists and 
anti-realists. As truth and language are vitally related (via meaning), some passing, 
but by no means insouciant, attention will be given to the role played by the latter in 
the service of the former. Attention to the metaphysical question ‘What is truth?’ 
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seems required of us for reasons I will state later, so a response to this enduring issue 
will be included. The whole purpose of our present study is to gain not only an 
understanding of truth as an epistemic concept, but also an understanding of the 
relationship between truth and language.  
What is Truth? 
We begin by attending to a vexatious question in philosophical discussions about 
truth—‘What is truth?’—a question famously put to Jesus by the Roman Procurator, 
Pontius Pilate.13 In doing so we shall be able to set the stage for considering 
Wittgenstein’s account of truth, and also introduce some of the standing issues that 
are essential for understanding truth-as-a-theological-problem. In his book, Trinity 
and Truth, Bruce D Marshall makes a distinction which he thinks is important in talk 
about truth. He posits that there is a difference between asking what truth is and 
asking what is true.14 The former is concerned with defining what truth is or 
comprises, whereas the latter is concerned with how one goes about deciding 
whether a particular belief is true. To be sure, both questions are closely related with 
one another, though often confused. The distinction, Marshall contends, serves a 
useful function. He writes, ‘By itself, an account of what it is for the Christian 
community’s beliefs to be true will not necessarily enable anyone, including 
Christians, to decide whether those beliefs are actually true. Decisions about the 
truth of beliefs or utterances require not simply a characterisation of truth, but 
criteria of truth, by appeal to which we can distinguish true beliefs and utterances 
from false ones, those to which our characterisation of truth applies from those to 
which it does not.’15 Be that as it may, I cite this distinction to indicate that in asking 
the question ‘What is truth?’ we are concerned with getting at a characterisation of 
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truth, that is, with defining what truth is. What is being asked is: what do we mean 
to say of a sentence, a belief or a claim, that it is true? While  the other question—
‘what is true?’—is not really a question about truth at all; it does not analyse ‘truth’ 
or ‘is true’ in any way, being chiefly concerned about criteria for deciding the truth or 
otherwise of a claim or statement.16  
Importance of the Truth Question  
The question that so troubled Pilate, even though he either did not want or wait for 
an answer is of course not original to him.17 It had been asked by philosophers and 
thinkers since the earliest times; indeed, it is still very much with us. Some reasons 
for its prevalence come easily to mind. Essentially, to ask about truth is to raise the 
question of being, or if you prefer, the question of reality. What we demand in the 
asking, as Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) tells us, ‘is an answer to the question as to 
where we stand today’ or ‘what our situation is today.’18 According to Heidegger, 
when the early philosophers inquired into the question of truth they were not 
concerned with truth ‘in the sense of a theory of knowledge’, but with it as ‘the 
science that considers beings as beings, that is, with regard to their being.’19 We 
further learn from him that there was already in those pre-critical days an assumption 
that ‘being actually “goes together” with truth.’20 Thus, we may say it is our latter-
day confusion of truth with knowledge that has spawned the theory that truth has 
‘the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a 
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correspondence of one being (subject) to another (object).’21 Another reason why 
the truth question dies hard has to do with what truth inherently is. Given its vital 
connections with human concerns such as language, thought and action, truth is the 
key to how we think about the world and how we live in it. Many issues of life relate 
to truth, such that they rely on or are impinged upon by notions about what truth is. 
For instance, truth and belief are so deeply wound together that when one tells 
another about what one believes, the implication is that those beliefs are held to be 
true. It also appears that we cannot do without the concept of truth, for, as Donald 
Davidson (1917–2003) has asserted, ‘without the idea of truth we would not be 
thinking creatures, nor would we understand what it is for someone else to be a 
thinking creature.’22 This partially explains why whenever we express an opinion, 
make an assertion, or report an incident and so forth, we presuppose the notion of 
truth—even though the word is not actually used. Last but not least, the Christian 
religion which makes claims to having true beliefs about God has long been 
concerned about truth; indeed, in its theological reflection and praxis, truth is what 
it essentially seeks. Thus, it is certainly more than a truism for the Christian to say 
that ‘one cannot have the concept of belief without having the concept of truth.’23   
Characterisation of Truth 
‘What is truth?’ will continue to be asked despite the many attempts over the 
centuries to give it a proper answer. One of the most straightforward 
characterisations of truth comes from the pen of Aristotle who writes, ‘To say of what 
is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and 
of what is not that it is not, is true.’24 Though so simple, the definition has triggered 
an array of questions: What do we mean by ‘say’? What is ‘is’?  What is its negation? 
How does what we say relate to what is?25 Up to the present time, opinions are still 
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divided as to whether Aristotle’s characterisation of truth is to be understood as 
indicating a correspondence view of truth, or to be interpreted in a deflationary way. 
St Augustine’s classic definition of truth—‘That is true which is’—has also been 
critically looked at, and found to be inadequate for ‘speaking about the truth of 
things’ only.26 The upshot of this sort of characterisation of truth is that the predicate 
‘is true’ is taken as more or less synonymous with ‘is real’, leading to talk about ‘the 
truth’ as roughly the same as talk about ‘the ultimately real.’ The practice of using 
the two predicate terms of ‘is true’ and ‘is real’ inter-changeably is especially 
common among philosophers and thinkers. Plato, for instance, uses the two terms as 
virtual synonyms in The Republic and many other contexts. Then there is Philo of 
Alexandria (25 BCE–50 CE) who likens God—whom he believes to be the true God—
to a coin that is genuine rather than counterfeit. Even Hume takes truth to consist in 
agreement to ‘either the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of 
fact.’27 In a discussion on the ‘rootedness’ of truth in The Nature of Doctrine, George 
Lindbeck proposes that we do not think of the correspondence of religious 
propositions to reality as an attribute that the propositions have but as ‘a function of 
their role in constituting a form of life, a way of being in the world, which itself 
corresponds to the Most Important, the Ultimately Real.’28 In the context of what he 
has written, the expression ‘the Ultimately Real’ refers to God who is also Truth. 
Lindbeck whose treatment of truth will be further discussed later, is among many 
contemporary thinkers who have attempted (rightly, to me) to characterise truth by 
underpinning it with something simpler or clearer to comprehend. Their efforts may 
not prove to be entirely satisfactory; but this can only be expected given the nature 
of truth. It would, however, be wrongheaded if all attempts to characterise truth are 
given up. Thus, though G E Moore, Bertrand Russell, Frege, Tarski and others have 
said that truth is ‘an indefinable concept’ they have not refrained from writing about 
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it and trying to relate them to other concepts like belief, desire, cause and action.29 
Nor should we. 
Truth as a Person 
We turn next to the notion of ‘truth as a person,’ a notion which must seem strange 
to those who are not identified or associated with the Christian religion. Both the 
Roman Catholic and the Protestant traditions are wholly united in maintaining just 
such a notion, principally derived from the Gospel according to John. To be sure, 
saying ‘truth-as-a-person’ or ‘truth-is-a-person’ does require some explication if we 
are to use the expression to more fully capture the Johannine logic. That truth is 
personal is of course a basic claim. Thus, truth is not merely an abstract idea, a 
concept or even a fact. Most importantly, truth is a person and this person is none 
other than Jesus of Nazareth who has said, ‘I am the way and the truth and the life.’ 
(John 14:6; emphasis added). Yet in John’s Gospel, Jesus is also presented as not being 
the truth all by himself. For instance, he is said to be ‘full of grace and truth’ (1:14) 
having come from the Father. And just as the law was given through the prophet 
Moses, ‘grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.’ (1:17). He himself speaks of 
another whom he would send after his departure—‘the Spirit of truth, who proceeds 
from the Father’ (15:26). Then in a response to Pilate’s famous question about truth, 
Jesus discloses his life’s mission: ‘For this I was born, and for this I have come into the 
world, to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears my voice.’ 
(18:37). From these considerations has emerged a particular Christian worldview that 
(a) the idea of truth cannot be separated from the person of truth, namely Jesus 
Christ; (b) Jesus is ‘the truth’ only in virtue of his unique relation to God the Father30; 
and (c) truth is not a thing to be discovered, rather, it is an encounter with a person. 
Though unique in the details of its tenets, the so-called Christian concept probably 
draws inspiration from Plato for whom truth is transcendental, and is related to Being 
itself, the highest Being, the One, the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Returning to 
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the exchange between Pilate and Jesus,31 the poignancy of the narrative should not 
be lost on us: Pilate’s inability to see in Jesus the face of truth even as he asked to 
know what the truth is.   
Truth Scepticism 
This brings us to the issue of scepticism directed at the concept of truth. This sort of 
scepticism has acquired an appellation, namely ‘truth scepticism’. In his discussion on 
‘Forms of Truth Skepticism’, Scott Soames (b. 1946) uses the term to cover a wide 
range of sceptical views which question the notion of truth, including scepticism 
about whether there is such a thing as truth, and scepticism about whether truth is 
knowable, theoretically fruitful, or definable.32 Now scepticism as a philosophical 
school of thought or method is no new thing: it has a long and influential history going 
back to Socrates.33 It is not a single position as there are different depths to it.34 
Shallow forms of scepticism mildly deny that we know a few of things we claim to 
know, while the deepest form denies we can know anything at all. There is also a 
radical form which not only asserts that we cannot know anything at all, it includes 
the claim that we cannot know about knowing anything. Yet, as A C Grayling (b. 1949) 
has appropriately pointed out, ‘scepticism is not well described as [merely] doubt or 
denial, nor is it properly understood without limitation of subject matter. Rather, it is 
best and most sharply characterised as a motivated challenge, in a specified area of 
discourse, to the makers of epistemic claims in that discourse.’35 For this reason—
that truth scepticism operates within a specified area of discourse, namely the 
discourse on truth, and has influenced our notion of truth and caused different 
metaphysical and epistemological views to emerge in response to its challenge—we 
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must linger a little longer upon it. 
It must seem reasonable to recognise that the assault on truth is probably what 
has led many thinkers towards scepticism. Given that we know truth generally has 
had a good press—it is almost always regarded as a good thing and of intrinsic value—
we must ask the question: why has it come under attack, with its importance 
challenged or diminished? Davidson in an essay entitled ‘Truth Rehabilitated’36 seems 
to have a ready answer. According to him, a ‘categorical mistake’ on the part of 
philosophy to regard truth as an object has had the effect of emblazoning certain 
philosophers to ‘represent truth as something grander than it is, or to endow it with 
powers it does not have’ and claim for themselves that as philosophers they ‘were 
privy to some special or foundational species of truth without which science could 
not hope to advance.’37 There arose naturally a negative reaction to such pretensions 
to superior access to truths from the other disciplines; some in philosophy were 
uneasy too. Davidson cites Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and John Dewey (1859–
1952) as representatives of the philosophers who reacted, and who did so by 
undertaking a re-evaluation of the concept of truth. In the example Davidson gives—
that of Dewey’s—truth was redefined to be something of which we approve, or that 
which we think is good or useful. Dewey’s declaration—‘a belief or theory is true, if 
and only if, it promotes human affairs’38—became a highly influential slogan despite 
its reductionism. As one who is concerned about the confusion caused by those who 
made the categorical mistake and who is desirous of restoring the concept of truth 
to its key role in understanding the world, Davidson offers a corrective, ‘Truth isn't 
an object, and so it can't be true; truth is a concept, and is intelligibly attributed to 
things like sentences, utterances, beliefs and propositions, entities which have a 
propositional content.’39  
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Perhaps a more formidable factor contributing to the rise of truth scepticism is 
the philosophical view that one can never be absolutely certain of the truth of any 
sentence or statement. Why is certainty elusive? In his book, Creation Out of Nothing, 
Don Cupitt, drawing inspiration from Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), writes:  
…for various reasons we can never be quite certain of the truth of any 
proposition, p. For (a) p is not self-evident. There are so many opinions 
held about everything in this uncertain world that we will always be able 
to find someone who disputes p. Furthermore, (b) such is the nature of 
human debate that a clever advocate can always counter the arguments 
for any particular point of view by developing an equally rational-
sounding case for the opposite point of view… And finally, (c) p can never 
be completely proved from its premisses q and r because such a proof 
would require us either to accept q and r (or their premisses) dogmatically 
and without proof, or to find p somehow hidden within q and r, as in the 
syllogism. The only other possibility is an infinite regress, from q and r 
back to s, t, u, and v, and so on forever. So nothing can ever be completely 
and transparently proved all the way back.40  
In my view, Cupitt has made quite a strong case for the nihilistic conclusions that he 
then goes on to draw—that nothing in the world and in life is fixed or sacrosanct. If 
the making of the world according to Kant is conceptual (that is, with the mind 
imposing concepts upon what we experience), it is linguistic to Cupitt. Thus, for the 
latter, it is ‘only within and by means of language [that] the world and humanity get 
constituted as formed and intelligible realities.’41 In that world with which he is now 
confronted, ‘everything is contingent, a product of history and open to reassessment, 
including all my own ideas about God and metaphysics. There are no guarantees and 
no certainties. Nothing is entrenched and everything is negotiable.’42 What then is 
the upshot of all this for the notion of truth? While truth is not denied, it is simply 
deflated as ‘the property of being true.’43 Cupitt casts doubt on the old belief of truth 
as One, objective, absolute and unchanging. Instead of us continuing to think of truth 
as something given from beyond, he urges us to think of truth as ‘personal’ and as 
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‘something plural, something generated by the play of language, something that we 
ourselves create and continually recreate.’44 This particular perspective, he adds, 
comes from the practice of working at the various local uses of ‘truth’. While on the 
subject of world making, Cupitt also mentions the option of materialism advanced by 
Karl Marx (1818–1883) whose standing claim has been that there has to be a 
substratum of formless matter out there in the first place ‘for human consciousness 
to arise from and for human labour to work upon.’45 But then, as Cupitt rightly 
observes the swing back in modern thought is not to materialism but to a qualified 
form of it, namely, ‘semiotic materialism’, which is the materialism of the sign.46  
The sceptical argument against truth, it must be admitted is as robust as it is 
formidable. We are, as Cupitt reminds us, ‘spoken by language’ and it is language 
‘that alone gives us the classifications by which we order our world.’47 Being thus 
constituted, we are unable to step out of our own skins to have access to any extra-
linguistic meanings and truths. We are urged by Richard Rorty, if I read him correctly, 
to drop the whole idea of truth as if it were out there awaiting to be discovered. He 
writes, 
To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no 
sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human 
languages, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot 
be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because 
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be 
true or false.48 
The Early Wittgenstein’s View of Truth 
Let us now return to Wittgenstein and consider where he stands in all this. As 
mentioned in my introductory remarks, the question of truth has been an inevitable 
one for the philosophy of Wittgenstein, early and late. To be sure, Wittgenstein’s 
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main concern has been with the ‘logic of language’ and the proper use of language in 
clarifying thought.49 It may be recalled that in his two landmark works, he has given 
hints of having been beset by a linguistic muddle: in TLP, he pinpoints it as a 
‘misunderstanding of the logic of our language’50 and in PI, it is ‘a misinterpretation 
of our forms of language’51 Recall, too, that Wittgenstein has been widely credited 
for the celebrated ‘linguistic turn’, a thought revolution which constructively moved 
contemporary philosophy from a concern with the question of truth to that of 
meaning.52 Still, and as earlier noted, all through the different phases of his 
philosophising, the question of truth remains one of his on-going concerns. In the 
pages of TLP we find him vigorously working out what conditions are necessary for 
determining the truth or falsehood of a proposition.53 For good measure, in that same 
work he even throws in an analogy about an imagined black spot on white paper, to 
illustrate that to be able to say ‘p’ is true or false is already to have made a 
presupposition about the circumstances for calling ‘p’ true or false.54 In his later 
works, while continuing to give a sustained treatment to the question of meaning, he 
returns every so often to the question of truth, seeking to render it clear for us. Not 
surprisingly, there is unanimity among scholars and writers that truth in Wittgenstein 
is neither denied nor dismissed; and that he even believes it is possible to discover 
truth. Where we find them dissenting is over which theory or theories of truth should 
properly be attributed to him to account for his notion of truth. To pursue one of our 
aims in this chapter, namely, the clarification of the concept of truth in Wittgenstein, 
I propose that we set out and consider his attitudes to truth during both his early and 
                                                     
49 This is also the view of Glen T Martin, From Nietzsche to Wittgenstein: The Problem of Truth and 
Nihilism in the Modern World (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 173; he also observes that 
Wittgenstein’s ‘tremendous drive to get clear about the logic of language is manifested in all the 
writings right up to the end of his life.’ 
50 TLP, p.3. 
51 PI, §111. 
52 The question of truth is a function of the relationship between language and reality, while the 
question of meaning is an intra-systematic question of coherence. For an explanation on why the 
latter takes precedence over the former, see my discussion on the ‘linguistic turn’ in Chapter 1.  
53 E.g. TLP, 4.024. 
54 See TLP, 4.063. 
The Question of Truth 
147 
 
later periods of thought.    
Scholarly opinion on Wittgenstein’s conception of truth is almost unanimous in 
affirming that the early Wittgenstein presupposes a correspondence theory of truth. 
Paul Horwich (b. 1947), for example, in his essay ‘Wittgenstein on Truth’ points out 
that a correspondence theory of truth seems to jump out of the pages of TLP.55 Glock, 
whom we have cited above, ascribes to the early Wittgenstein a correspondence 
theory too, though in a later work he would argue that the standard interpretations 
on correspondence have been mistaken.56 P M S Hacker has detected (1) a ‘variant 
of metaphysical realism in the Tractatus ontology of simple sempiternal objects, of 
complexes and of facts’ which is learnt from Russell and Frege, and (2) an ‘assumption 
that the fundamental role of words is to name entities (although this role was denied 
to logical operators and to categorial expressions) and of sentences to describe how 
things are in reality.’57 These factors, Hacker notes, unite to define Wittgenstein’s 
thinking that ‘there must be a connection of meaning between words and the entities 
they name, that language acquires content by means of such a connection with 
reality.’58 The account here given by Hacker is clearly a version of the correspondence 
theory. More examples could be adduced but the point is that most commentators 
on Wittgenstein are agreed that a correspondence theory has provided the basis for 
his early conception of truth.  
Now the correspondence theory of truth is a theory that has a long and enduring 
history. It is still much favoured and is thought to best capture the concept of truth. 
It may be briefly explained as the view that truth is a relationship of correspondence 
between words, ideas or beliefs (known as ‘truth bearers’) on the one hand, and 
reality (or ‘truth maker’) on the other. In the relationship, there is a ‘match’ between 
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the two different sorts of things, between truth-bearers and the truth-maker. So, 
words, ideas or beliefs are true if and only if they ‘copy’ their reality, to use an 
expression by William James (1842–1910).59 Aquinas is often cited as a major figure 
in Christian theology who has thought about truth in terms of a relationship of 
correspondence. As well as declaring veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus60 (Truth 
is the equation of thing and intellect), he also claims, ‘since the true is in the intellect 
in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must 
needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing 
understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.’61 An 
alternative way of spelling out the correspondence relation is to say that a 
proposition or statement is true if and only if what it is is isomorphic with that which 
it is about. Or, as David Fergusson (b. 1956) contends, ‘what truth we do confess is 
established ultimately by the way things are [...].’62 Sometimes, the theory is given 
the following formulaic expression: ‘it is true that p if and only if p.’63  
Historically, this understanding of truth is also known in philosophical circles as 
‘realism’.64 The reason for this is instructive. The correspondence theory of truth 
relies on there being objects which are real, or states of affairs (facts) which are true. 
Andrew Newman (b. 1948) who professes to stand within a tradition that is realist 
about universals, explains, ‘There is an obvious connection between realism about 
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universals and the correspondence theory of truth, since realism about universals 
implies that there is something in the world other than particulars in virtue of which 
sentences and propositions are true.’65 It is tempting to simply ascribe the 
correspondence theory of truth to Wittgenstein on the basis of his realist convictions 
at the time of writing TLP. Certainly, a correspondence theory of truth of any sort is 
dependent on some form of realism. But the relationship between the two positions 
is not one that is mutually necessary. Christopher Insole helps to clarify matters by 
expressing that ‘although the idea of reality as what is there anyway may go naturally 
with talk of “truth fitting the facts”, there is no compulsion on the realist to flesh out 
this metaphorical talk with any detailed articulation of “truth as correspondence”. 
Realism can be stated without invoking any explanatory or substantial notion of 
truth.  As we saw… realism is quite compatible with minimalist and deflationary 
accounts of truth.’66 
All the same, the correspondence theory of truth is not without problems. As our 
intention here is not to evaluate the theory in detail, only a few major issues will be 
looked at. A common objection to the theory, one which we have briefly discussed in 
the section on scepticism, is that truth is epistemologically neither accessible, nor 
ascertainable. But even if this were granted, it would still not follow that the theory 
of truth in the sense of correspondence with reality is invalidated. Secondly, the 
correspondence theory is often challenged on the grounds that the specific relation 
of correspondence or agreement is vague, or even incoherent. ‘Truth means, as a 
matter of course, agreement, correspondence of idea and fact,’ Dewey says, but he 
immediately goes on, ‘but what do agreement, correspondence mean?’67 Here, we 
may usefully reference an analysis of the correspondence theory by Garth L Hallett 
in which he compares two different ways of considering ‘correspondence’. He 
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observes, ‘The traditional thesis position was right in characterising truth as 
correspondence, in the straightforward sense of similarity, but wrong in supposing 
that the similarity holds between likenesses in the minds of believers or speakers and 
the things they believe or speak about.’68 Hallett’s differentiation is helpful but I am 
not sure if it can successfully overcome the objection of vagueness because there is 
still the challenge of explaining how beliefs and reality are similar ‘in the 
straightforward sense of similarity’. Then there is the conundrum of understanding 
how words and statements can possibly correspond to things in the world. Indeed, 
how do the words ‘snow is white’ correspond to the fact that snow is white on the 
ground? This brings us to a final objection. Heidegger’s problem with the theory of 
correspondence is that correspondentism perpetrates violence upon objects. How 
so? ‘By defining truth in terms of the correspondence between one’s ideas and a 
thing’s fundamental reality, one may end up identifying that fundamental reality with 
one’s ideas about it, thereby making oneself its ultimate measure and cutting it down 
to the size of one’s categories. The danger, then, is that if one understands truth in 
terms of an isomorphism relation between one’s ideas and an object’s fundamental 
reality, such that one identifies the truth of, say, a cat with one’s idea of felinity, the 
truth of a woman with one’s idea of femininity, and so on, then one may make one’s 
antecedent ideas the measure of these objects and thereby do violence to them.’69 
One has to admit that Heidegger’s objection, rendered in the clear words of Kevin W 
Hector, deserves to be taken seriously by all. 
We must now ask the pertinent question: does TLP contain the correspondence 
theory of truth? Our response will be briefly presented as much has been already said 
to indicate that the early Wittgenstein did think of truth in terms of correspondence. 
In his work on the correspondence theory of truth, Newman tells us that Wittgenstein 
makes no formal announcement as to what truth consists in, even if the notions of 
                                                     
68 Hallett, Theology within the Bounds of Language, 42. 
69 Kevin W Hector, Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 207. 
The Question of Truth 
151 
 
truth and falsity are main features in his philosophical discourse.70 He also mentions 
that though Wittgenstein’s work is devoted to the correspondence theory of truth, 
he does not use the term ‘correspondence theory of truth’.71 Be that as it may, I shall 
try to show that against the backdrop of his discussion of the proposition in TLP, a 
correspondence theory of truth seems to make sense. Though it is not my intention 
in this discussion to provide an exegesis, some references to the philosopher’s text 
are inevitable.   
The earlier sections of TLP seem to set out an ontology of sorts, maintaining, as 
we have noted, that language and reality are linked. Propositions of language are thus 
thought to have the capacity to picture reality or mirror its objects. In Wittgenstein’s 
own words, ’The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the 
reality as we think it is.’72 Here are a few more statements which are explicit about 
that particular feature,  
The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional 
sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation 
to the world.73 
In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements 
of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.74 
The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the 
configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.75 
The proposition shows its sense. The proposition shows how things stand, 
if it is true. And it says, that they do so stand.76 
To show why we think a correspondence theory of truth should be ascribed to 
Wittgenstein rather than some other theory, we must ask how a proposition can 
represent a situation in the world. The answer, based on what we have learned about 
propositions, is that a proposition names or stands for a state of affairs, not unlike 
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how a realistic picture, or a map, or an architect’s model, represents what it does. 
Following many other scholars, some—and I cite a very recent example in Istvan 
Danka—have read TLP as establishing ‘a one-to-one correspondence between the 
realm of facts and propositions, claiming that the two are isomorphic.’77 This is the 
famous ‘picture theory’ which we alluded to in the beginning. ‘Clearly,’ as Horwich 
rightly asserts, ‘depiction of a possible fact is to be treated as a form of 
correspondence to it.’78 To conclude, we may aptly say of the early Wittgenstein that 
his conception of truth is supplemented if not undergirded by a correspondence 
theory of truth.  
The Later Wittgenstein’s View of Truth 
Wittgenstein’s view on truth in his later phase is markedly different from the one he 
has earlier held. The shift in his thinking, we have noted, is known to have begun soon 
after the completion of TLP, or at least after his disavowal of the ‘picture theory’ of 
language. Whereas the ‘picture theory’ has been put forth initially as a fundamental 
guide to conceiving the nature of language, it is now viewed in PI as ‘a primitive idea 
of the way language functions.’79 The new thinking differs from the old in an 
important way, namely, that the signs of language are thought to have meaning not 
on account of their correspondence with objects but because of the use they are put 
to. A succinct exposition of Wittgenstein’s revised position by James K A Smith in 
which two features of language use and the dynamics of meaning are highlighted, is 
relevant here:  
First, language is used for something. It is employed for some end, spoken 
within a community of practice that has some telos, that is trying to get 
something done… Language use is always caught up in teleological 
communities of practice, which means that even reference and ostensive 
teaching are always already embedded in wider contexts of action and 
practice. Second, in some sense language and meaning are bigger than 
words. Language and meaning are bound up with a context of practice 
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that is more than the repertoire of our words, and that penumbra of 
practices and action is essential to constituting the meaning of our 
words.80 
What Smith does not mention, but presumably knows, is the ramification for the 
concept of truth that comes with the change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Given that 
truth is rooted in language, one’s concept of language will inevitably affect and bear 
on one’s concept of truth. In Wittgenstein’s case, the impact on his concept of truth 
that results from his changed position concerning language has been very 
considerable.  
Wittgenstein, we have noted, is unabashed about admitting that mistakes have 
been made in TLP. In one of his self-criticisms which appears in PI, he describes his 
earlier notion of the proposition as ‘a bad picture’. He invites his reader to reason 
with him,    
Now it looks as if the definition—a proposition is whatever can be true or 
false—determined what a proposition was, by saying: what fits the 
concept 'true', or what the concept 'true' fits, is a proposition. So it is as 
if we had a concept of true and false, which we could use to determine 
what is and what is not a proposition. What engages with the concept of 
truth (as with a cogwheel), is a proposition. But this is a bad picture.81 
On the view being criticised, the concepts ‘true’ and ‘false’ are held to be prior to 
the concept ‘proposition’. The implication appears to be that we first operate with a 
clear concept of truth and falsity, and then on the basis of that, we decide what is, 
or, is not, a proposition. Wittgenstein now comes to realise that the concept of truth 
and falsity and the concept of proposition are actually interdependent; one is not 
necessarily prior to another. His argument, in words from a paraphrase by Jerry H 
Gill, is as follows, ‘The concept “true” is no more prior to, nor independent of, the 
concept “proposition” than the concept “check” is logically prior to, or independent 
of, the concept “king” in the statement, “The king in chess is the piece that one can 
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check.”’82 Thus, to say, as he has said in TLP, that ‘a proposition is whatever can be 
true or false’ is simply to say that ‘we only predicate “true” and “false” of what we 
call a proposition’—and no more. To persist in defining or thinking of a proposition 
as before, that is, as ‘whatever can be true or false’ is not satisfactory since ‘we do 
not have a grasp of truth and falsity independently of having a conception of the 
nature of their possible bearers.’83 Or, more succinctly put, we simply cannot get out 
of our own skins.84 All three terms used in the discussion, namely ‘proposition’, ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ should be seen as interrelated in our language. Consequently, 
Wittgenstein concludes by maintaining that ‘what a proposition is is in one sense 
determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English for example), and in 
another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game.’85 We shall consider these 
two suggested ways of approaching the proposition.  
It is sometimes held that in Wittgenstein the basic contrast between his earlier 
and later phases ‘is that between a realist semantics based on truth-conditions, and 
an anti-realist semantics which settles for assertability or justifiability-conditions.’86 
It is then said that he rejects the idea that sentences have truth conditions in favour 
of assertability conditions. This inference that the question of truth for Wittgenstein 
is fixed in terms of assertability conditions is mistaken; I suspect it is more the result 
of a confusion arising from his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, the 
now all-too-familiar theory that holds that propositions are true by virtue of their 
correspondence to objects or facts. The clear fact of the matter is that Wittgenstein 
does not reject truth conditions; what he does is revise his conception of a truth 
condition by insisting that truth conditions are determined by conventional rules of 
sentence formation which tell us the circumstances under which it is correct to 
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predicate ‘is true’ of our statements. It is worth noting Wittgenstein’s reason for 
insisting on rules or grammar. In his early phase, his concern has been to look at 
language in terms of its possibilities of sense and nonsense, convinced that the ‘one 
essence’ resident and hidden in all language could be found and ‘brought to light.’87 
The quest ‘to grasp the incomparable essence of language’88 is abandoned by the 
later Wittgenstein who finds that ‘[e]ssence is expressed by grammar’89 rather than 
in factual propositions. In other words, if we wish to speak of or about what a thing 
is, that is, what its ‘essence’ is, we shall not only have to talk about the thing itself, 
but also the grammar in which the words we use pertaining to it, function. 
The other suggestion by Wittgenstein that a proposition be understood in terms 
of its use in a ‘language-game’ if adopted, will greatly impact our concept of truth like 
no other. ‘The sentence,’ he has said, ‘has no sense outside the language-game.’90 
What the term ‘language-game’ means has been discussed in Chapter 2, so we need 
not be detained in trying to define it. In any event, like the term ‘form-of-life’, there 
is really no strict definition to it. However, for our present purposes, let us simply take 
it to represent ‘a complete unit of human linguistic behaviour’, within which the 
behaviour of people and the language they use are closely woven together.91 As such, 
it is extremely useful as a methodological tool for illuminating the way language 
actually operates.  
One of the most important insights engendered by the notion of language-games 
is that context and setting are integrally linked to meaning. Previously under the 
picture theory, meaning is the correlation between a word and an object or thing. 
Meaning is thus a matter of straightforward reference: ‘a word refers to a thing and 
the “hook” between the two is meaning.’92 The notion of language-games, however, 
                                                     
87 PI, §91. 
88 PI, §97. 
89 PI, §371. 
90 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 
§488. 
91 Bell, ‘Wittgenstein and Descriptive Theology’, Religious Studies, Vol.5:1 (1969), 5. 




conveys a different idea: the meanings of the propositions of language are bound up 
with a context of practice, and may not be separated from ‘the actions’ into which 
they are woven. Differently put, a proposition or sentence may have no particular 
fixed meaning that is always attached to it; instead, its meaning can vary according 
to the language-game within which it is used and the part it plays in the language-
game. Indeed, that same proposition or sentence can even have different meanings 
in different language-games, as it has no essential core of meaning. Wittgenstein 
draws on the analogy of the artichoke to illustrate the point he is now making. Like 
an artichoke which has no essence but many layers of leaves, so there is no essence 
to all propositions, nor by implication to language itself.93 Understanding meaning, 
which makes possible truth, must now require that we look at the language-games, 
the sentences, the activities, the situation—indeed the larger context—with which 
they are intertwined. Recall again that Wittgenstein has said that outside a language-
game, the sentence has no sense.94 I may not agree with his remarks cited below 
explaining why one looks for the meaning of an expression by dwelling on the 
expression itself, but his point that we should always think of the practice with which 
the expression is used, is well taken:  
There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression's meaning by 
contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which one uses 
it, instead of always thinking of the practice. That is why one repeats the 
expression to oneself so often, because it is as if one must see what one is 
looking for in the expression and in the feeling it gives one.95 
Wittgenstein famously states that ‘the term “language-game” is meant to bring 
into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a 
form of life.’96 Consequently, and in almost all cases, ‘the meaning of a word is its use 
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in the language.’97 Against the traditional view that understands language to be 
independent of human action and to have an ontological groundedness, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy posits a different view—that language is connected and 
bound up with human action, and that meaning arises from the way the signs of 
language are used. In this connection, he writes,  
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but 
the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it 
is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom 
of the language-game.98 
Now if meaningful propositions are defined by their use or by ‘our acting’ then 
meaning should no longer be deemed to be ‘correlated with that which must be 
either true or false, and “truth” becomes just another language-game or games 
(within the multiplicity of games.)’99 It would thus be simplistic to ground meaning to 
any sort of reference or representation, or to think of the meaning of a specific word 
as consisting only in the object signified. Glen Martin has made a strong case against 
Wittgenstein’s formerly-held premise about the paradigmatic nature of the 
proposition. He argues as follows,  
The idea that a proposition pictures the world in such a way as to be true 
or false was itself just a picture which it seemed could only be applied in 
one way. Wittgenstein says that it seemed ‘that the picture forced a 
particular application upon us.’ (PI 140). But any picture can be applied in 
some other way: what constitutes isomorphic mapping depends on how 
one applies that picture. Not only is the notion of a ‘proposition’ not 
restricted to that of ‘truth or falsity’ but the idea of something being 
either true or false is itself of no help because even that picture has yet 
to be applied and can be applied in more than one way (that is, the 
meanings of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ may vary depending on their 
application).100 
The issue concerning the arbitrary nature of truth is one that naturally arises from 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games and his idea that ‘the meaning of a word is 
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its use in the language’. To recap, Wittgenstein has pointed out that the meanings of 
the signs of language are inseparably connected with the practices with which they 
are interwoven in a language-game. Consequently, ‘what is true’ and ‘what is false’ 
may vary, depending on their context. His assertion that ‘meaning is use’ shifts the 
focus from an ontological or referential interpretation of meaning to seeing it as 
defined by human action. What the assertion further implies has been clearly spelled 
out by Smith: ‘To observe that “meaning is use” is to recognise that meaning is always 
game-relative—which is to say that meaning is always conventional. It depends; more 
specifically, meaning depends on the conventions of a community of practice—what 
Wittgenstein variously describes as a “language game” or a “form of life”. […] So the 
claim that “meaning is use” is, at root, a deeply social account of meaning.’101 Now 
Wittgenstein himself has anticipated being quizzed: ‘So you are saying that human 
agreement decides what is true and what is false?’102 His immediate response—‘It is 
what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they 
use’—reveals an awareness of his interlocutor’s criticism that his view has implied a 
relativistic  conception of truth, that is to say, the view that ‘true’ and ‘false’ are 
simply a matter of agreement in opinions. Brilliantly, he argues that the agreement 
in question refers to an agreement of opinion about ‘form of life’, not an agreement 
of opinion about matters of fact. Jerry Gill enlightens us by clarifying that ‘agreement 
in form of life is logically prior to agreement about what is and what is not the case’ 
and that ‘agreements in factual judgement also play an important part in the make-
up of a form of life.’103 My own view is that Wittgenstein’s critic is clearly mistaken in 
thinking that the view of truth he seeks to espouse is one that is arbitrary or 
relativistic. This is, however, not to deny that some form relativism is rooted in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy.104  
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We shall turn now to the theory of truth which, by broad scholarly consensus, the 
later Wittgenstein is said to have explicitly held.105 This is the so-called deflationary 
theory.106 According to Horwich, the term ‘deflationary’ is applied to accounts of 
truth that emphasise the following features: (i) truth has no traditional explicit 
definition; (ii) the nature of the concept is implicitly fixed by the way that each 
statement specifies its own condition for being true; (iii) it is an extremely superficial 
concept; and (iv) it is merely a useful expressive device.107 Thus from a deflationary 
perspective, ‘truth’ is a purely logical concept; the predicate ‘is true’ serving only to 
express generalisations over sentences, propositions, claims, assertions or beliefs.  
Here, it needs to be said that those who advocate deflationism do not necessarily 
deny truth, nor do they shy away from affirming that some claim or belief is true. But 
they do ‘deny that truth involves anything like the kind of relation that the 
correspondence theorist sees at its heart.’108  
Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘This is how things are’ at PI §136 are often cited as 
providing the clearest evidence for his deflationism. Against the backdrop of a 
discussion of the proposition, he maintains that to ascribe truth to a proposition is 
the same as asserting the proposition itself. He writes,  
At bottom, giving ‘This is how things are’ as the general form of 
propositions is the same as giving the definition: a proposition is 
whatever can be true or false. For instead of “This is how things are” I 
could have said “This is true”. (Or again “This is false”.) But we have 
‘p’ is true — p 
'p' is false = not-p.109 
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On the analysis of ‘true’ and ‘false’ just shown, we have a situation in which the 
predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ may simply be dispensed with. The reason is all too 
obvious: they are both redundant, since ‘p is true’ is logically equivalent to ‘p’, and ‘p 
is false’ is logically equivalent to ‘not p’. F P Ramsey’s classic statements are 
illustrative of what is now known as the principle of redundancy: ‘It is true that Caesar 
was murdered' means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and 'It is false that 
Caesar was murdered' means that Caesar was not murdered.110 Ramsey further adds 
that ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ are ‘phrases we sometimes use for emphasis or for stylistic 
reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument.’111 If 
he is right, we would not even require the concept of truth at all. Indeed, why do we 
even continue to use the term ‘true’ if there is nothing that the truth predicate sets 
forth which cannot be set forth without it? In any event, Wittgenstein seems to have 
adopted Ramsey’s analysis when he presents the following formulation, ‘What he 
says is true = Things are as he says.’112 One might also say being ‘true’ and ‘false’ are 
just a matter of being ‘as stated’ or ‘as denied’, so ‘What he said was no doubt true’ 
becoming ‘Things were no doubt as he stated’ and ‘What he no doubt said was false’ 
becoming ‘Things were no doubt not as he stated.’113 Here it is important to clarify 
that to say that ‘true’ is redundant does not amount to saying the concept of truth is 
also redundant.  
As we might expect, there are issues with the deflationary view of truth. I can 
think of three, though I believe a detailed analysis of the theory—which is beyond 
the scope of our present study as well as my competence—may throw up more. 
Firstly, in spite of the caveat that deflationists are not truth-denying, their claim that 
the word ‘true’ in a statement is redundant, or that to say a statement is true is 
merely another way of asserting it, will appear to suggest that we can simply ‘walk 
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away’ from metaphysical and theological questions concerning truth.114 What this 
does, if true, is push these questions to the peripherals of intellectual discourse. The 
upshot is we are no further forward in understanding the concept of truth. Nor does 
the redundancy approach have anything important to offer on the relation between 
truth and meaning. In the second place, the elimination of the word ‘true’ seems to 
serve little purpose, if it simply means the substitution of another phrase in its place. 
A case can be made for the reversal of the redundancy approach by arguing that the 
word ‘true’ is more than just an assertion variable: ‘the term merits a definition 
applicable in all its occurrences, albeit one which may reveal it as eliminable in certain 
of these.’115 Thirdly, we would argue that as a theory it is not all-comprehensive for 
it is not always possible to eliminate the word ‘true’ in a statement. Here is a good 
example: ‘Everything that follows from what John just said is true.’ In this assertion, 
we do need ‘true’, for we cannot assert everything that follows from what John 
said.116 In light of these issues and given what we know of Wittgenstein’s aversion to 
philosophical theorising, we have good reason to think that he may after all not be as 
fully deflationary as he is made out to be. That said, the deflationary account of truth 
should still be recognised for its usefulness in directing us away from thinking ‘that 
truth is a mechanism by which concepts in our heads magically hook onto entities 
outside of our head.’117  
Truth after Wittgenstein 
In the final section of the chapter, I wish to discuss how truth, as we understand it, 
relates to language. In particular, I will consider a number of issues of truth with 
regard to my thesis—that we may make statements about God which tell us facts 
about God, but that our words can neither yield a complete explanation nor an 
exhaustive conception of the divine reality. In considering the issues, I will try to bear 
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in mind the light that Wittgenstein has shed. 
1. A Crisis of Truth? 
In recent years, it has become something of a commonplace for some 
commentators within the traditional wing of the Christian religion to raise the alarm 
that there is a ‘crisis of truth.’ Their variable claim is that the notion of truth is being 
undermined or rejected, or that there is even a ‘total war on truth itself’.118 While still 
Pope, Joseph Ratzinger wrote, ‘…our faith is decisively opposed to the attitude of 
resignation that considers man incapable of truth—as if this were more than he could 
cope with. This attitude of resignation with regard to truth… lies at the heart of the 
crisis of the West, the crisis of Europe.’119 Postmodernity or more accurately, 
postmodernism is usually blamed for eroding the foundations of belief by fostering 
the ‘shifty’ view that there is no such thing as objective reality, truth and so forth.120 
We are accordingly urged to do battle with the postmodernists in preventing further 
‘truth decay’ and to return to an embrace of ‘absolute truth’.121 Actually, in the issue 
of the treatment of truth by postmodernism, matters are not quite so simple as these 
commentators have painted. According to Smith, the thrust of postmodernist 
theorists is not that there is no such thing as truth, but that truth is to be explained 
in terms of a framework very different to the one deployed by the traditionalist. The 
postmodernist theorists, he explains, ‘don’t deny truth, nor do they forfeit the ability 
to be able to say “X is true”; they just don’t think that truth is a mechanism by which 
concepts in our heads magically hook onto entities outside of our heads.’122 In 
keeping with their way of thinking about truth, postmodernists are likely to admit to 
subscribing to a theory of truth already familiar to us and earlier discussed, namely, 
the ‘deflationary’ theory, in preference to either the correspondence or the 
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coherence theories. They would typically make the minimalist claim that to assert a 
statement true is simply to assert the very statement itself.  
In view of the misapprehension that postmodernism denies truth, it may be worth 
noting the clarification by Rorty, probably the most prominent defender of 
postmodernism, that he is not dismissive of truth: 
To say that we should drop the idea of truth as out there waiting to be 
discovered is not to say that we have discovered that, out there, there is 
no truth. It is to say that our purposes would be served best by ceasing to 
see truth as a deep matter, as a topic of philosophical interest, or ‘true’ 
as a term which repays ‘analysis.’123 
To dispel any remaining doubts that the postmodernists are not claiming that there 
is no truth, let us appeal to the witness of another noted postmodernist, Jacques 
Derrida (1930–2004), who although known for challenging the concept of truth and 
making it tremble, did not seek ‘to eradicate the possibility of objective truth.’124 In a 
remark made within parenthesis, Derrida explicates what truth is: ‘(truth as an 
unveiling of that which is in its Being, or as an adequation between a judicative 
statement and the thing itself.)’125 His essay ‘University without Condition’ explores 
the concept of truth under four headings for kinds of truth, namely, adequation, 
revelation, object of theoretico-constative discourses and poetico-performative 
events.126 Then referring to truth as ‘enigmatic’, he remarks, ‘However enigmatic it 
may be, the reference to truth remains fundamental enough to be found…’127  
Admittedly, the postmodernist view of truth will not sit well with those who think 
of truth as some ‘thing’ that is objectively and silently standing over us to be sought 
for and discovered. Our unease may have all to do with the way reality is ‘pictured’. 
According to Charles Taylor, most of us are enthralled to the habit of assuming that 
our grasp of reality ‘outside’ must come through ideas or representations we have a 
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priori formed of it ‘inside’ our minds. ‘We grasp the world through something, what 
is outside through something inner.’128 Calling this the ‘inside/outside’ (I/O) 
structuring framework, Taylor outlines the process by which the mind’s constructions 
occur: ‘The input is combined, computed over, or structured by the mind to construct 
a view of what lies outside.’129 Under this Descartes-inspired I/O framework, we 
relate to the world by setting up a certain distinction between inside and outside, 
seeing knowledge as exclusively grounded in ideas or ‘representations’ which are 
then given objective status. 
The relevance of all this for the purposes of our discussion is not merely that Rorty 
(or postmodernism) believes in truth and adopts a deflationary approach to it, or that 
the inside/outside ‘picture’ of knowledge and truth is still insidiously and powerfully 
at work in shaping our thinking. What I see as having more relevance is, first, the 
claim by Rorty that ‘where there are no sentences there is no truth’ and secondly, his 
idea that ‘most of reality is indifferent to our descriptions of it, and that the human 
self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather than being adequately or 
inadequately expressed in a vocabulary…’130 Factoring in his other remarks about 
truth—that truth is ‘made’ rather than ‘found’ and that truth is a property of 
sentences or propositions—we may infer that truth for him is more like a human 
activity which has a particular place within a language game, than a ‘hard scientific 
fact,’ and, that it is not something that simply stands outside our sphere of linguistic 
signs and concepts awaiting to be discovered. Although traversing slightly different 
routes of thought, both he and Wittgenstein seem to have arrived at similar 
conclusions respecting the notion of truth and reality. Both are adamant in their claim 
that truth is socially, or even better put, linguistically constructed. At the risk of 
oversimplifying matters, would it not help if I propose a clarification that while truth 
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is indeed objective, it however cannot be known objectively? Thus, just like the way 
we get to know the world, we shall know or encounter truth only linguistically—
through texts, representations, conceptions.  
This last remark is especially significant for what I have in mind because the 
question of truth naturally arises when language is used for religious purposes. In the 
case of lectures, sermons and formulations of doctrine such as creeds, declarations, 
‘statements of faith’ or ‘articles of faith’, the question as to the truth or falsity of their 
claims will surface as a matter of course, once their content or sense is understood 
by the believer, even if not very fully. The question of truth, however, does not arise 
in the case of first-order language like prayers, commandments, litanies as these are 
not statemental—that is, they do not express any propositions. A prayer asking God 
for healing or blessing, for instance, is an utterance that is neither true nor false. Nor 
does the question arise for utterances that ‘do’ things—the type which Austin calls 
‘performatives’131—such as ‘I christen this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ or ‘I dedicate 
this building to the glory of God.’ None of these utterances is either true or false; but 
the mere act of uttering one has the effect of performing the action specified in that 
particular utterance. Sherry’s interesting example of a non-religious work to illustrate 
the point that some item may be essential without containing many or even any 
truths may be cited: the Highway Code—essential for the rules and regulations and 
recommendations it prescribes for the motorist and yet it contains very few truths.132  
Other than a few exceptions which we have noted, most instances of the religious 
use of language presuppose the notion of truth, even if the user herself denies that 
truth is real or knowable or sets out to use language to bear false witness. That is why 
the issue of truth in religious language is so crucial and cannot be side-stepped. In the 
case of doctrines and creedal statements, it may be readily conceded that they 
‘function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities.’133 In 
other words, they purport to disclose important facts and insights concerning God, 
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human existence, the world, the Eschaton, and so forth. Thus, doctrines and creedal 
statements do play a vital role in defining beliefs, shaping values and ordering lives. 
They are generally held as important and true. In consequence, they have drawn 
different and varied understandings and interpretations to themselves, and these 
have in turn generated among the believing communities accord as well as discord—
regrettably more of the latter than of the former. The quarrels, acrimonies and even 
violence among believers over differences rooted in doctrines and teachings are only 
too well known. It is not surprising that an evaluation of the truth or falsity, accuracy 
or inaccuracy, and correctness or incorrectness of the claims made is consistently 
being demanded.  
2. Truth-value 
I turn now to a brief consideration of the question of the truth-value of religious 
language. Let me clarify that we are not concerned with wanting to prove any 
particular religion or religious belief true. Our burden is rather to understand ‘truth’ 
as it is claimed by religious statements such as doctrines and creeds to possess. As 
Wittgenstein puts it, ‘if a proposition has no sense, nothing corresponds to it, since it 
does not designate a thing (a truth-value) which might have properties called “false” 
or “true”.’134  
The question about truth-value has attracted two well-known responses. The first 
is by R B Braithwaite (1900–1990) who takes the view that religious assertions are 
primarily used to ‘announce allegiance to a set of moral principles,’135 and that this 
‘use’ (in guiding conduct) renders them meaningful: they are then deemed to have 
passed the verificationist test.136 The other response is by those who think that 
religious reflection and discourse has its own unique criteria of truth. Their basic point 
is that the word ‘true’ carries a different meaning in religion from its use in ordinary 
discourse. While it is a fact that language about God or religion is very different from, 
                                                     
134 TLP, 4.063. 
135 Braithwaite, ‘An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief’ in Mitchell (ed.), Philosophy of 
Religion, 82. 
136 Ibid., 77. 
The Question of Truth 
167 
 
say, language about science or business, yet it is surely improper to confuse the 
concept of truth especially when we have sought to emphasise that truth is a 
property of linguistic entities. The term ‘true’ as well as its opposite term ‘false’ 
should always retain the same meaning no matter what is being talked about, and no 
matter how great the differences are between a particular object of discourse and 
another. My suggestion is that the basic continuity between ‘truth’ in religion and 
‘truth’ in everyday life be assiduously maintained, and the attempted substitution of 
the empirical sense of truth by a religious or spiritual sense of truth be abandoned. 
We shall still have room for ‘truth’ in the aesthetic, literary or existential sense of the 
word. There is great wisdom in insisting upon a continuity between the realms of the 
religious and the non-religious with respect to the concept of truth, for unless 
religious language is grounded in the wider, everyday life, it will fail to make the vital 
connections needed to stake its claim to truth. Sherry similarly cautions that if religion 
operated with its own kind of truth ‘we are in danger of isolating religion from other 
spheres of life and thereby perhaps trivialising it.’137  
This last remark may appear to contradict the position I have earlier defended—
that truth in religion and truth in other spheres of life should be continuous. I should 
therefore explain that my stated position refers to the sense in which ‘truth’ is 
defined, that it should be equivocal in every case. However, how truth is understood 
by users of religious language is a different matter, and so it is with the question of 
what religious statements are about with respect to truth that I am concerned. I hope 
it is obvious that the question I am asking is different to the one of ‘What kind of truth 
do religious statements have?’ I can perhaps put what I have in view in another way 
by borrowing a useful distinction suggested by T F Torrance (1913–2007), the 
distinction between the ‘truth of being’ (which is truth itself) and the ‘truth of 
statement’ (which is a statement about truth).138 The former is ontologically prior to 
the latter and may be more or less synonymous with reality or the essence of things; 
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whereas the latter is our conception or articulation of truth.139 Naturally and in 
keeping with the purpose of our inquiry, our concern here is with the latter. The 
observant reader might have perceived that the distinction I made between the 
question of what religious statements are about with respect to truth and the 
question of what kind of truth religious statements have, corresponds closely but 
inversely to Torrance’s distinction between the truth of being and the truth of 
statement. Be that as it may, I hope it is by now clear that the ultimate subject-matter 
with which religious language is concerned is God—his being, his reality and his 
overture to the created order. This is not to deny that there are several strands to 
religious language and that many kinds of facts, issues and even entities are also 
included within the scope of regular religious discourse. To have God as subject-
matter is sheer grace; it is only possible because ‘God opens himself to us and informs 
us of himself in a way that no created being can.’140 While God is open to some 
understanding on our part, he remains the ‘wholly other’ who is ineffable and 
mysterious and beyond all knowing. Torrance’s reminder is as noteworthy as it is 
profoundly put, ‘We may apprehend God but we cannot comprehend him.’141 Recall 
that it was Wittgenstein’s encounter with what he could only refer to as ‘the mystical’ 
that drew his famous conclusion—‘Whereof one can speak, thereof one must be 
silent.’142 All this about the divine being is commonly known, and we are again 
reminded that the religious use of language for the discourse of such a reality is sui 
generis, which is not the same as saying it is not going to be problematic. 
In Torrance’s distinction referred to above, he rightly gives priority to the ‘truth 
of being’ over the ‘truth of statements’ and for a sound reason. He writes, ‘…the 
Reality of God ever remains the Source of all our authentic concepts of him and the 
unchanging Ground of all our faithful formalisations of his revelation.’143 In other 
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words, the Being of God is a priori to the language which seeks to express him, 
whereas religious statements even if they are about him are derived and ‘ever open 
to further clarification, fuller amplification, and change.’144 The aim he aspires in such 
a ‘stratification of truth’ as he labels it, is ‘to show the subordination of all our 
conceptual and linguistic formulations to the inherent intelligibility of reality.’145 Yet, 
the lapse in identifying statements or linguistic formulations about truth with truth 
itself is not uncommon. I venture to suggest that it is exactly such an identification 
that has led to doctrines, creeds and statements of faith being objectified or 
absolutised. In the circumstances, doctrines, creeds and statements about truth 
would have nearly replaced truth. That a concerned Pope John XXIII had to advise the 
assembled fathers of his church at the Second Vatican Council to distinguish the 
substance of the faith from ‘the formulation in which it is clothed’146 is indicative of 
the prevalence of such ill-advised identification. We recall the bitter and acrimonious 
divisions in the church which had been and still are the result of differences rooted 
in doctrines and teachings. The failure to make the needed distinction has bewitched 
many into thinking that doctrines and religious statements are propositionally precise 
representations of the truth of being, with the upshot that doctrinal differences have 
become more difficult to reconcile, if not totally irreconcilable. Lindbeck’s caricature 
of the propositionalist’s intransigence with respect to doctrinal reconciliation is of 
particular relevance here: ‘For a propositionalist, if a doctrine is once true it is always 
true, and if it is false, it is always false.’147 
3. Cognitive/Non-Cognitive Distinction 
As users of ordinary religious language, believers mostly take the God described 
thereby as their object of faith. They do also hold and regard the tenets and creeds 
of their religion as true—that these statements or propositions are descriptive of 
‘what is the case’. These believers will thus resist any suggestion that their religious 
                                                     
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 146. 
146 Pope John XXIII, Gaudet Mater Ecclesia. <on-line> 




claims are merely expressive, or, non-cognitive. The two-fold distinction that 
emerges may be briefly characterised as follows: the former is concerned with how 
matters are cognitively to be described and explained; the latter is concerned with 
how they are to be subjectively favoured or disfavoured.148 For remarks such as the 
following, Wittgenstein is often thought to be an advocate of non-cognitivism in 
religion: 
I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrines, so that 
nothing is spoken. Clearly then, the essence of religion can have nothing 
to do with what is said—or rather if anything is said, then this itself is an 
element in religious behaviour, and not a theory. Further, no question 
accordingly arises whether the words are true or false or meaningless.149 
For my part, the cognitivist/non-cognitivist distinction—let us term it such—is not a 
useful one, for it may reflect little more than a difference in how we look at things. 
Statements of belief can sometimes be both expressive and cognitive, depending on 
the surrounding practice in which they are held. Moreover, admitting that they are 
expressive does not entail the surrender of the claim of truth. Nor should my espousal 
that religious language is cognitive be allowable only if I also insist on there being 
strict applicable definition and complete clarity.  
I suspect the concern that religious claims must be as far as possible descriptive 
and fact-stating, is a consequence of the thinking that religion must explain things 
objectively. As Wittgenstein aptly observes, ‘Philosophers constantly see the method 
of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions 
in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads 
the philosopher into complete darkness.150 Wittgenstein could have included 
religious people as well.  
While we credit science for the immense gain in our knowledge of ‘how things are 
in the world,’ we ought to recognise that religion makes its own contribution as well. 
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What religion uniquely delivers has been picked up by the atheist philosopher, Tim 
Crane (b. 1962): 
Religion attempts to make sense of the world by seeing a kind of meaning 
or significance in things. This kind of significance does not need laws or 
generalisations, just the sense that the everyday world we experience is 
not all there is, and that behind it all is the mystery of God’s presence, or 
more abstractly, the unseen order.’151 
Crane not only correctly identifies divine mystery as the concern of religion, he 
proposes that how that element is approached or embraced lies at the heart of the 
difference between the two ‘magisteria’ of religion and science. He elaborates: 
Science too has its share of mysteries… But one aim of science is to 
minimise such things, to reduce the number of primitive concepts or 
primitive explanations. The religious attitude is very different. It does not 
seek to minimise mystery. Mysteries are accepted as a consequence of 
what, for the religious, make the world meaningful.152 
As we have pointed out in our introductory chapter, religious people should not 
assume that the scientific method of explanation of things is the only one that counts. 
Science makes no such hegemonic claim for itself, although the same cannot be said 
for its ideological form known as ‘scientism’. The important point for religious people 
to note is they should not assume that religion must explain its claims in the manner 
required by science. In the face of divine mystery, what is central to religion is a 
commitment to finding meaning, rather than a quest for complete explanation or 
certainty. This is the attitude encapsulated by Anselm’s maxim, Credo ut intelligam—
I believe so that I may understand. We might even say such an attitude of faith is an 
integral part of the language-game(s) in which religious people participate. 
4. Relativism 
Let us now take up the issue of relativism, for a possible objection might be raised 
that my thesis seems unconcerned about getting at the absolute truth. Truth, after 
all, is what theology seeks and what theological reflections aim to deliver by means 
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of language. John Caputo has recently made the remark that ‘relativism means there 
is no Truth.153 His point is, with so many competing truths around and one is as good 
as another, who can say what is true? To be sure, Caputo is not in support of 
relativism, having criticised it for not coming up with a theory of truth and thus 
rendering us unable to say that anything is wrong.154 A more common difficulty with 
relativism finds expression in the cry of those who encounter the claim that truth is 
relative, the cry that ‘truth is arbitrary—anything goes.’155 As expected, relativism so-
conceived is seen as a threat to truth which must then be opposed. Those religious 
people who think this way would ‘often invoke “absolute truth” as both a casualty 
and antidote. What’s threatened by relativism is “absolute” truth, and yet the only 
thing that can deliver us from relativism is “absolute” truth.’156  Smith whose words I 
have just quoted, thinks that the practice of affixing the qualifier ‘absolute’ to truth 
ought to be re-evaluated. His worry is the use of the term must lead to a theological 
conundrum, namely, the question whether we as contingent and finite beings can 
attain ‘absoluteness’. If we respond in the affirmative, are we not failing to own up 
to our contingency and dependence as creatures? Indeed, any claim to absoluteness 
is sheer hubris. For my part, I simply take the position that absolute truth is an ideal 
which is for God to dispense; as far as we are concerned our task is to seek it. On the 
other hand, saying that truth is relative is not the same as denying truth or playing 
fast-and-lose with truth. ‘It is simply,’ as Smith rightly argues, ‘to recognise the 
conditions of our knowledge that are coincident with our status as finite, created, 
social beings.’157 
Wittgenstein, we have seen, on being accused of maintaining that truth is decided 
by human agreement, astutely replied ‘It is what human beings say that is true and 
false; and they agree in the language they use.’158 His relativism is a response to the 
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problem of meaning which in turn is ‘the possession of a role and a place in a 
“language” or a “form of life”.’159 Another way of looking at the present argument is 
to relate it to our ability to discover how things are in the world. That the world is 
knowable to us, even if only in a very limited and infinitesimal degree, is a valid case 
for believing that there is a great variety of truths, even relative and tentatively-held 
ones. For the world is a store-house of many things, and the human quest for 
knowledge has yielded much fruit and enabled us to discover many truths. Any 
attempt to dismiss the view that there are particular truths in favour of the Neo-
platonic idea of one single ‘absolute truth’ is, I think, wrongheaded. 
It would be wrongheaded too to conclude that religion is unconcerned with 
making factual or historical claims. That ‘there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is 
his messenger’ is both a factual and historical claim. To Christians, the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ is a historical occurrence of such significance that if it did not happen, 
many will, with St Paul, declare faith to be ‘in vain’. (1 Cor 15:14). Wittgenstein seems 
to have adopted the same position when he makes the following confession: 
What inclines even me to believe in Christ's resurrection? I play as it were 
with the thought.—If he did not rise from the dead, then he decomposed 
in the grave like every human being. He is dead and decomposed. In that 
case he is a teacher, like any other and can no longer help; and we are 
once more orphaned and alone.160  
To be sure, he has also said that ‘Christianity is not based on a historical truth.’161 His 
point may well be that if a religious claim is generally held by others to be false, the 
believer may still choose not to accept that opinion, since religion is not of the same 
language-game as that played by its critics. Catholics have exemplified such a 
response to contrarian positions by continuing to believe in transubstantiation even 
though others may not think wine has changed in any way.162  
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In this chapter, several key issues concerning the concept of truth have been raised 
and addressed, if only briefly. Admittedly, the concept continues to be controversial. 
It certainly defies attempts to underpin it with something more fundamental or easier 
to grasp, despite it being rigorously discussed since the earliest times. Yet, there can 
be no question of side-stepping the concept because truth is, and always will be, 
theology's proper goal. In any event, our analysis of language and its use must lead 
us to a consideration of truth, for one of the basic functions of language is to convey 
meaning which, in turn, makes ‘truth’ possible.  
Wittgenstein’s position on meaning has been the main thrust in the shaping of his 
concept of truth. His great insight—that the meaning of a word is not to be correlated 
with the object that corresponds with the word but rather with its use—provides the 
basis for delinking meaning from any sort of reference or representation. And if 
meaning is constituted through use, it becomes clear that ‘true’ as a word must 
function ‘within the activity of using language (language game) and its meaning is 
determined by the part it plays in this language.’163 This suggests that the notion of 
truth must pertain to language; Rorty’s oft-quoted line that sentences are needed for 
there to be truth points in the same direction.  
If truth is linguistic, the notion of truth must be more than an epistemic concept. 
In the words of Caputo, truth is ‘a function of the light of God that shines on things 
and with which God illumines our minds.’164 Indeed, ‘God is truth’ adds Caputo, a 
remark reminiscent of Christ’s own claim. While it may be claimed that ‘true’ 
assertions can be made which deliver on factual knowledge, they are marked by 
‘rough edges’ and are certainly incapable of rendering complete explanations or 
precise definitions. Yet, we should not be perturbed that we can never fully reconcile 
the explicit and the inexpressible, or that we have constantly to strive for more 
completion and clarity. We accept that we are dealing with mystery which discloses 
                                                     
163 Gill, ‘Wittgenstein’s Concept of Truth’, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.6:1 (1966), 74. 
164 Caputo, Truth, 29. 
The Question of Truth 
175 
 
itself while remaining ever hidden. To echo Crane’s sense of the matter, we need not 
suppose ourselves to be falling short of our belief, and it is not as if ‘were we more 
intelligent or better informed, we would be able to figure God out.’165   
In earlier chapters, I have made occasional references to the ecumenist, George 
Lindbeck whose work has been acclaimed for applying Wittgenstein’s categories to 
religious language. Lindbeck’s main concerns are: firstly, the nature of church 
doctrines and how they should function in ways that could help to reconcile 
theological difference, and secondly, the development of a cultural-linguistic model 
for conceiving religion. Our interest in him arises from the way he develops 
Wittgenstein’s ideas in depth. In our next chapter, we turn to examine his influential 
book, ND in some detail. 
                                                     




Chapter Six  
Linguistic Analogy in Lindbeck’s Theories of 
Religion and Doctrine 
 
It has become customary… to emphasise neither the cognitive nor the 
experiential-expressive aspects of religion; rather, emphasis is placed on those 
respects in which religions resemble languages with their correlative forms of 
life and are thus similar to cultures.1 
George A Lindbeck 
Introduction 
In our introductory chapter, we alluded to the attempt by the theologian and 
ecumenist George Lindbeck to develop a theological approach based essentially on 
Wittgenstein’s categories and insights. Lindbeck is noted for being one of the first 
theologians to appropriate Wittgenstein. His work, the Nature of Doctrine (ND), 
developing the philosopher’s ideas in depth, has been enormously influential. These 
factors however are not the only ones we have considered for focussing on him here. 
We have a more compelling reason—that it will be instructive for us to look at how 
Wittgenstein’s tools have been applied to theological issues by other minds. 
Lindbeck’s exploration may also provide ideas which are useful to my present project. 
By way of introduction, let me indicate that what interests me most about 
Lindbeck is his vision of locating the conceptualisation of religion in the characteristics 
of language. I refer to his so-called ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory on religion and doctrine, 
the main elements of which may be briefly recalled. A religion is to be seen as 
resembling a language together with its correlative form(s) of life and is thus similar 
to a culture. A religion is neither a system of beliefs, nor a set of symbols expressing 
attitudes, feelings, or sentiments. Rather, it is like an idiom that allows for the 
construing of reality and the living of life. And, like a language or culture, religion is 
essentially communal in character. Extending the analogy of language to the 
doctrines of a religion, Lindbeck proposes that doctrines be regarded as rules that 
                                                     




govern discourse, reflection and practice. Or, more technically expressed, they are 
‘second-order’ statements concerning belief and action, rather than ‘first-order’ 
propositions or truth claims about God or the world.2 Although controversial, these 
‘programmatic’ proposals have been hailed as amounting to a ‘paradigm shift’ for the 
conceptualisation of the nature of religion and religious doctrine.3 To demonstrate 
the superiority or importance of the ‘cultural-linguistic’ approach to religion—for 
reasons we shall shortly see—Lindbeck contrasts his theory of religion and doctrine 
with two other dominant theories. The first is the ‘cognitive-propositional’ theory 
which ‘emphasises the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in which 
church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective 
realities.’4 The second which Lindbeck labels the ‘experiential-expressive’ theory 
because of its tendency towards the subjective, interprets doctrines as non-cognitive 
symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations.5 Although Lindbeck 
does not specifically say so, what he has presented are ‘ideal types’6 of theory of 
religion, that is, they are constructs or models for the purpose of conceptual study 
and heuristic analysis. As such, they should not be, but are often, confused with ‘what 
is the case’. I believe some of Lindbeck’s critics would have been less nit-picking if 
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they knew the theories were meant to be ‘ideal types’.7 
Our Tasks 
In what follows, I will say more about each of the three theories of religion and 
doctrine. However, the treatment will not be exhaustive, as our task is mainly to show 
how language and grammar are used as descriptive analogies within his overall 
conception of the roles of language in religion. In this connection, a summary of 
Lindbeck’s position by David H Kelsey (b. 1932) in terms of a chain of language-related 
metaphors may be aptly recalled: ‘A religion (in this case, Christianity) is (like) a 
culture; a culture is (like) a language; and as French grammar is to the French 
language, so is Christian doctrine to Christianity.’8 In the development of his own 
‘cultural-linguistic’ theory, Lindbeck has been quite forthright about his reliance on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Indeed, he discloses that the roots of his 
theory, especially on the linguistic side, go back to that philosopher.9 His generous 
acknowledgement says it all: ‘Wittgenstein's influence… has served as a major 
stimulus to my thinking (even if in ways that those more knowledgeable in 
Wittgenstein might not approve.)’10 So, where and in what manner he has applied 
the stimulus from the philosopher will also be explored. Naturally we will also want 
to assess if his appropriation of Wittgenstein has been effective or otherwise. Overall, 
we will concentrate on the linguistic analogy to look out for tools and insights which 
may have something to contribute to my own thesis. In the later part of the chapter 
we will examine Lindbeck’s understanding of truth which is central to his entire 
project. We will also discuss both the promise and problems that Lindbeck’s cultural-
linguistic approach to religion and doctrine holds for the theological enterprise. The 
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final section of the chapter will be devoted to an assessment of some of the key 
assumptions that underlie that approach.  
There is a whisper that however novel or useful Lindbeck’s programmatic 
proposals on religion and doctrine may be, they are these days not much considered, 
or that they are passé. After all, more than three decades have gone by since he first 
presented them in ND. And it does seem that the high level of interest which initially 
and for some ensuing years greeted the slim volume has waned considerably. Our 
position, however, is that the ‘cultural-linguistic’ or ‘postliberal’ (a term used by 
Lindbeck himself and which appears in the subtitle of his work) approach to religion 
and doctrine still holds great promise, and that it has aspects which are pedagogically 
useful. Far from being obsolete, Lindbeck’s ideas are still being explored and 
discussed in scholarly circles. In the recent decade or so, we have witnessed the 
publication of a number of studies on Lindbeck or that are related to his themes; 
among those who have so published we count the following (to name only a few): 
Adonis Vidu (2005), C C Pecknold (2005), Kevin J Vanhoozer (2005), Paul Dehart 
(2006), D Stephen Long (2009), Steven Knowles (2010), Robert L Fossett (2013), John 
Allan Knight (2013), Ronald Michener (2013), James K A Smith (2014), David Trenery 
(2014).11 Lindbeck’s theses have also continued to receive attention in numerous 
handbooks on or guides to theology; the two more popular ones are, namely, The 
Modern Theologians edited by David Ford (2005) and The Cambridge Companion to 
Postmodern Theology edited by Kevin J Vanhoozer (2003). I believe we can expect 
more studies on postliberal theology to be produced. Pecknold’s generous remarks 
about Lindbeck’s ground-breaking book will surely find wide agreement:  
For better or for worse, what began in 1984… is now one of the most 
pedagogically powerful representations of postliberal theology to date… 
Both the profound pedagogical effect of Lindbeck’s slim volume, and the 
representational status it has gained as a contemporary classic of 
postliberalism seem to suggest that… it is a work of some enduring 
significance.12 
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It is necessary to discussion of Lindbeck’s theses about the nature of religion and 
doctrine that we know something of the background to the development of his 
‘cultural-linguistic’ theory and his claim that it is superior or preferable to the rival 
‘cognitive-propositional’ and the ‘experiential-expressive’ theories. Why it is so will, I 
hope, become clear presently. For many years Lindbeck, as an active participant in 
ecumenical discussions, has been dissatisfied with the inadequacy of existing models 
of religion to deal with what he terms ‘doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation.’13 
The question that puzzles him the most is: how can doctrines that were once held to 
be contradictory to each other be reconciled and yet remain unchanged?14 Or, to use 
a different phraseology from a recent critique of Lindbeck’s work, ‘how it is that 
certain linguistic usages can serve to mark the boundaries of communal belonging?’15 
Lindbeck recalls too that reports of agreements reached on church-dividing topics 
such as baptism, the Eucharist, ministry, justification, the papacy and so on, are often 
received with suspicion that those so engaged in ecumenical dialogues (himself 
included) are self-deceived victims of their own desire for reconciliation, for these 
very discussants would continue—by their own admission—to adhere to their 
original, long-held convictions. The problem, as Lindbeck sees it, is not that the claim 
to have achieved doctrinal reconciliation is false but that the categories for dealing 
with doctrinal reconciliation available to these folk are inadequate.16 The theory that 
Lindbeck now puts forward and writes about in ND is therefore intended as a 
response to the aforesaid conundrum. Equally, the metaphors and the central 
analogy of ‘religion as language’ that fund Lindbeck’s argument are selected purely 
on the basis that they are effective for resolving that particular problematic. The 
claim then that his own theory of religion and doctrine is the superior or preferred 
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theory is made strictly within an ecumenical context.17 Whether his claim is justified 
or not, however, must at this point be left an open question; but the background just 
presented should be kept in mind as we proceed to consider his ideas. 
So how have the ‘cognitive-propositional’ and ‘experiential-expressive’ theories 
failed the ecumenical cause, whereas Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory seems to 
have succeeded? According to Lindbeck, the first two theories do not measure up 
because by their very nature the possibility of doctrinal reconciliation is simply 
denied: one requires us to reject doctrinal reconciliation, while the other would have 
us reject doctrinal constancy.18 In the ‘cognitive-propositional’ theory, the possibility 
of doctrinal reconciliation is simply ruled out unless the differing sides are prepared 
to capitulate or retract. For under this theory, doctrines are held as norms about 
beliefs and practice, and so are not open to reformulation. Lindbeck elaborates, 
For a propositionalist, if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it 
is once false, it is always false. This implies, for example, that the historic 
affirmations and denials of transubstantiation can never be harmonised. 
Agreement can be reached only if one or both sides abandon their 
positions. Thus, on this view, doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation 
is impossible because there is no significant sense in which the meaning 
of a doctrine can change while remaining the same.19    
In the second type of theory, given its focus on the ‘experiential-expressive’ 
dimension of religion and a lack of serious interest in questions of diversity, doctrinal 
harmony has been reduced to resolving underlying feelings, attitudes, existential 
orientations or practices rather than doctrinal differences which presumably are left 
unsettled. Indeed, in this tradition ‘doctrines function as nondiscursive symbols, they 
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are polyvalent in import and therefore subject to changes of meaning or even to a 
total loss of meaningfulness.’20 After all, for experiential-expressive symbolists, the 
essence of religion is an experience or mode of consciousness that relates to the 
transcendent, with doctrines serving only as nondiscursive symbols—they can remain 
the same even if their meanings have changed, or they can alter without any change 
of meaning. Indeed, as Trenery has observed, on the ‘experiential-expressive’ 
approach to religion and doctrine, ‘[a]ny degree of variation in doctrinal formulation 
appears to be consistent with an underlying unity of religious experience.’21 
Caveats 
Before proceeding further, several clarifications or caveats pertaining to the present 
discussion issued by Lindbeck himself may be briefly noted.  
1. Doctrine and Religion are interdependent on each other  
At the outset, Lindbeck insists that the problem of doctrine ‘is not confined to 
doctrines per se, [sic] but extends to the notion of religion itself.’22 The reason is there 
is an ‘interdependent’ relationship between theories of religion and theories of 
doctrine, so that ‘deficiencies in one area are inseparable from deficiencies in the 
other.’23 This is certainly true. Indeed, from what is gleaned from the celebrated 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926−2006), the dynamics are even greater, with 
doctrine in significant inter-relationship not only with religion (i.e. schemes of 
symbolisation and representation) but with the wider community.24 No sooner as one 
begins to explore the nature of doctrine than one is at once thrown into an enquiry 
that embraces the whole of religion. It should therefore occasion no surprise that 
Lindbeck is not concerned with enumerating specific doctrines (such as those relating 
to the Trinity, Christology, infallibility, the Eucharist, and so on). Neither is he 
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concerned to attempt any assessment on claims as to which statements should have 
or should not have doctrinal status. In other words, rather than seek to ‘decide 
material questions,’ he is only concerned ‘to provide a framework for their 
discussion.’25 Sensing the need for a ‘non-controversial’ description of doctrines, he 
offers the following:  
Church doctrines are communally authoritative teachings regarding 
beliefs and practices that are considered essential to the identity or 
welfare of the group in question. They may be formally stated or 
informally operative, but in any case they indicate what constitutes 
faithful adherence to a community.26 
The stress on doctrines as ‘teachings regarding beliefs and practices’ is a reiteration 
that the role of doctrines is a second-order one. Doctrines are not first-order 
formulations of beliefs which shape practices; they are authoritative insofar as they 
function as rules governing discourse, attitude and action. Recall the analogy that 
religion is the language and doctrines are the grammar of religion. The following 
remark may be instructive: ‘The system therefore consists of a “first-order” (the 
actual performances of particular “sentences”) and a “second-order” (the grammar 
by which those sentences are regulated), and Lindbeck keeps a fairly rigid boundary 
between the two.’27  
2. Language 
It seems that Lindbeck has issued a clarification on ‘language’ which will have a 
bearing on a correct understanding of his argument. I borrow the following remarks 
which appear as a footnote in John Allan Knight’s chapter on ‘George Lindbeck and 
Frei’s Later Work’:  
First, [Lindbeck] means language to include any form of symbolic action 
that has a conventionalised meaning. Second, he doesn’t mean that an 
action or its meaning is necessarily exhausted by its linguistic constitution. 
Third, we might engage in activities that are not linguistically constituted. 
But these activities are not distinctively human. That is, what it means to 
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be human is to exist in a culture, to take part in a form of life that is 
regulated by a language game. Activities that are distinctively human, 
then, will be linguistically constituted.28 
In the main body of his chapter, Knight has expressed that,  
…when [Lindbeck] says an activity is linguistically constituted, he means 
constituted by a particular linguistic system. Therefore, there cannot be 
any such thing as religion in general, and, more generally, humans have 
incommensurable experiences. To speak of the religious quality of all 
experience, from a cultural-linguistic point of view, is to use language to 
which no meaning can ultimately be assigned.29 
It is also vital to discussion of the ‘cultural-linguistic’ approach to note Lindbeck’s 
insistence that language precedes and is prior to religious experience. The order is 
strictly as follows: language comes first, the world and experience second. Put 
differently, ‘it is necessary to have the means for expressing an experience in order 
to have it, and the richer our expressive or linguistic system, the more subtle, varied 
and differentiated can be our experience.’30 Such an understanding of language will 
surely challenge the commonly held assumption that experience being extra-
linguistic is the bedrock of religious belief. Even so, might Lindbeck’s claim of the 
priority of language over experience be equally extreme and so equally 
wrongheaded? Do language and experience not interact rather than one being wholly 
determinative of the other? 
3. Culture 
Next, Lindbeck is careful to explain the analogy he uses in saying that religion 
(also) resembles a culture. While he affirms Paul Tillich’s formulation that ‘religion is 
the substance of culture, and culture is the form of religion’31—by which he 
understands that religion as an individualistic sense of ultimate concern as well as, 
collectively, the vitalising source of all significant cultural achievements—he does not 
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collapse the distinctions between the two. Religion, unlike a culture, has a more 
specifiable domain, namely, whatever that is taken as most important.32 It is by virtue 
of their domain concerning that which is most important that religions are such 
comprehensive interpretive schemes that can structure and shape all human 
experience and understanding of life, self and world. Yet, culture is an instructive 
analogy for Lindbeck’s purposes as it lays stress on the elements of ‘exchange and 
collective elaboration of meaningful systems’33 which characterise all socio-cultural 
processes. Inspired by Geertz, ‘culture’ is now widely understood as a semiotic 
medium or symbol system—like a shared language with its ‘ensemble of publicly 
available symbols which function together to structure shared possibilities of 
communication, interpretation, and experience.’34 Paul Dehart (b. 1964) has pointed 
out that these symbolic exchanges ‘have their own “logic” due to the meaningful 
interrelations which constitute them.’35 In a footnote, Lindbeck explains, ‘It is this 
relatively greater emphasis on the internal logic or grammar of religions which 
differentiates what I am calling ‘cultural-linguistic’ approaches to religion from more 
one-sidedly cultural ones.’36  
Three Models of Religion  
The presentation of Lindbeck’s three-fold typology of theories of religion and 
doctrine, we have noted, is primarily a response to a longstanding concern regarding 
the prospect of ecumenical unity and agreement. The paramount issue is the 
question of the possibility of the reconciliation of doctrines, doctrines which are 
church-dividing as well as those which are not so. Reading the circumstances, James 
K A Smith has correctly remarked that ‘Lindbeck’s quarry is a theory of doctrine.’37 
Still, it should be quite apparent in the accounts of the theories so far presented or 
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in the terminology used in their descriptions that they include or are aligned with 
different understandings of the nature of religious language. To be sure, each of these 
theories incorporates a view of language. Thus, a dominant metaphor—that of 
language—seems to be present in all of the rival views. With this perspective in mind 
let us consider each of the theories in turn.  
1. The Cognitive-Propositional Theory 
On this ‘cognitive-propositional’ approach, the factual aspects of religion are 
emphasised, and religion itself is likened to a science or a philosophy, as these were 
typically understood.38 It follows that the doctrines of religion are treated as 
propositions that correspond to or represent what is objectively real and of ultimate 
importance. Such propositions (doctrines) are informative and assessable in cognitive 
terms, though as truth-claims they can of course be either true or false. Lindbeck 
does not develop this theory in great detail, though he tells us that he sees it as a pre-
liberal ‘approach of traditional orthodoxies (as well as of many heterodoxies)’ and 
that ‘it has certain affinities to the outlook on religion adopted by much Anglo-
American analytic philosophy with its preoccupation with the cognitive or 
informational meaningfulness of religious utterances.’39 He does, however, attempt 
to eschew the ‘cognitive-propositional’ position for being out of sync with modernity, 
even suggesting that those who still perceive or experience religion in such fashion 
are people who ‘combine unusual insecurity with naiveté.’40 We have already noted 
his main criticism that the propositional perspective practically rules out the 
possibility of doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation.  
It is quite obvious that the theory of language utilised in the ‘cognitive-
propositional’ approach to religion and doctrine is that which correlates to what is 
commonly known as referentialism (or representationalism). A simple definition of 
the referential theory is that ‘the meaning of a word is the object to which it refers.’41 
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In this theory, the assumption is that there is a relationship between three terms, 
namely language, reality and knowledge, knowledge being ‘a relation of ideas 
(“representations”) in my mind that “correspond” to reality “outside” my mind.’42 
Knowledge acquisition, as we have previously noted, becomes ‘a matter of getting 
something “inside” our mind to hook onto things “outside” our minds.’43 Language is 
thus merely the instrument; it is supplied by God for the primary function of 
describing God—his being, his relation to the world and his action—in propositional 
form. These immaterial ‘facts’ about the divine reality are the primary referents of 
religious propositions, whose truth is dependent on their correspondence to states 
of affairs. An example of an extreme form of referentialism is found in the following 
account on the verbal inspiration of scripture by A A Hodge (1823–1886) who goes as 
far as to claim that even the choice of words in Scripture is divinely ordered:  
[By verbal inspiration] is meant that the divine influence, of whatever kind 
it may have been, which accompanied the sacred writers in what they 
wrote, extends to their expression of their thoughts in language, as well 
as to the thoughts themselves. The effect being that in the original 
autograph copies the language expresses the thought God intended to 
convey with infallible accuracy, so that the words as well as the thoughts 
are God’s revelation to us.44 
As a matter of philosophical interest, it has been averred that if the ‘cognitive-
propositional’ model is to endure in our modern times it must be founded upon or 
wed to a representationalist epistemology.45  
A major problem with the referential theory of language is that it cannot ‘account 
for the variety of functions that words serve’46; that is, it is not an all-embracing 
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theory as it only works when we think of certain types of words, e.g. nouns like ‘table’, 
‘chair’, ‘bread’, names of people, etc. Wittgenstein provides a simple demonstration 
that language cannot be all referential:  
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I 
give him a slip marked ‘five red apples’. He takes the slip to the 
shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked ‘apples’; then he looks up the 
word ‘red’ in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says 
the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—
up to the word ‘five’ and for each number he takes an apple of the same 
colour as the sample out of the drawer.——It is in this and similar ways 
that one operates with words.——‘But how does he know where and 
how he is to look up the word “red” and what he is to do with the word 
“five”?’——Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations 
come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word 
‘five’?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word ‘five’ is 
used.47 
In the above passage, only the word ‘apples’ makes a reference to some reality; the 
word ‘five’ has no meaning other than from the way it is used, and the word ‘red’ is 
meaningful in so far as it is used with reference to ‘apples’.  
Another difficulty with the referential theory and by extension, the ‘cognitive-
propositional’ approach to religion, is its tendency to isolate words or even 
statements from the context of the life of the people. The fact is the meaning of 
religious utterances does not depend only on the correspondence of what is stated 
or claimed to reality, but must also take into account the ‘patterns of acting and 
feeling’ which help create that correspondence.48 We recall Lindbeck’s insistence that 
insofar as religious utterances are concerned ‘[t]heir correspondence to reality in the 
view we are expounding is not an attribute that they have when considered in and of 
themselves, but is only a function of their role in constituting a form of life, a way of 
being in the world, which itself corresponds to the Most Important, the Ultimately 
Real.’49 A common mistake then is to focus on the so-called ‘referents’ in religious 
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language, missing their wider context. Thiselton shares the following observation: 
The unbeliever does not learn the meaning of such words as ‘God,’ ‘love,’ 
‘salvation’ by being shown observable objects to which these words refer. 
They draw their meaning in the first place from the role which these 
words play in the lives of Christian believers, even if this does not 
completely exhaust their meaning for the believer himself. As Paul van 
Buren puts it, ‘To examine the word (i.e. ‘God’) in isolation from its 
context in life of religious people is to pursue an abstraction.’50 
Proponents of the ‘cognitive-propositional’ position often pride themselves on 
being passionate for and concerned about truth. This is reflected in their insistence 
that language can actually refer to the divine reality as well as describe factual 
information about God. Such a cognitivist disposition is certainly respectable, and in 
Lindbeck’s reckoning, its great strength is that it admits the possibility of truth 
claims.51 Yet, the cognitive aspect of religion while often important, is not primary, 
nor is it the only concern. Most religions also command, exhort, instruct, comfort, 
challenge, admonish, give encouragement, offer hope, etc. Also, an authentic 
religious life is frequently marked by rounds of activities that are in the main non-
cognitive in nature, or only minimally so. What Lindbeck fears is that the ‘cognitive-
propositional’ tradition may trade the rich diversity of uses of religious language for 
a truncated view of religion, one which espouses an exhaustive cognitivism or 
propositionalism.  
Thus, Lindbeck’s rejection of the propositional approach to religion is right—for 
the most part. Doctrinal propositions can only attempt to express the divine mystery; 
they can never represent God exhaustively or unambiguously owing to the very 
nature of language—its inadequacy and limitedness. The words of Wittgenstein’s 
hyperbole (as I deem them) come to mind, ‘to say that this proposition agrees (or 
does not agree) with reality would be obvious nonsense.’52 Propositions are not 
isolated and unmediated; the kind of referring that can occur depends on the nature 
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of the categorical scheme and their syntax. Yet, Lindbeck’s disavowal of all referential 
statements is problematic if he disallows that some truth may be in them. The 
rebuttal from Alister E McGrath (b. 1953) strikes the needed balance:  
Human words, and the categories which they express, are stretched to 
their limits as they attempt to encapsulate, to communicate, something 
which tantalisingly refuses to be reduced to words… Experience and 
language point beyond themselves, testifying that something lies beyond 
their borderlands, yet into which we tantalisingly cannot enter.53 
2. The experiential-expressive theory 
Unlike the ‘cognitive-propositional’ model, the ‘experiential-expressive’ is not 
concerned with the factual aspects of religious content. Instead, it is concerned with 
the expressive nature of one’s inner being and understands doctrines to be ‘non-
informative and non-discursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential 
orientations’54 that are shared by all of humankind. On this view, what lies at the core 
of religion is a root experience or consciousness that points to an ultimate and 
mysterious reality. Historically, the roots of this conceptualisation may be traced back 
to Schleiermacher (1768–1834) whose classic dictum, ‘The essence of religion 
consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence’ comes easily to mind.55 As a theory 
of religion, the ‘experiential-expressive’ interpretation has always been pervasive and 
popular; it seems to have a special appeal to the liberal-minded. In the present age 
where self-expression is fashionable, it is even in the ascendancy across the board.  
Here we come very close to an account of religious language that we may say 
seeks access not to an ultimate reality or states of affairs but to ‘internal 
dispositions.’56 Religion and what identifies a religion with is not located in the 
referential function of language, but in the ability of language ‘to provide private 
objectivisation or public articulation of the inner encounter.’57 In short, what religious 
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language expresses is existential orientation.58 From the perspective of those in this 
linguistic tradition, the external or outer features of religion are thus the 
nondiscursive symbols of interior experience. This explains why on the ‘experiential-
expressive’ model of religion, doctrinal changes are not an issue as doctrines are 
merely a ‘feeble’ way of enunciating the experience of one’s interior life. There is, 
thus, as Lindbeck famously points out, ‘at least the logical possibility that a Buddhist 
and a Christian might have basically the same faith, although expressed very 
differently.’59  
Lindbeck sees a major problem in this model of conceiving religion and the 
religious language it typifies. In particular, he questions the assumption that ‘the 
various religions are diverse symbolisations of one and the same core experience of 
the Ultimate.’60 The notion of a common core experience, he observes, has of course 
permeated much of contemporary Christian theology. As an example, he cites 
Schleiermacher’s articulation—which we have earlier quoted—that the source of all 
religion is in the ‘feeling of absolute dependence,’61 and Tillich’s depiction of this 
experience as that of ‘a being grasped by ultimate concern.’62 The problem for 
Lindbeck, and for us, with respect to the idea of a common core experience is that ‘it 
is difficult or impossible to specify its distinctive features, and yet unless this is done, 
the assertion of commonality becomes logically and empirically vacuous.’63 Even 
Bernard Lonergan (1904−1984), a noted advocate of the ‘experiential-expressive’ 
position has wisely conceded that religious experience ‘varies with every difference 
of culture, class or individual.’64 In what has been said, it would appear that 
Lindbeck’s case against the idea of a common core experience is well argued and 
supported. Still, what might need to be challenged is the appeal to Schleiermacher as 
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if experience is all that mattered to him. This is a serious misrepresentation because 
for Schleiermacher, the experience that comes to us still points to an ultimate reality, 
even if it cannot be fully conceptualised. He is also clear that while we can share in 
the religious experiences of others, our experiences are not all the same.65  
Another objection against the ‘experiential-expressive’ theory, an objection that 
is akin to the one just discussed, concerns a gross phenomenological inaccuracy, 
namely, the claim that it is experience that gives account of and shape to the external 
features of religion. In other words, in the interplay between ‘inner’ experience and 
‘outer’ religious factors, it is the former that is viewed as the leading partner. This so-
called ‘inside-out’ approach is predominant in the liberal theological tradition, with 
its unquestioned embrace of what is commonly termed ‘the turn to the subject.’ 
Lindbeck mentions that thinkers from Schleiermacher through Rudolf Otto to Mircea 
Eliade (1907–1986) and beyond, have all held such a position, locating ‘ultimately 
significant contact with whatever is finally important to religion in the prereflective 
experiential depths of the self and regard[ing] the public or outer features of religion 
as expressive and evocative objectifications (i.e. nondiscursive symbols) of internal 
experience.’66 Consider, for instance, the following line from Schleiermacher which 
reflects his ‘inside-out’ assumption concerning ‘outer’ religious beliefs,  
There is an inner experience to which they [i.e. religious beliefs] may all 
be traced; they rest upon a given, and apart from this they could not have 
arisen by deduction or synthesis from universally recognised 
prepositions.67 
But Lindbeck is unconvinced that this ‘inside-out’ assumption can be conclusively 
maintained. I think he is fair to state that it is ‘simplistic’ to claim a unilaterality that 
either religions produce experiences, or that experiences produce religions, for the 
relationship between the two is dialectical and the causality is reciprocal.68 As before, 
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it is also the case that it is difficult or impossible to isolate a common core experience 
from either religious language or behaviour. He seems more inclined to say that 
religious experience is conceptually derivative, and that the possibility of experience 
itself is shaped by the ‘outer’ dimensions of religion. 
It is also at this point that Lindbeck appeals to Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument.69 The term ‘private language’ is used by Wittgenstein to refer to a 
language which is only comprehensible to its single originator but not to others 
because they do not have access to its vocabulary.70 Sometimes, the term is wrongly 
interpreted to mean that one cannot speak to oneself, or that one cannot withhold 
the things one is thinking from public view. The fact is these sort of things can be 
done, so clearly the term is not to be so applied or understood. In the following 
passage, Wittgenstein invites his readers to imagine such a language, the words of 
which can only be understood by the person speaking:  
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down 
or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, 
and the rest—for his private use?——Well, can't we do so in our ordinary 
language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this 
language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; 
to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot 
understand the language.71 
The logic that Wittgenstein uses to reach his so-called ‘private language’ argument 
seems to be anything but controverted:  
‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what 
is false?’—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they 
agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in 
form of life. If language is to be a means of communication there must be 
agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
judgments.72 
Contending that because ‘private languages are logically impossible’73 Lindbeck 
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draws the following parallel: 
If so, the same would have to be said regarding private religious 
experiences (such as the dynamic state of being unrestrictedly in love), 
which are purportedly independent of any particular language game. This 
is not the place to assess this argument. I shall simply note that even 
those experiential-expressivists—such as Lonergan (or Karl Rahner and 
David Tracy)—who acknowledge that experience cannot be expressed 
except in public and intersubjective forms, do seem to maintain a kind of 
privacy in the origins of experience and language that, if Wittgenstein is 
right, is more than doubtful.74  
3. The Cultural-Linguistic Theory 
In Lindbeck’s schematic assessment noted above, the ‘cognitive-propositional’ 
and ‘experiential-expressive’ approaches to religion and doctrine have both failed to 
adequately account for the possibility of doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation. 
By their very nature, the former is unable to relent on its invariability (in that the 
adherents continue to hold to the truth of their doctrines), while the latter seems 
infused with a certain variability (in that expressions of belief once held to be 
irreconcilable can now be interpreted in ways that allow for their harmonisation).75 
Lindbeck briefly considers a ‘hybrid’ approach that could better account for both the 
variable and invariable aspects of religious traditions.76 Despite some virtue to it, 
Lindbeck however jettisons this approach for being ‘weak in criteria for determining 
when a given doctrinal development is consistent with the sources of faith’ and being 
‘unable to avoid a rather greater reliance on the magisterium.’77 It is then that a new, 
postliberal, way of conceiving religion and doctrine known as the ‘cultural-linguistic’ 
theory comes to be proposed. From a critical perspective, one wonders if Lindbeck 
might have been too quick to reject his own idea of a hybrid approach: might not all 
three theories of religion be applied to complement one another? Religious 
statements, especially those on doctrine, may well be a composite of propositional 
truth-claims, expressions of faith experiences, and rules or idioms that describe or 
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prescribe religious duties and conduct.  
Though the main elements of the ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory have been indicated 
at the beginning of the chapter, it is still necessary to look at the more technical 
version supplied by its originator. For Lindbeck,  
a religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework 
or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought. It functions 
somewhat like a Kantian a priori… It is not primarily an array of beliefs 
about the true and the good (though it may involve these), or a symbolism 
expressive of basic attitudes, feelings, or sentiments (though these will 
be generated). Rather it is similar to an idiom that makes possible the 
description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing 
of inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments. Like a culture or language, it 
is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals 
rather than being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities.78 
The first thing we can say is that the linguistic analogy is drawn by Lindbeck at 
several important points. He emphasises that religion itself be ‘viewed as a kind 
of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium… [indeed,] similar to an idiom.’ 
In contrast with the claims of the earlier views, religion is neither a system of 
beliefs expressed in terms of the cognitive, nor a ‘symbolism’ expressive of 
sentiments or feelings arising from a spiritual encounter. One becomes religious 
as one would acquire a language or a culture; conversion or discipleship then is a 
kind of acculturation, for ‘[t]o become a Christian involves learning the story of 
Israel and of Jesus well enough to interpret and experience oneself and one’s 
world in its terms.’79 To be sure, one needs also to think of how religions can 
change: the reason is one is inducted into something that is potentially open-
handed, as in the extreme example of the transformation of Judaism into 
Christianity. Being religious is also like a kind of ‘knowing how’—just like joining a 
particular linguistic and cultural community—and such knowledge cannot be 
passed on by second-hand. Within a religion, one must, in order to become 
socialised into it, embrace its ‘vocabulary’ and learn and practise its skills. Picking 
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up a well-known and important element in Wittgenstein’s thought, Lindbeck 
notes:  
Lastly, just as a language (or ‘language games’ to use Wittgenstein’s 
phrase) is correlated with a form of life, and just as a culture has both 
cognitive and behavioural dimensions, so it is also in the case of a 
religious tradition. Its doctrines, cosmic stories or myths, and ethical 
directives are integrally related to the rituals it practises, the sentiments 
or experiences it evokes, the actions it recommends, and the institutional 
forms it develops.80 
Lindbeck’s use of the concept of language-games-with-a-form-of-life to connect 
with religious tradition with its rituals, sentiments, experiences, actions, and 
institutional forms, represents a key mention of Wittgenstein in ND. Questions 
however have been raised as to whether Lindbeck is right to so appropriate this 
Wittgenstein’s concept.81 The main complaint appears to be that as Wittgenstein 
never likened language as a whole, or even a realm of discourse (such as religion, 
philosophy, or science) to a game, what Lindbeck did was a transgression of 
Wittgenstein’s intentions. Though I agree, following Fergus Kerr, that on textual 
grounds religion or anything else on a grand scale cannot count as a form of life, I do 
not think Lindbeck is guilty of any misuse.82 To be pedantic, Lindbeck’s comparison is 
drawn between the lesser elements of a religious tradition (not the whole religion) 
and language games/form of life. In the circumstances, his appropriation of 
Wittgenstein has worked out well, shedding light on aspects of his theory.  
Another instance of appropriating Wittgenstein occurs at the point of proposing 
that doctrines be interpreted as rules. Lindbeck has proposed that church doctrines 
be construed ‘not as expressive symbols or as truth claims, but as communally 
authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action.’83 He also insists on 
understanding the function of doctrines in terms of their use. Unsurprisingly, once 
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doctrines are interpreted in their function as ‘usage guides’84 the conflict between 
preserving the fixed form of doctrinal formulation (i.e. ‘constancy’) and allowing 
flexibility in their theorisation (i.e. change) will at once seem less formidable. 
It may occasion surprise that although he is insistent that his ‘cultural-linguistic’ 
theory is superior to the ‘cognitive-propositional’ and ‘experiential-expressive’ ones, 
Lindbeck does not seek to have them completely discarded. Rather, he urges an 
‘absorption’ of these theories into his model.85 It is, he says, a testament to the 
strength of the cultural-linguistic outlook that ‘it can accommodate and combine the 
distinctive and often competing emphases of the other two approaches.’86 More 
pertinently, as we have noted, their chief deficiency vis-à-vis the ‘cultural-linguistic’ 
approach to religion is the fact that they are ‘more one-sidedly.’  
The contrast between Lindbeck’s approach and the other two may be further 
illustrated by comparing their respective perspectives with regard to the question of 
language. Whereas in the earlier theories of religion the relevant dimension of 
language with which each is identified has been either reference or symbolisation, in 
this ‘cultural-linguistic’ model, the dimension of language is semantic 
interconnection.87 Put differently and more strongly, the ‘cognitive-propositional’ 
and ‘experiential-expressive’ interpretations have impoverished religion—by 
reducing the nature of religious belief either to propositional truth on the one hand, 
or to the expression of religious experience on the other. These tendencies will 
naturally impinge on the way scripture is to be interpreted, either as texts which 
attempt to describe and encompass an objective reality, or as texts which facilitate 
the expression of one’s experience of the transcendent or the living of life. This is an 
area of study which will require further exploration. 
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The ‘Rule’ Theory of Doctrine 
The so-called ‘rule’ or ‘regulative’ theory of doctrine (hereinafter the ‘rule’ theory) is 
developed in a series of arguments which begin with Lindbeck making the basic point 
that doctrines are ‘second-order reflection on the data of religion,’88 or to say the 
same thing, ‘[t]hey are second-order rules for first-order talk.’89 Doctrines as such do 
not assert anything either true or false about God at all: they only speak about or 
describe assertions so made. Applying the linguistic analogy once again, Lindbeck 
likens doctrines to languages, or more precisely, to grammatical rules. No doubt the 
phrase ‘theology as grammar’ by Wittgenstein probably provided the inspiration.90 
To clarify what doctrines-as-grammar means, Lindbeck explains thus, 
Some doctrines, such as those delimiting the canon and specifying the 
relation of Scripture and tradition, help determine the vocabulary; while 
others (or sometimes the same ones) instantiate syntactical rules that 
guide the use of this material in construing the world, community, and 
self, and still others provide semantic reference.91   
Lindbeck further argues that what is most prominent in this new conception of 
doctrines ‘is their use, not as expressive symbols or as truth claims but as communally 
authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action.’92 Given that doctrines are 
descriptive and have a regulative function, doctrinal conflicts will be easier to 
overcome as differences are reconciled while the doctrines remain unchanged. 
‘Thus,’ he elaborates, ‘oppositions between rules [i.e. doctrines] can in some 
instances be resolved, not by altering one or both of them, but by specifying when or 
where they apply, or by stipulating which of the competing directives takes 
precedence.’93 One cannot but detect here a further appropriation of a 
Wittgensteinian concept—that of rules operating within a language-game, serving 
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very different roles in the game.94 To strengthen the case for regarding doctrines as 
rules, Lindbeck assures his readers that there has been historical precedent. He cites 
as evidence the notion of regulae fidei which has been practised since the earliest 
Christian centuries, and the subsequent recognition by later historians and 
systematic theologians that the role of doctrines within the teachings of the church 
has been largely regulative.95  
Lindbeck devotes a chapter in his book to discuss how the ‘rule’ theory of doctrine 
can be tested for its usefulness. He selects three ‘hard’ cases, namely the classic 
Christological/Trinitarian affirmations, the Marian dogma and papal infallibility for 
examination to see whether the theory works in them.96 To attempt to recount the 
detailed discussions involved in each case would take us beyond the concerns of the 
present study. Let it suffice to say that the requirement of the rule theory that ‘a 
distinction be made between doctrine and formulation, between content and form’ 
seems to succeed in at least allowing for various formulations of a particular doctrine. 
In Christology, for instance, the believer may not deny the divinity or humanity of 
Jesus but within these ‘rules’ he or she is free to give his or her own particular 
expression to the doctrine. The ‘rule’ theory thus provides for several ‘logical 
possibilities’ in the way the believer chooses to talk about his or her belief.97    
The Question of Truth 
I return now to the question of truth raised in the previous chapter. In the 
development of the ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory of religion and doctrine, Lindbeck 
recognises that one religion may profess to be ‘truer’ than another. So he devotes an 
excursus in his book to dealing with the notion of ‘truth’, drawing a distinction 
between two types of truth: intrasystematic and ontological. The first refers to the 
truth of coherence. So, an utterance is intrasystematically true if it coheres with the 
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overall context in which it is made. Lindbeck explains as follows, 
Thus for a Christian, ‘God is Three and One’ or ‘Christ is Lord’ are true only 
as parts of a total pattern of speaking, thinking, feeling and acting. They 
are false when their use in any given instance is inconsistent with what 
the pattern as a whole affirms of God’s being and will. The crusader’s 
battle cry ‘Christus est Dominus,’ for example, is false when used to 
authorise cleaving the skull of the infidel (even though the same words in 
other contexts may be a true utterance.) When thus employed, it 
contradicts the Christian understanding of Lordship as embodying, for 
example, suffering servanthood.98 
The second kind of truth—ontological truth—is constituted by correspondence. An 
utterance or statement is ontologically true if its content corresponds to reality, or 
false if it does not. By way of illustration, the two types of truth are contrasted with 
reference to Shakespeare’s statement in Hamlet: ‘Denmark is the land where Hamlet 
lived’. Within the context of Shakespeare’s play, the statement is intrasystematically 
true; if taken as history it is ontologically false.99  
Of the two concepts of truth, Lindbeck contends that intrasystematic truth is of 
greater ‘fundamental significance’.100 He posits, ‘a statement… cannot be 
ontologically true unless it is intrasystematically true, but intrasystematic truth is 
quite possible without ontological truth.’101 In other words, ontological truth is not 
essential for the interpretation of doctrine, as ‘intrasystematic truth is quite possible 
without ontological truth.’102 Even so, Lindbeck cannot be labelled as dismissive of 
ontological correspondence. Though he rejects propositionalism along with the 
experiential-expressive approach to religion in favour of his own linguistic-cultural 
approach, he makes a return to the propositional, conceding: ‘we must not simply 
allow for the possibility that a religion may be categorically as well symbolically or 
expressively true; we must also allow for its possible propositional truth.’103 One may 
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further recall that in his preferred approach, religion does not preclude the cognitivity 
of religious truth claims—just that ‘the cognitive aspect, while often important, is not 
primary.’104 It is important to note that the ‘concession’ to the propositional carries 
a caveat that truth is to be understood as a ‘lived’ reality. In his memorable words,  
There is… a sense in which truth as correspondence can retain its 
significance even for a religion whose truth is primarily categorial rather 
than propositional. A religion thought of as comparable to a cultural 
system, as a set of language games correlated with a form of life, may as 
a whole correspond or not correspond to what a theist calls God’s being 
and will. As actually lived, a religion may be pictured as a single gigantic 
proposition.105 
Thus, truth for Lindbeck cannot adequately be expressed in terms of a proposition or 
experience. Truth is dependent on the extent to which ‘objectivities are interiorised 
and exercised by groups or individuals in such a way as to conform them in some 
measure in the various dimensions of their existence to the ultimate reality and 
goodness that lies at the heart of things.’106 Falsity is simply the failure to achieve that 
end. As David Fergusson has rightly inferred, truth for Lindbeck is only attained by a 
‘total existential conformity’ of one’s self to God.107  
It may be of interest to observe how closely Lindbeck’s notions of truth coincide 
with those held by Wittgenstein: intrasystematic truth matching Wittgenstein’s later 
view on truth, and ontological truth matching his earlier position. The coherence of 
intrasystematic truth with its stress on ‘the total relevant context’ is but another way 
of making the same point by Wittgenstein regarding languages functioning with 
language games. In Lindbeck’s description of ontological truth, it is not difficult to 
uncover elements from both the early and later Wittgenstein.  
Returning to the two types of truth—intrasystematic and ontological—it is clear 
that Lindbeck does not see a dissonance between them. He is of the view that the 
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former is a necessary though insufficient condition for the latter. Consequently, he 
grants and assigns intrasystematic truth a greater ‘fundamental significance’ over 
ontological truth. To some, Lindbeck’s position at correlating the two notions of truth 
will not satisfy, as was his unconvincing attempt at defining the notion of 
intrasystematic truth as equivalent to the truth of coherence—a matter to which we 
shall return later. For my part, I do not think the two notions require a defence, since 
as Fergusson has rightly observed, the conjunction between them ‘is held together 
by a Thomistic theory of meaning.’108 If this is so, we are back to a point that the later 
Wittgenstein has made—that meaning is prior to the concept of truth. Also, the truth 
or falsity of a statement is in part dependent on what it means. Fergusson’s 
elaboration in this regard is helpful: 
Here we see an attempt to construct a doctrine of analogy… which holds 
together ideas about truth and use. In our statements about God the 
signified (significatum) corresponds to the divine being whereas the 
mode of signifying (modus significandi) does not. The statement that 
‘God is good’ affirms that there is a notion of goodness unavailable to us 
which applies to God. Yet although our mode of signifying is analogous to 
something in itself unknown its function is the performative one of 
enabling us to live and act as if God were good in the way we ordinarily 
understand goodness. The theory of analogy thus deployed enables us to 
hold that a religious utterance is true if it is correctly used and its 
significatum corresponds to God.109 
In the provocative example of the crusader cited above, is Lindbeck correct to judge 
the crusader’s cry ‘Christus est Dominus’ false for the reason he has stated? 
Fergusson thinks that if Lindbeck has properly differentiated between meaning and 
use, a different conclusion would have prevailed: the crusader would be considered 
to have made a true statement; ‘the obscenity resides not in the fact that the 
statement is false but that its use is grotesque.’110 For, as Fergusson contends, ‘if the 
statement is ontologically true it is not because it is being properly used; it is true 
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because of the way things are independently of my asserting them to be so.’111 It may 
be instructive to note that Fergusson’s argument that the crusader’s statement is 
true is one that is based on his own seeing of truth in terms of correspondence, even 
if he takes cognisance of Wittgenstein’s insight about the place of use.   
 The relevance of all this for my argument is that we can still claim to be making 
meaningfully true statements about God even when we grant that the language we 
use cannot and should not be pressed to yield absolute precision or comprehension 
about God. 
Reactions/Queries 
As expected, Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-linguistic’ approach has drawn ‘flak’ from various 
audiences, especially those he has broadly classified as the ‘propositionalists’ or 
‘cognitivists’ and the ‘experiential-expressivists’. Even those who subscribe to a 
combination of ‘propositionalist’ and ‘experiential-expressivist’ views have not 
remained silent. Consequently, much has been written in critique of Lindbeck’s 
approach and ideas.112 In this section, I will look at only some of the points raised.  
To be sure, some of the critics have recognised merits in the ‘postliberal’ scheme. 
For instance, McGrath credits and endorses Lindbeck for his ‘timely and persuasive’ 
critique of the experiential-expressive theory of doctrine.113 Kevin Vanhoozer (b. 
1957) considers his corrective of propositionalism helpful.114 And from the pen of 
Hans Frei (1922−1988), a generous compliment for Lindbeck’s rightful ordering of 
priorities—subjecting theology to be in the service of the church first, before and 
above the interest of the academy.115  
The first of several rejoinders to Lindbeck’s project I would like to bring up is that 
from D Z Phillips (1934–2006) who in his book, Faith after Foundationalism has 
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expressed concern that theologians and philosophers may simply use the notion of 
grammar itself to determine the direction in which they want theological doctrines 
to develop.116 Phillips observes that Wittgenstein’s remark ‘theology as grammar’ 
then becomes the ‘handmaid of a particular theological development.’117 He 
adjudges Lindbeck to be among those who have so misappropriated the notion of 
grammar. Lindbeck’s error is in wrongly concluding ‘that seeing theology as a kind of 
grammar entails not talking of God as an independent reality and ceasing to make 
truth claims concerning him.’118 All that one can derive from the Wittgenstenian 
notion, Phillips clarifies, is that such God-talk ‘should be understood within the 
grammar of the religious discourse in which it is made.’119  
Phillips makes a further complaint that he is unable to locate the ‘audience’ that 
Lindbeck’s book seeks to talk about and address.120 Behind Phillips’ complaint is the 
underlying dissatisfaction with Lindbeck for giving a ‘confused’ account of his rival 
theories of religion and doctrine. Even more serious is the charge that he may have 
‘misrepresented religious realities’.121 Hence, his remark about Lindbeck engaging in 
‘language idling’.122  
Whereas Phillips’ criticism of Lindbeck’s treatment of rival views on doctrine has 
largely been on philosophical grounds, the criticisms advanced by others are less so. 
McGrath, for instance seems offended that propositionalists have been called names 
like ‘voluntarist’, ‘intellectualist’ or ‘literalist’, and described as people who ‘combine 
unusual insecurity with naïvete’.123 B A Gerrish takes exception to remarks by 
Lindbeck that ‘for a propositionalist, if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if 
it is once false, it is always false’ (ND, 16) and that ‘there are no degrees or variations 
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in propositional truth’ (ND, 47). He thinks Lindbeck’s portrayal in effect imputes an 
inflexibility to the propositionalist that is simply false. On the contrary, he argues, 
‘[p]ropositionalists may very well think in terms of the relative adequacy of a 
doctrinal definition, adequacy being assessed, at least initially, by reference to its 
original historical context.’124 They are, he claims, not closed off to the possibility of 
doctrines being ‘reappraised, reformulated, qualified, amplified, or supplemented’ at 
some future time.125 While he is not altogether opposed to Lindbeck’s account of the 
propositionalist view, Vanhoozer adjudges it ‘thin’ and ‘rather simplistic’.126 My 
response to these criticisms is one of only partial agreement: for there can be no 
doubt that among those described as propositionalists are many who are indeed 
absolutists. 
A serious criticism against the ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory has been its assumption 
that language is a ‘given’; or as McGrath puts it, that ‘language’ is just there.127 To be 
sure, Lindbeck’s claim is more a claim that language (and culture) precedes 
experience—that it is ‘a condition for religious experience.’128 ‘Thus,’ he asserts, 
‘language, it seems, shapes domains of human existence and action that are 
preexperiential.’129 I suspect the root cause of the misunderstanding lies in Lindbeck’s 
metaphor, namely, a religion is (like) a language.130  
Behind McGrath’s criticism is a more basic concern about divine revelation. 
Lindbeck is asked to respond as to ‘whether the Christian idiom, articulated in 
Scripture and hence in the Christian tradition emerges from accumulated human 
insight or from the self-disclosure of God in the Christ event.’131 Not finding an answer 
throughout his analysis, McGrath unfairly indicts him for ‘a studied evasion of the 
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central question of revelation.’132 One wonders might the fact that Lindbeck is more 
concerned about theological method than theological content be a sufficient 
explanation for the absence of treatment of revelation in his project? 
The ‘rule’ or ‘regulative’ theory pertaining to church doctrine may be faulted for 
encouraging a certain relativism. Under the refashioned theory, doctrines have 
become rules, or more accurately, rule-like: they no longer bear ideational content, 
in stark contradiction to the traditional view in which doctrines are formulations of 
beliefs about objective realities. So how exactly do doctrines-as-rules function? 
According to Lindbeck, ‘[d]octrines regulate truth claims by excluding some and 
permitting others, but the logic of their communally authoritative use hinders or 
prevents them from specifying positively what is to be affirmed.’133 Given such an 
understanding, Lindbeck arrives at the following inference: 
Thus oppositions between rules can in some instances be resolved, not 
by altering one or both of them, but by specifying when or where they 
apply, or by stipulating which of the competing directives take 
precedence.134  
Lindbeck’s rule theory seems devised chiefly to secure the harmony of conflicting 
doctrines, even to the extent of making light their differences. Hence the criticism of 
relativism.  
The next issue I wish to raise under the present discussion has had a brief mention 
in our earlier discussion about Lindbeck’s notions of truth. It concerns the criticism 
directed at Lindbeck for advancing the view that intrasystematic truth is equivalent 
to the truth of coherence. We may recall his attempt at defining the concept:  
Utterances are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the total 
relevant context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-
linguistic terms, is not only other utterances but also the correlative forms 
of life.’135  
D Z Phillips’ objection is that the notion of ‘coherence’ is entirely unmediated, since 
                                                     
132 Ibid. 
133 ND, 19. 
134 ND, 18. 




‘no context has been given for it’.136 In the above definition, Lindbeck’s expression 
‘cohere with the total context’ has been qualified to refer to ‘correlative forms of life’. 
Whatever this, and what Lindbeck has elsewhere called the ‘Most Important’ and the 
‘Ultimately Real’ may be, they are just concepts fitted in a logical space to create an 
illusion.137 More importantly, Lindbeck’s twinning of intrasystematic and ontological 
truth has been criticised for confusing truth and use. The confusion is evident in the 
many statements made by Lindbeck himself where pragmatic considerations are 
seen to be determinative of coherence/truth value. I cite two as examples: 
Medieval scholastics spoke of truth as an adequation of the mind to the 
thing… but in the religious domain, this mental isomorphism [coherence] 
of the knowing and the known can be pictured as part and parcel of a 
wider conformity of the self to God.138 
The same point can be made by means of J L Austin’s notion of a 
‘performatory’ use of language: a religious utterance, one might say, 
acquires the propositional truth of ontological correspondence only 
insofar as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that 
correspondence.139 
Evidently, in Lindbeck’s construal, religious truth is a matter of the correspondence 
between reality (what is the Most Important, the Ultimately Real) and a lifestyle or a 
pattern of desired behaviour. Detecting such a confusion in Lindbeck’s line of 
approach, Fergusson gives a well-reasoned critique: 
The proper use of a statement does indeed depend on context and the 
warrants for assertion provided by the religion… Correct use is [however] 
neither equivalent to nor a necessary condition of truth.140 
Fruits 
Despite the various criticisms directed at it, the ‘cultural-linguistic’ approach to 
religion has a number of ‘fruits’ which may be harvested to help us do constructive 
theology in what Lindbeck has termed ‘a postliberal age’. I will now try to look at 
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some of these. Lindbeck’s crystallisation of how religion is like a language and a 
culture, and his drawing on Wittgenstein (and other social scientists like Geertz and 
Peter G Winch, (1926−1957) may also provide some support for my own thesis about 
the proper place of words and statements in discourse about God.  
One of the great strengths of the cultural-linguistic theory, in particular, its rule 
theory on doctrines, is its usefulness in serving the ecumenical cause. Of course, all 
hinges on whether the basic assumption that doctrines are second-order rules 
governing first-order talk of divine matters is readily agreed to. Traditionalists and 
propositionalists will need to be convinced that the doctrines they hold about the 
divine and such understanding of reality as they have reached, are in part a social 
construct.   
While the ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory can help Christians come to terms with 
ecumenism, it also insists upon a proper respect towards religions as distinct groups 
with ‘family resemblances’ between them. Lindbeck argues against a reduction of 
religions to a single, universal religion. To attempt to unite all religions in the world is 
as foolish and unattainable as to want to reduce the world's different ways of 
speaking and thinking to a single language. The proposal to conceive of religions as 
resembling languages, together with ‘forms of life’ associated with them (read 
‘culture’), if pursued, will be good for fostering community life since such a 
conceptualisation can only be fulfilled within a community. The reason is language is 
social; language always exists within a community. (We are reminded that private 
languages are logically impossible).141 Since to be religious is to learn a language, one 
would need to attend to specific communities in which that language is used. It 
follows that constructive theology must and can only take place communally. 
There is an important advantage in Lindbeck’s culture-linguistic approach which 
one must not miss. In conceptualising religion in the characteristics of language, 
Lindbeck allows that the former can be viewed from two different perspectives. That 
is to say, religion as a system can be interpreted as either (a) organised around a set 
                                                     




of explicit first-order statements; or (b) constituted ‘by a set of stories used in 
specifiable ways to interpret and live in the world.’142 The difference is a significant 
one for revealing the level of intellectualism between the two positions. Yet, as 
Lindbeck observes, it is often overlooked by most believers, especially those who 
suppose that religious beliefs are expressed in first-order propositions that refer to 
objective divine realities. Characteristically, the believers in question do tend to have 
a ‘preference for doctrine and theological texts as the locus for truth-by-
correspondence’143 Lindbeck’s counter-claim however is that religious truth cannot 
be located only on one level, i.e. whether there is correspondence or lack of 
correspondence; but that it must find expression in issues related to practical living. 
He explains,  
For the cognitivist, it is chiefly technical theology and doctrine which are 
propositional, while on the [cultural-linguistic] model, propositional truth 
and falsity characterise ordinary religious language when it is used to 
mold [sic] lives through prayer, praise, preaching, and exhortation. It is 
only on this level that human beings linguistically exhibit their truth or 
falsity, their correspondence or lack of correspondence to the Ultimate 
Mystery.144 
It stands to reason that when religious truth-claims are construed wholly or chiefly 
on the basis of correspondence, the prospect of possible error becomes unacceptable 
or intolerable. The idea that a religion must be error-free is seen by most adherents 
as essential if that religion is not to be surpassed.145 But precisely that is how the 
intellectualism we spoke about is brought on. Indeed, Lindbeck thinks that both the 
Protestant belief in scriptural inerrancy and the Roman Catholic tradition of papal 
infallibility are patterned after ‘vulgarised forms of a rationalism descended from 
Greek philosophy by way of Cartesian and post-Cartesian rationalism reinforced by 
Newtonian science.’146 The way I see things, the intellectualistic mentality, the 
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temper of our time, is insidiously seeking to reduce religion to concepts or tenets that 
all seem to hold together. This form of intellectualism is a menace to religion for the 
failing, in Lindbeck’s words, ‘to do justice to the fact that a religious system is more 
like a natural language than a formally organised set of explicit statements, and that 
the right use of this language, unlike a mathematical one, cannot be detached from 
a particular way of behaving.’147 In a way, this is what I seek to argue in my thesis—
that assertions and statements have their proper place in religious discourse, and 
that such utterances need not be inerrant or infallible even if they are fact-stating. 
Nor should statements attempting to speak of God be expected to be precise or 
exhaustive, as if they are statements of science.  
Last but not the least, another strength to be gained from Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-
linguistic’ paradigm comes from his insistence that meaning is located within the text. 
The traditionalist, on the other hand, would insist on locating religious meaning 
outside the text.148 The methodology of locating meaning within the text goes under 
the moniker ‘intratextual theology’. Lindbeck’s definition of this particular 
methodology has almost become classic: 
Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework 
rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the 
text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the 
text.149  
One can of course find faults with the ‘intratextual’ methodology, especially if one 
is concerned solely with the question of truth or facticity. Lindbeck would be 
mistaken if he thinks that ‘the truth of a statement is dependent upon its location 
within the semantic system, rather than upon its reference to reality beyond the 
system.’150 Yet, there are fruits to be harvested from it to aid one’s theological 
reflection. I cite two:  
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(i) the intratextual approach enables Scripture to function as the lens 
through which one views the world; 
(ii)  the intratextual method aids a reading of Scripture that is not 
focussed on the literal meaning of a text in isolation from its wider 
historical and communal settings.  
Thus, an intratextual reading of Scripture will require the reader to ‘derive the 
interpretive framework that designates the theologically controlling sense from the 
literary structure of the text itself’151 and not merely from isolated verses or passages. 
What needs to be recognised is that such intratextuality may prove a highly complex 
process involving skilful application of the principles of biblical criticism. Given that 
some biblical texts do pull in different directions, complete reconciliation may not be 
attainable. 
Assessing George Lindbeck’s Assumptions 
In this concluding section, I propose to do a brief evaluation of the main assumptions 
which have underpinned or are reflected in Lindbeck’s approach to religion. My 
burden is to identify implicit features in the assumptions which are relevant or useful 
for resisting the tendency to situate religious language either in a metaphysical 
analysis concerned about objective truth-claims and exact definitions about divine 
reality, or in a phenomenological description of religious experience. The former, i.e. 
the tendency to regard language as competent to convey objective and complete 
accounts of the divine, is that which my own thesis seeks to disavow.  
I start by reaffirming a point made earlier that in each of the theories of religion 
and doctrine discussed by Lindbeck, a backdrop of a linguistic practice is 
presupposed. That is, each is premised on a particular theory of the role of language. 
The reader will recall the correlation between all three theories with their respective 
types of language, namely, the ‘cognitive-propositional,’ the ‘experiential-
expressive,’ and the ‘cultural-linguistic’. That said, I should highlight the fact that 
Lindbeck’s own ‘cultural-linguistic’ model is not only correlated to a theory of 
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language, it is largely driven by language as its central analogy. This analogy has been 
useful for him in several ways, not least in providing ‘the conceptual resources that 
underpin interpretation.’152 That Lindbeck’s ideas and proposals have essentially an 
analogical character is thus not to be gainsaid or missed, and it is good that this 
observation be held in mind. For one of the temptations the general reader of 
Lindbeck is likely to succumb to is the failure to attend to the ‘principle of analogy.’ 
In all analogies, the issue is not one of arriving at complete adequacy of description 
or discourse, but rather an approximation of truth. By their very nature, analogies are 
limited since what they are principally concerned to or can do is make comparison 
between an object or idea with some other thing that is familiar but different from 
it. Their force depends on how they identify and illuminate the similitudes of the 
objects or ideas being compared (say, religion and language), and on how effectively 
these are brought to bear on the argument at hand. As such, they are somewhat 
constricted in compass and are even prone to selectivity with respect to the 
presenting data. All this with regard to analogies is of course well known, even 
Kelsey’s caution about ‘the danger of relying on them beyond their capacity to 
illumine.’153 We should thus not be surprised that Lindbeck’s use of the language 
analogy in proposing the ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory has evoked the criticism that his 
project is riddled with certain obscurities. To give just one example, there is the 
negative comment that some ‘other aspects of the lives of religious communities may 
have been obscured by this central analogy.’154 What should really surprise us are 
criticisms of the sort that call into question one or another aspect of the analogies in 
themselves.  
The use of linguistic analogy by Lindbeck in driving his interpretation of religion, 
as well as the emphasis on language in the development of his theological 
perspective, are in my view, generally apt and constructive. For starters, the linguistic 
outlook on the religious phenomenon is thus properly raised to the fore. This 
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contrasts with the trend prevalent within the field of the social sciences to 
understand religion only or mainly as a cultural phenomenon. Referring to his own 
theory with its distinct roots on the cultural and linguistic sides, Lindbeck observes 
that ‘it is only rarely and recently that it has become a programmatic approach to the 
study of religion.’155 Among theologians, the awareness of language and its place in 
religious life is not altogether novel but their interest has been principally concerned 
with the problematic of language use in expressing God, namely, human language’s 
adequacy or inadequacy to do that. By adding ‘linguistic’ to the term, Lindbeck is thus 
making the point that we cannot overlook the dimension of meaning in social 
interchanges, concerned as we otherwise are with discerning the dynamics of social 
structures or individual psyches operating on the cultural level in religion. In short, 
religion is ‘a comprehensive interpretive medium’ bestowed with its own guiding 
logic and grammar. An important footnote in the first chapter of ND reveals 
Lindbeck’s design, ‘It is this relatively greater emphasis on the internal logic or 
grammar of religions which differentiates what I am calling “cultural-linguistic” 
approaches to religion from more one-sidedly cultural ones.’156 
We may thus justifiably state that most of the assumptions underlying the 
development of Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory have arisen from his sensitivity 
to recent shifts in the theories of religion.157 The assumption I am about to introduce 
is certainly one of them. In his foreword to ND, Lindbeck refers to a view espoused 
by philosophers of science that in the practice of empirical and objective disciplines 
such as physics and chemistry, all observation terms and all observation sentences 
are ‘theory-laden’—that is to say, the facts pertaining to these are alterable according 
to the adoption of a particular theory.158 Somewhat analogously, within a religion or 
among religions, the same difficulty of accounting for differences obtains—perhaps 
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even more forcefully—with each of the theories on religion and doctrine subscribing 
to a particular view of what is relevant evidence for or against the adequacy of its 
own perspective. ‘There is,’ he concedes, ‘no higher neutral standpoint from which 
to adjudicate their competing perceptions of what is factual and/or anomalous. 
Comprehensive outlooks on religion, not to mention religions themselves, are not 
susceptible to decisive confirmation or disconfirmation.’159 Now for a long time, 
philosophers and even theologians have made much of this same notion that there 
is no higher, neutral or impartial ground for adjudicating differences and variances of 
opinion between religious systems or schools of thought. Richard Rorty who has 
asserted both the ubiquity and contingency of language, has argued that ‘there is no 
standpoint outside the particular historically conditioned and temporary vocabulary 
we are presently using from which to judge this vocabulary.’160 For the textualist Don 
Cupitt, language is, as it were, ‘able to explain itself entirely in terms of itself,’ and so 
there is ‘no need to go outside language.’161 Indeed, ‘there is no eternal and impartial 
standpoint’ from which we can assess the various perspectives that we find ourselves 
exploring.162 Many other known voices have joined in to sing the same refrain that 
language has no outside, that there is no escape from it. On his part, Lindbeck is 
probably more motivated by a conciliatory desire to demonstrate that while each 
religion as an interpretative medium can develop its own corpus of beliefs and 
dogmas, and even establish its own canons of justification, there can be no basis for 
asserting the truth of such beliefs and dogmas against other competing claims.163 The 
sheer incommensurability between religions simply rules out any basis for doing that. 
Admittedly, the way I have put matters thus far may suggest that the issue of 
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relativism does not arise, or that it can be conveniently put to one side. The case is 
quite otherwise: Lindbeck has had his worries over it. For example, he concedes that 
his ‘intratextuality seems wholly relativistic: it turns religions, so one can argue, into 
self-enclosed and incommensurable intellectual ghettoes.’164 He further adds, ‘If 
there are no universal or foundational structures and standards of judgment by which 
one can decide between different religious and nonreligious options, the choice of 
any one of them becomes, it would seem, purely irrational, a matter of arbitrary 
whim or blind faith.’165 We ask, does Lindbeck’s ‘cultural–linguistic’ account offer any 
way to overcome relativism? The plain answer, we have seen, is there is no direct or 
quick way to judge the truth of religious statements. If we have understood Lindbeck 
correctly, his model disavows the approach to truth as the preserve of atomistic, 
independent and individual knowers in favour of a return to a sense of religion as a 
‘form of life’ bound up with the tangible practices of a lived community. Analogous 
to the methods of testing scientific theories or views, ‘[c]onfirmation or 
disconfirmation occurs through an accumulation of successes or failures in making 
practically and cognitively coherent sense of relevant data.’166 The process of 
adjudication will naturally take time; and while it will ‘provide warrants for taking 
reasonableness in religion seriously’—that is, ‘religious claims nevertheless can be 
tested and argued about in various ways’—the different perspectives will not be 
decided on the basis of reason alone.167 If it seems we are being put in a bind, the 
solution on offer is not a return to some foundationalist strategies of uncovering 
universal principles or structures, but an acceptance of a ‘tradition-guided’ method 
of comparative assessment of rival views suggested by Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 
1929).168 For the truth of a religion, on the ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory, is not just an 
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objective proposition or an abstraction to be believed but a reality bound up with the 
traditions, practices and conventions of a believing community identified with that 
religion. Ironically, such a characterisation certainly tells more about the truth of that 
religion than ostensibly abstract truth-claims ever could.  
Lindbeck’s creative employment of the language analogy in his approach to 
religion is, I suggest, predicated upon the premise that human persons are linguistic 
and textually constructed, as is religion itself. While we have said that we are 
embedded in language; this is only partially the case, for the converse is not yet 
considered, namely that language is in us too. On this account, language is like a 
Kantian a priori, in the sense that our whole sense of the world—of what is the case—
is shaped and formed by the socially-constructed discourses in which we are engaged 
and located. Simply put, having a language is a prerequisite for the possibility of 
experience, religious or otherwise. An oft-repeated claim made by Lindbeck has been 
that while experience occurs within the signs and symbols of language, it is the 
former that is shaped, moulded and constituted by the latter.169 Recall his famous 
contention, ‘There are numberless thoughts we cannot think, sentiments we cannot 
have, and realities we cannot perceive unless we learn to use the appropriate symbol 
systems.’170 This stress on language as making possible inner thoughts, sentiments, 
the description of realities and even the formulation of beliefs is a welcome 
departure from the traditional thinking that language is merely a tool or instrument 
for ‘expression’ and a derivative one at that. How then does all of this relate to the 
external and objective reality, assuming that it is there, and is itself not a linguistic 
construct? I have added the qualifier ‘assuming that it is there’ because this external 
and objective reality is these days commonly not assumed or is considered 
hypothetical by some anti-realist thinkers. In point of fact, the existence of an 
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external and objective reality or simply ‘what is the case’ is not denied, except by 
those who subscribe to an extreme form of anti-realism. Actually, it is already a very 
difficult thing to convince oneself or others that nothing exists out there, let alone 
deny that the world—yes, even the world-in-itself—exists. For there seems to be ‘a 
certain undeniable givenness to the universe’ or what is objectively out there.171 In 
this connection, these words from Gerard Loughlin are most apposite, ‘But one of the 
things that we know in language is that there are things outside language.’172  It 
follows that the affirmation by the Christian or the theist of the reality of God is one 
that can be plausibly made. However, in light of our present discussion about our 
linguisticity, we would want to do so while allowing that such an affirmation can take 
place only within language, or better, within a story. We might even insist that what 
we know is known only in and through language. Two theological payoffs for such a 
move may be briefly noted. In the first place, we are led to a reverent appreciation 
that the objectivity of the divine is not that of a static, fixed and perhaps impersonal 
reality. It is not a sort of ‘Thing-in-itself’ or a ‘fact’ existing in or outside the universe. 
Rather, the divine reality is perceived and experienced as it comes to us through the 
story of the gospel, as God has so ordained. Secondly, the claim that the divine 
objectivity is experienced via language, that it is co-temporal with our linguistically 
constructed reality, entails that we preserve the distinctiveness of Christian (or 
religious) discourse, avoiding the pitfalls of linguistic practices which tends towards 
absolutism or idolatry on the one pole, and expressivism or sentimentalism on the 
other.  
As a final note, I would like to consider the concept of ‘form of life’ which has 
played a critical role in Lindbeck’s methodology. One of his criticisms of the churches 
is that they have become more concerned that church members ‘embark on their 
own individual quests for symbols of transcendence’, than that they themselves 
become ‘communities that socialise their members into coherent and 
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comprehensive religious outlooks and forms of life.'173 In his book, the ‘cognitive-
propositional’ and the ‘experiential-expressive’ models are deemed weak for not 
emphasising the importance of practices of religious communities. These models 
seem to have failed to appreciate religion as a ‘form of life.’ In contrast, Lindbeck 
himself has set great store by the concept of ‘form of life’. In his ‘cultural-linguistic’ 
model, religion is conceived as akin to ‘languages together with their correlative 
forms of life.’174 From his dense articulation in connection with our present concern 
two further inferences may be discerned. Firstly, he privileges the performance or 
practice of a community against believing or profession of faith. Given that ‘a religion 
is essentially bound up with the communal form of its practices,’175 one becomes 
religious by interiorising a set of skills by practice and training. Secondly, he regards 
religious truth or falsity as dependent on the success or failure of a community 
internalising its religion as a form of life. To reinforce this view, Lindbeck argues that 
the belief that Christ’s Lordship is an objective fact must still be attested by believers 
actually doing something about it, namely, to commit themselves to a way of life.176 
The positions we have noted are among the stock-in-trade of philosophers of 
language who have insisted that the question of meaning or truth cannot be decided 
or settled without considering the social practices within which language and 
justification make sense. This is another way of saying that the meaning of a 
proposition or statement is not simply arrived at by looking or defining at its 
constituent words or by trying to relate it to some possible state or states of affairs. 
The great service of a concept like ‘form of life’ is in showing the language user that 
the meaning of propositions is not some ‘object’ or ‘thing’ clothed in words, but 
rather it is linked to the actions or activities in which those propositions are used by 
people.  
In sum, we may say Lindbeck is right as far as he goes, leaving us with useful 
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lessons and tools for understanding doctrine. The expression of doctrine is of course 





Conclusions: Reordering How We See Language 
 
The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have 
the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us 
as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance 
of our language.1 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
In this study, I have been concerned to advance the thesis that the language we use 
to talk about God can be fact-stating or cognitive, but that it cannot be pressed to 
yield a complete and exact description of the reality of God. The fact that words in 
themselves are often ambiguous and never completely transparent in the way they 
carry their meaning is obviously central here. But the root of the problem stems from 
the claim that God’s way of being is utterly different from human being or any other 
mode of being present in this world, to the extent that he is beyond human 
discernment. Moreover, God and language appear to be incommensurable and there 
seems to be no common ground or point of overlap between them.2 To borrow an 
expression by Aquinas, even the ‘names’ we use to signify God or predicate his 
substance ‘fall short of a full representation of him.’3  
As explained in my introductory chapter, it is precisely because of such difficulties 
that many religious people have found themselves wedged between two poles. One 
tendency is to regard religious statements as having no factual content, or as only 
amounting to the expression of moral or ethical intentions or exhortations. The other 
is the tendency to assume that words are perfectly fitted to render the divine 
completely intelligible and to give believers precise explanations. These two 
tendencies are known, respectively, to engender scepticism and absolutism. What 
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my project hopes to inspire is a via media—something in the order of a non-
objectifying form of religious language, the use made of which honours 
transcendence and caters for the need for self-expression.   
In the preceding chapters, our consideration of the various cluster of issues 
concerning language—its phenomenon and ‘discovery,’ its problematic nature, the 
historical approaches to its employment, and so on— as well our exploration of the 
leading ideas in Wittgenstein and Lindbeck have provided a fund for constructing a 
defence for our central claim. In what follows, I shall attempt to pull the different 
threads together, examining the key principles and drawing some inferences—an 
exercise which, it is hoped, might move us further forward in the direction of ‘how to 
avoid not speaking of God.’4 This task, I anticipate, will not be a tidy one; inevitably, 
it will also at times appear a little repetitive as material from earlier chapters is 
reviewed. 
Distinguishing between ‘Sign’ and ‘Thing’ 
In Chapter 1, we offered a brief sketch of how language came to be ‘discovered’. We 
observed that the early Greek thinkers regarded language as an instrument or tool in 
the service of communicating and distinguishing thoughts. As such, it was structured 
in such a way that a strict separation between ‘sign’ (signum) and ‘thing’ (res) was 
always maintained, even as the etymological relations between words and what 
words mean were explored.5 I believe Socrates’ widely-known attempts at defining 
concepts like ‘justice,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘good’ stem from this interest in an analytic 
understanding of words and their meanings. As for Plato, language is a clear reflection 
of what exists in reality, with words mirroring the ‘furniture’ of the universe, which is 
to say forms, concepts or ideas. We note, however, that in his linguistic schema, the 
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possibility of any sort of ‘essential’ relation between word and thing is always ruled 
out since worldly reality will always fall short of the perfect ideal reality or form. This 
basic approach to language adopted by these early Greek thinkers has been the 
dominant paradigm ever since; it has certainly had a significant influence on Christian 
thought regarding language. Not surprisingly, throughout the history of Christianity, 
long and bitter disputes had been fought over what words actually mean or 
represent. The celebrated Arian controversy in the third century over whether Jesus 
Christ is the same as God— or, put in theological language, whether the Son is of one 
substance (homoousios) with the Father or is he of a similar substance (homoiousios) 
with the Father—is a case in point.6 In my view, this and other important 
controversies that helped shape and define Christian orthodoxy may not have arisen 
in such an acute form if the Christian religion in its wrestling with language had made 
a distinction between sign and thing. The fact is that the two notions should always 
be distinguished because they do differ from one another, not least, in how they 
function. A sign, like an indicator, points beyond itself to what is signified, whereas a 
thing is a kind of stopping point, an end-in-itself. An example may help to make the 
distinction clear: the word ‘t-r-e-e’ is a sign that one uses to point or refer to the thing 
that grows tall and green out there.7 Any collapse of sign and thing into one 
indistinguishable whole, were that to happen, would probably result in indifference 
or even obliviousness on the part of the church fathers with regard to the precise 
distinctions between the varieties of language structure, function and meaning. 
Weighing in on this aspect of language, Pannenberg writes, 
It is thus essential to the function of the sign that we should distinguish 
them. We must not equate the thing with the sign in its weakness. Only 
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by this distinction can the thing signified be, in a certain sense, present by 
way of the sign.8 
In light of our awareness of how words and meaning are intricately connected, I 
submit that in our approach to the problem of religious language we continue to 
distinguish between sign and thing.9 To state the obvious, the notion of God’s radical 
otherness requires the disavowal of any conflation of the two entities. Words we use 
to talk about God are distinct from the reality of God himself. Moreover, and in the 
context of our present discussion, we believe the only way we can have access to the 
eternal and ultimate thing (res) is through the proper mediation of sign or signs 
(signa). Res per signa discuntur: ‘things are learnt about through signs,’ as St 
Augustine famously insists.10 Even so, that must not be taken to imply that signs can 
signify or represent fully. Nor should they be expected to render complete and exact 
descriptions. Here I recall Wittgenstein’s observation that the concepts of 
understanding, meaning and thinking are concepts with ‘blurred edges’.11 The 
foregoing remarks have an obvious link to the claims of my thesis: they are an 
invitation to theology to undertake a careful analysis and form an accurate estimate 
of its own language. 
Eclecticism 
In the same chapter (Chapter 1), the three traditional responses to the problem of 
religious language were also touched upon, namely the via negativa or the ‘apophatic 
way’, the doctrine of analogy of Aquinas, and the univocal way of Duns Scotus. 
Though these approaches are creative and ingenious, none has won universal 
acceptance by the religious or philosophical communities in either the past or the 
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present. The reason is not hard to acertain: there are insurmountable difficulties—
indeed, ‘fatal flaws’, according to Stiver12—in each one of them. Yet, we may still 
defend them as being necessary for God-talk since the reality of God is beyond all 
conceptual determination. Gallantly, each of them seeks to give expression to the 
principle that though the transcendent God resists and is beyond language, some way 
must be found to express him in words, however inadequately. Not to attempt to 
find a way to do that is to be content with either silence—which, as I have argued, 
must entail the end of theology and proclamation of the faith—or the embrace of 
agnosticism. My suggestion is that instead of sticking to any single-track way of 
speaking of God, we apply an eclectic approach by drawing from and mixing the 
various traditional ways, even stretching language beyond its normal usage while 
being fully aware of the obscurities and difficulties involved. It is unwise to limit our 
attention to one or two of the traditional ways; even more so to generalise and insist 
that only one of them is the correct pattern. As we have noted, the via negativa, the 
doctrine of analogy, and the univocal way, and even methods not previously 
discussed in our study (for example, Origen’s allegorical interpretation of Scripture or 
Bultmann’s demythologizing approach) have failed in one way or another to offer a 
wholly adequate solution to the problem of religious language. My proposal to pick 
and apply elements which best suit the genre and intention of the applicable text or 
context may well provide a way forward. What label we use to describe our methods 
or approaches is not important. What we must do, having learned from Wittgenstein, 
is not to think that language always functions in one, standard way.13  
Wittgenstein’s foregoing reminder serves to underscore the indispensability of 
language. ‘It is in language that it's all done.’14 Yet, the repertoire of words available 
to us—for the most part at least—are drawn from the everyday and carry the same 
range of meanings. As such, they do not have any special status. In any encounter 
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with a religious text, one is bound to become quickly aware that the majority of the 
words used in it are not exclusive to religion, being, in fact, shared with and among 
other types of discourse. Even with terms which are decidedly religious, they are not 
viewed to have come pre-packaged with a priori meaning.15 Yet, we are not claiming 
that terms used in religion and ordinary life have exactly the same meanings at all 
times. Not infrequently, words applied for the purpose of speaking of God are used 
in ways which differ from their use in an ordinary context. Take the example of ‘The 
Lord hears the prayer of the righteous.’ Surely we are not meant to think of God as 
having ears like ours, spreading out to catch every word the righteous utters. But in 
most cases, where a word is used in both religious and secular contexts, its primary 
meaning is that which was first established in ordinary usage, though it retains a 
peculiar meaning and outlook when used in religion. In this light, I make the claim 
that although words are good enough to disclose aspects of the divine reality, they 
are not so specifiable as to render precise definitions and complete explanations.   
The ‘Linguistic Turn’ 
The so-called ‘linguistic turn’ of the last century ushered in a significant revolution in 
our thinking about language. With its dawn, every problem of philosophy is ‘turned’ 
into a problem about language, or to be more precise, into a problem dependent 
upon issues that have to do with language. ‘Most questions and propositions of the 
philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our 
language,’16 the early Wittgenstein tells us. The Kantian emphasis on the knowing 
subject with its maxim that one must first understand knowing before one can be 
confident about what one knows is not so much abandoned as it is by-passed by a 
more legitimate consideration, namely, that to understand knowing one must first 
deal with the language in which it is expressed. In other words, we can no longer be 
concerned with only questions about what reality is or how reality can be known, but 
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with a more basic question, namely, what do we mean by what we say in the 
assumptions, claims and even conclusions we make or draw.  
In religious discourse and deliberations, the philosophical shift from a concern 
about questions of validity or truth to a concern with meaning will have the welcome 
effect of encouraging more clarification than argument. Misunderstandings, 
disagreements or confusions over meaning should prompt open discussions rather 
than fights. Regardless of whether the ‘linguistic turn’ is thought to have run its 
course or not,17 it would still be an essential move to start any reflective thought not 
with the question of truth but by going much further back—with language and 
meaning.  
‘Meaning as Use’  
Meaning, as we have noted in Chapter 2, is a question around which most of 
Wittgenstein’s works revolved. Departing from common practice, Wittgenstein goes 
beyond the ostensive definition of the word ‘meaning’ to the question of its 
implications for connecting thought, language and the world. What concerns him, we 
will recall, is not the foundational or logical form of meaning—certainly not what one 
can easily learn from the dictionary or from one’s parents or school teacher—but 
what language can be and do when one uses it. Wittgenstein’s opposition to the illicit 
use of the word ‘meaning’ to signify that which ‘corresponds’ to a word, his 
catchphrase that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’, and his advice not 
to confuse ‘to mean it’ with ‘to think of it’, have attained their status as the defining 
marks of his renewed position on meaning.18  
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, the notion of ‘meaning as use’ must not be 
interpreted as an identification of ‘meaning’ with ‘use’. In the appeal to ‘use’, we are 
directed to ‘look to see’ not just language per se but, to borrow a phrase, what ‘goes 
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in language at work.’19 The view that obtains is one of language being used for 
something, and that such use is always within a given context of human behaviour. 
Such ‘uses’ are multifarious: giving or obeying orders or instructions, reporting an 
event, pronouncing blessings upon friends, praying, and so forth.20 Meaning (or 
sense, if you like) is not some sort of an entity or thing to be sought after with a view 
to logical analysis or empirical investigation; rather, meaning is in the application 
made of the words and sentences by human persons. To see meaning in the manner 
proposed is bound to alter how we look at language. For one, we shall be relieved of 
our mental ‘cramps’ in any attempt to locate a ‘single picture or theory of language’ 
or to make claims as to what the essence of language is. It is not that the classic 
correlation between ‘word’ and ‘thing’ no longer holds, but that it is inadequate as 
an explanation for meaning. The lone, atomic word isolated from its larger context is 
often taken to be the primary bearer of meaning—but in most cases, it is not. Thus, 
to determine what a statement or proposition means, one must go beyond the neat 
order in language as well as the parts that constitute it. The exhortation to look at 
use may well open up a new vista of understanding for the language users—that the 
meaning of a word may change according to how it is used. This is especially relevant 
in the case of religious use of language because, as we have reiterated, many of the 
terms associated with religion have a variety of meanings attached to them.  
Another (and perhaps more significant) feature about language arising from the 
principle of use may be noted. Language is used for something and its employment 
is towards some end. It is spoken within a community of practice concerned with 
some telos, from trying to do any of the things mentioned by Wittgenstein, to 
engaging in theoretical reflection like God-talk. In a sense then, we can speak of 
language and meaning being larger than words. Once again, we shall be led to alter 
how we look at language: if formerly our intelligence has been under a spell of 
‘bewitchment… by means of language’21 and our assumption has been that language 
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is only an abstract and a priori thing separated from human persons, we may begin 
to think differently.  
These remarks about meaning have a direct bearing on my thesis. In the first 
place, when I contend that religious language cannot give a complete description or 
explanation of the divine reality, I am directing us away from ‘the idea that using a 
sentence involves imaging something for every word.’22 I am convinced that meaning 
is more than reference: words do more than refer or point to things or objects. Hence, 
to properly understand the language of religion, we must consider its use—that is, 
attend to its context and to how it relates to its intended purpose. To repeat a point 
made earlier, one must cease to think of religious words or terms as if they are some 
kinds of mental activity, or as if there is only one proper meaning applicable to each 
of them.  
‘Language-Games’ 
Wittgenstein’s elaboration of the notions of ‘language-games’ (Sprachspiel) and 
‘form of life’ (Lebensform) has given us a good general guide as to what he means by 
them, though there is still some ambiguity in the way they are presented. The 
numerous, simple ‘language-games’ he cites reveal the workings of language and why 
it functions the way it does. A language-game, we are led to infer, is the practical 
context in which words and linguistic exchange make sense. As a reminder that 
language is indeterminate and not fixed, Wittgenstein tells us that there is a 
multiplicity of language-games. The term ‘form of life’ similarly evokes the idea of 
language and forms of human discourse being embedded in life, within its cultural, 
social and historical settings.  
The application to religious discourse is as follows. We are to see language as 
something immensely down-to-earth, that it is not merely concerned with making 
assertions, or stating of propositional truth claims. Nor, as we have seen, is language 
concerned merely to point or refer to things.  If ‘language-games’ are bound up with 
                                                     




the activities and exigencies of human existence, then ‘the locus of meaning is not 
the line that connects the dots of a word to a thing; rather, the locus of meaning is 
an entire web of communal practice and conventions.’23 To speak of meaning in 
terms of community practice and conventions is to highlight two controversial but 
related aspects about language. First, meaning is contingent rather than necessary: it 
is not already decreed or determined by God. Secondly and in consequence, meaning 
is the result of agreement reached or arrived at by the community of language users. 
‘Meaning,’ to borrow Gerard Loughlin’s useful presentation, ‘is not something other 
than signs, to which signs are somehow stuck, so that I know what the sign “cat” 
means because it has been stuck onto cats, or what “idea” means because it has been 
stuck onto ideas. I know what “cat” means because it is different from “hat” and 
“mat” and from other words of the lexicon… These strings of signs have meaning 
because I know how to use them to do things within my language community. I can 
tell someone to get the cat off the mat.’24 Now this idea that the meaningfulness and 
intelligibility of sentences and statements is related to and even determined by 
convention is no new thing: it was affirmed by Aristotle who recognised the effects 
of linguistic structure(s) and rules of usage on language.25 From such a point of view, 
language is understood as a deeply social phenomenon; it ‘cannot be understood 
purely as something oral’, to use Steven Knowles’ expression. In this connection, 
Knowles also makes an interesting point: ‘Things unsaid must be taken into 
consideration, and that which is unsaid is understood within its context.’26 He further 
observes, ‘[w]hen one learns a language it is through the interaction and participation 
within that particular community, which is immersed in a particular culture that one 
understands and learns about.’27 We are to see language as something we use in a 
great variety of ways and for all sorts of ends. It is also to be likened to an ancient city 
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with its maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and so forth.28 This 
important metaphor is suggestive of the complicated relations between the different 
language-games as they interface with each other. Any attempt to reduce their 
relations to a simple formula will go awry.29 A case in point is the disastrous attempt 
by the logical positivists to relate and draw tight parallels between their idea of 
science and their idea of religious faith. 
Language & Reference 
We have also seen how Wittgenstein came to modify his earlier views on the relation 
between language and reality. In PI, he offered a radical critique of ‘referentialism’ 
(or ‘representationalism’), a view of language which he had once espoused.  Whereas 
language has had a uniform structure and thus relates in a single way to the world,30 
according to his mature philosophical phase, it no longer has; and whereas meaning 
has been traditionally understood as determinate and precisely demarcated,31 
Wittgenstein’s new position on meaning denies and rejects such an understanding. 
Some philosophers of religion have read him here as denying objective reality—that 
there is nothing outside language—and, as also the ruling out of ‘the possibility of 
language about God being representational or referential in a realist sense.’32 This is, 
in my view, a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein, arising from a failure to appreciate 
that his concern is with the meaning of language rather than with its reference. 
Consider the following remarks in which he distinguishes between existence of 
something in reality and the existence of the same, as part of the language in use: 
‘I couldn't think that something is red if red didn't exist.’ What that 
proposition really means is the image of something red, or the existence 
of a red sample as part of our language.33 
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Another of his remarks, one that was made in his pre-Tractarian phase, reveals the 
clarity of his mind concerning the distinction between a proposition and its reference: 
There must be something in the proposition that is identical with its 
reference, but the proposition cannot be identical with its reference, and 
so there must be something in it that is not identical with its reference.34  
I have belaboured the matter in question because Wittgenstein’s subsequent 
rejection of the ‘picture’ or ‘referential’ theory of language is sometimes taken to the 
extreme—the refusal to recognise that understanding in any kind of human discourse 
or exchange is ‘at root referentialist.’35 Significantly, the scenario of the builders 
narrated by Wittgenstein in PI to demonstrate the inadequacy of the referentialist 
theory also serves to indicate that reference or correlation between words and 
objects actually makes some degree of understanding between the characters in the 
story possible, resulting in the subordinate worker acting in the desired way. ‘While 
understanding might sometimes involve more than reference, it seems to always 
involve at least reference as its basis.’36  Though by itself not a sufficient warrant for 
justifying that language about God is representational or referential, the fact is that 
when adherents of a religion use language to speak about God they are taking God 
to be the object of their discourse. In remarking that ‘God is real to me’ or something 
similar, the adherents are referring to an external reality, even if we judge their claim 
to be merely subjective. The habit of using language to refer to God or things in the 
world is one that is deeply ingrained in our being. It therefore behoves us to give due 
consideration to the referentialist element present in religious propositions or 
expressions, if we are to avoid doing violence to the integrity of religious language 
itself. Perhaps, we can now understand why Wittgenstein’s criticism of referential 
language is limited to only pointing out its inadequacy as a linguistic system for every 
situation in which language functions.  
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What is more worrying to me is a certain obsession to look at language strictly 
and only through a ‘representational-coloured’ lens. For one thing, a resolute focus 
on words or statements being representations of other things or states of affairs is 
likely to throw one off course perhaps into missing the whole story about the content 
of language. For understanding a discourse is not just a matter of associating words 
or statements with objects; one need to pay attention to how language operates in 
everyday life. To really understand and grasp the whole story one need to be a 
‘player’ within a language-game because meaning, as we have learned, is 
conventional. The representationalist position, however, seems to ride roughshod 
over the vital role which convention plays in our speaking, listening, reading, writing, 
and expression generally; it does so perhaps in the misplaced belief that we the 
language users are given language in order that we may merely comment on the 
world as spectators. Whereas Wittgenstein has held that language presupposes the 
human community and ‘the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form 
of life,’ those who espouse representationalism see no such connections. For them, 
language is a detached tool, closed off from the world and even from the very 
speakers and hearers themselves. If religious terms like repentance, forgiveness and 
salvation seem to be meaningless to people today, the reason may be because the 
Christian religion is no longer perceived to be the balm for the consciousness of moral 
guilt. A further worry is that under the representational or referential model of 
language, the relationship between language and reality is typically reduced to 
something like ‘a piecemeal correspondence between one thing (a word) and 
another thing (an object in the world).’37 When this happens, meaning itself is pushed 
to a point where it is treated almost by default as some kind of detached object or 
thing dressed in words that could be captured or caged for independent investigation 
and classification. Think, for example, of the difficulty in explaining the Trinity as 
comprising three ‘persons’. In a parallel development, words like ‘God’, ‘soul’, ‘mind’ 
                                                     




and the like, are similarly assumed as if they were things or substances, not unlike a 
myriad of other impersonal and concrete items in the world. This eventuality has 
been anticipated by Wittgenstein in a lecture in which he remarks, ‘One great trouble 
our language gets us into is that we take a substantive to stand for a thing or 
substance.’38 To be sure, the words in question are substantives but this does not 
mean that we are to take them as necessarily referring to things. Religious language 
is not exempt from the risk of being treated as a conceptual abstraction isolated from 
community or persons. The present discussion will have an important bearing on the 
questions of sense posed in our study with respect to language about God. We do 
right to go beyond explaining religious terms like ‘God’ and so forth in the manner of 
ostensive definition: to engage in that sort of activity would be as wrongheaded as 
trying to explain numerals or colours by pointing. We can of course expect, following 
Wittgenstein, that some quarters will still want to argue that the word ‘god’ means 
something like a human being and that he might have two or four arms; while 
someone may think that we cannot talk of God having arms—that all this God-talk is 
essentially about grammar.39  
Despite the shortcomings ascribed to representation, we have defended its place 
in the practice of religious discourse. It is pertinent that we have a clear conception 
of what we mean by the term, ‘to represent’. In his recent Gifford Lectures, Rowan 
Williams tells us that his use of the term ‘representation’ is meant ‘to draw attention 
to the interesting fact that we can claim to be speaking truthfully about many aspects 
of our environment without actually trying on every occasion to reproduce or imitate 
it.’40 His disavowal of representation as a strict sort of reproduction or imitation 
makes a good starting point because it sets the language user ‘free to recognise that 
language may be truthful even when it is not descriptive in the strict sense.’41 
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Representation, Williams elaborates, is ‘[n]ot simply the copying, imitating, or just 
registering of features, it presupposes, it seems, some notion of a characteristic form 
of action that can be activated in different media.’42 This notion of ‘form of action’ 
resonates with Wittgenstein’s overall proposal in which the use of language is seen 
as ‘part of an activity, or of a form of life.’43 The relevance of such a concept to our 
inquiry about religious language is tremendous, in that it can help move the 
discussion from abstraction to practical action concerning what one must do in 
response to religious truth claims.  
The Mystical 
In Chapter 4, we saw that the notion of the mystical is an issue which distanced 
Wittgenstein from the logical positivists. The latter had adopted a view of language 
that effectively ruled out metaphysics. Not so for Wittgenstein who recognised a 
mystical realm ‘in which the answers to questions are symmetrically combined—a 
priori—to form a self-contained system.’44 The questions he speaks of here are the 
important ones concerning life and death, values, ethics, religion and God. These are 
areas of knowledge which ‘must lie outside the world’,45 in the sense that assertions 
about them cannot be expressed as propositions of fact. But they can make 
themselves manifest. 
It may be appropriate here to recall the startling instruction by Wittgenstein 
that the propositions he had expounded and developed in his philosophy should be 
recognised as ‘nonsensical’, or more precisely ‘as steps’ of a ladder which one can 
use and later dispose of. I take that instruction as suggestive of the provisional nature 
of his whole philosophy. He is not saying that philosophising is pointless but that it is 
only a preamble to ‘see[-ing] the world aright.’46 What is being underscored in no 
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uncertain terms is that the whole point of his philosophy lies in pointing his readers 
to the sphere of the mystical. By his positing of the mystical—as that which escapes 
description by the use of language—Wittgenstein brings his ontology to completion. 
In the face of the mystical, Wittgenstein had famously urged that we keep silence. 
It is important that we read his plea correctly. It is not a silence consequent, to borrow 
a phrase, upon a ‘positivistic disdain of the non-empirical.’47 Rather, the silence 
enjoined by Wittgenstein is inspired by his belief that to talk about the mystical which 
transcends human cognition is to trivialise it. For admittedly, ‘propositions can 
express nothing higher.’48 Nor is he, as far as we read him right, urging or implying a 
renunciation of language or religious discourse. For surely Wittgenstein cannot be 
unaware that language is indispensable and is all that we have. Again, what he is 
concerned to do is remind us of the ‘higher’ function of language to direct our gaze 
towards the mystical in hopes that we will be ushered into and awed by its mysterious 
and sustaining presence.  
Several implications for the user of religious language at once emerge. The first is 
that one must recognise that with the mystical as the object of religious language, 
one can never presume to be able to achieve completion or precise definition in 
words. Indeed, strictly speaking, the mystical or ‘the transcendental,’ to employ 
Wittgenstein’s terminology, resists even being put into words; it lies beyond and 
‘outside’ language. There is, as most believers are agreed, a qualitative difference 
between the mystical (God) and humankind so that the divine reality is beyond 
understanding, dwelling in inaccessible light. Moreover, there are epistemological-
semantic limits to what we can say about God. Donald Hudson explains the applicable 
logic for us: ‘the transcendental is the structure of language, and the reason why it 
cannot be put into words is the impossibility of putting into language that which must 
be in it already for it to be language.’49 Less technically put, and as a general rule, 
anything which is necessary for language to be language cannot itself be put into the 
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words of language. To illustrate this, think of an artist who can paint a picture of 
anything at all except a picture of his own particular way of painting.50 So, any move 
on the part of religion towards a complete hold upon the content and meaning of 
transcendental reality is bound to founder. 
The second implication concerns Wittgenstein’s point that the mystical shows 
itself. It is one thing to say that the mystical cannot be expressed; it is altogether 
another to claim that it shows itself. How does the showing work? Drawing a parallel 
to the language of poetry with its capacity for letting the unutterable be uttered, 
Keightley proposes that in a similar manner the mystical shows itself through the 
medium of language of religion.51 This is certainly an attractive thought. Religious 
language can stand on its own and will not require to be supplemented by any other 
type of discourse. If so, talk about God need not be reduced to anything other than 
itself, though one should be mindful that the meaning of what one says in words will 
be more effectively disclosed if backed by appropriate behaviour and action on one’s 
part. 
This leads us to the third implication for religious language that stems from 
Wittgenstein’s insight: the whole issue of silence. As noted above, keeping silent is 
the appropriate way to respond to the mystical. For centuries, mystics have 
withdrawn themselves to spend extended periods in silent contemplation, and the 
practice of apophatic theology continues to be popular. Wittgenstein, in virtue of his 
plea to remain silent and his living up to the implications of his own teaching to do 
what could not be said but could be shown is thus justly deserving of another 
honour—being the champion of what has been favourably termed a ‘wordless 
faith’.52 But for the reflective user of religious language, the question as to the proper 
relationship between silence and articulate language remains yet unanswered. At 
first glance, they seem to be total opposites. Can silence even be ‘expressed’ in 
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language? Indeed, without the means of language silence would not exist at all 
because no one will know what it is. To keep silence when faced with the mystical 
however will require ‘a continuous effort of looking carefully at “ordinary” reality’ if 
one is to enter into an experience of that reality.53 The mystical does not suddenly 
dawn on one, as in a flash. Paradoxically, it is only by means of language that silence 
is created, and by our inventing new language-games that we can hope to grasp or 
better, be grasped by the mystical.  
The Question of Truth  
Even though the present study is concerned with the understanding and use of 
language in talking about God, I concede that the question of truth cannot be ducked 
or sidestepped. Truth, as was noted in Chapter 5, is what theology seeks and what 
theological reflections aim to deliver. Given the essential involvement of theology 
with and in language—theology needs and uses language to express ‘what is the 
case’—any conscious look at the latter will have to attend to considerations of what 
truth itself consists in, and how it is reached. It might be added that its intersections 
with theology as well as with other spheres of human endeavour underscore ‘the 
characteristic human instinct to regard truth as significant.’54  
The importance of understanding the notion and function of truth is 
uncontroversial, as is the view that truth and language are closely related. Not to stir 
up any controversy, I have indicated that the essential connection between the two 
lies in meaning. From a Wittgensteinian perspective (that meaning is constituted 
through use), the word ‘true’ is seen as a function within the activity of using 
language. Wittgenstein’s oft-quoted words spring to mind, ‘It is what human beings 
say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use.’55 If he is right, it 
would be simplistic to deal with questions about truth in religion by simply 
attempting to check for sufficient evidence to verify a doctrinal statement or claim. 
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To illustrate, how does one know what is admissible evidence for verifying a 
proposition such as ‘The devil tempted me to criticise the preacher’? The appropriate 
thing one can and must do is consider such factors as the overarching concepts of a 
particular religion and both the context and way in which the meaningfulness of such 
a claim is expressed and grasped by the language one uses. Peter Donovan is surely 
on the right lines when he insists,  
The finding of observations more or less fitting the words used, the 
discovery of patterns in the data suggesting something like what the ideas 
and images of the language convey, should be seen as the supporting of 
interpretations rather than the verifying of assertions and the proving 
true of claims. A well-supported interpretation is still open to 
amendment; unlike a true proposition it does not claim to have the whole 
truth or say the final word. In the highly disputed field of supernatural 
realities, which religions take themselves to deal with, even the best-
supported interpretations may still not count as a true description.56 
I must, however, clarify that I am not trying to confuse truth with its verification. That 
we verify religious assertions as well as, say, scientific ones in different ways and 
according to different canons is not in dispute. The word ‘true’ when predicated of 
propositions of religion or science or some other discipline remains unambiguous in 
every case. My intention in the foregoing discussion has been to make the point that 
the word ‘true’ has to do with language, not that it is to be variously interpreted. 
Wittgenstein makes a similar point when he remarks, ‘What looks as if it had to exist, 
is part of the language.’57 
In the same chapter (5), the reader will recall my repeated emphases that 
Wittgenstein and other philosophers like Rorty and Davidson, have not denied the 
existence of objective truth, or have they fought shy of affirming something as true. 
Instead, they have offered us a deflationary view of truth, a view which maintains 
that to ascribe truth to a proposition is the same as asserting the proposition itself.58 
Admittedly, for most of us, we have become accustomed to applying the words we 
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use in a statement (such as ‘the tomb is empty) as being ‘true’ or ‘false’ to  the objects 
expressed by such a statement. It seems we are stuck with a ‘correspondentist’ frame 
of mind, ever seeking as much as lieth in us to know the truth. This mindset is 
definitely not a misplaced one for it is almost required of us to want to know ‘what is 
really the case’. But given that divinity is transcendent, believers should stand ready 
to accept that objective truths about God will always come to them as incomplete, 
imprecise and provisional, and only by means of language. Yet, as I have previously 
defended, we are not giving relativism or scepticism a free run.  
Lindbeck’s Legacy 
In my evaluation of the cultural-linguistic approach to religion by Lindbeck and his 
appropriation of Wittgenstein’s insights (in Chapter 6), I paid tribute to his ingenuity 
in applying the analogue of language to religion. I shall not repeat the discussion here, 
except to mention one key point that is directly relevant to my thesis. This is the 
‘relatively greater emphasis on the internal logic or grammar of religion’59 that 
Lindbeck has urged upon us. The idea goes back to Wittgenstein’s famous statement: 
‘Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)’60 The 
analogue of grammar and its derivative rules proposed by Lindbeck has the merit of 
re-directing our whole approach toward religion—reversing how a religion is 
popularly construed as making ontological truth claims to it being construed in terms 
of how its language is structured and ordered. The thesis I am concerned to advance 
in this project urges the adoption of the same theological outlook, of locating the 
significant aspect of religion in the grammar that informs the way we reflect and do 
theology, rather than in the exactitude or precision of text.   
Some Concluding Remarks 
It remains for me to suggest a few potential directions of research which might be 
pursued in light of what I have presented. The first concerns theological 
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methodology. Having now a better understanding of the nature and functioning of 
language and having seen how many basic issues of theology are in its language, I 
would urge that more attention be devoted to an analysis of language. This is not to 
say that we are lacking in scholars of and research pertaining to language, but rather 
to express the view that there must be no let-up. There is also the need to engage 
with more current lines of thought on language-related issues. My own present 
research, I admit, would have benefited more if I had also engaged with the work of 
the structuralists and the post-structuralists. Had I more room, the study would also 
have benefited from further discussion of the challenge of relativism, as well as the 
debate on verification and falsification. Finally, I have only made passing reference to 
the realism/anti-realism divide. It would be useful to examine it as it pertains to the 
religious use of language. 
We have learned that religion ‘is not primarily an array of beliefs about the true 
and the good (though it may involve these)’61 but that it is also a ‘form of life’ in which 
believers must locate the religious concepts they hold. The whole matter of spiritual 
transformation and living a good or God-centred life is therefore an important one. 
For as I have said, we might come to have a better understanding of what we express 
about the divine reality if we are in tune with the transcendent by means of prayer 
and walking with him. Detailed investigation into how the issues surrounding 
language can be further explored to aid or augment the spirituality of believers would 
be very worthwhile.  
Let me now bring this whole study to a close by indicating once again that the 
approach to language advanced here does not rule out that words about God can be 
cognitive or fact-stating, only that they cannot be identified with a complete and 
precise description of the divine reality. Despite having ‘rough edges’—in that their 
meanings are not always transparent or strictly defined—religious words have a 
reliable function and are generally understandable. In that sense, God is not beyond 
                                                     




words. All that has been said to caution against the improper use of words is not to 
dissuade people from speaking about God. One specific outcome to be sought after, 
in addition to those we spoke of at the outset of our project, is that believers may 
have a greater sensitivity to the role of religious language. In this regard, St Paul (c. 
4 BCE—c. 62), the one who penned the most words in the New Testament, in terms 
of the number of letters attributed to him, has blazed the way for us when he reveals:  
For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know 
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